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The link between migration and the environment is not new. Environmental 
concerns have always influenced human mobility; people have always been mov-
ing either temporarily or permanently in response to environmental changes. How-
ever, the nature, the dynamics and the scale of environment-related migration have 
dramatically changed, in recent years, and there has been a growing recognition 
that environment induced migration is likely to become one of the key challenges 
of the 21st century, which must be addressed to ensure human security and sustain-
able development.  
This new attitude is due to the changing nature of environmental degradation. 
A number of global environmental problems, including climate change, destruction 
of rainforests, land degradation, loss of biodiversity, oceanic and riverine pollution, 
drought and natural disasters, is increasingly stressing the earth’s ecosystems and 
reducing the ability to provide services to human beings. Among those problems, 
climate change poses the most severe threats. The harmed equilibrium of all the 
world’s ecosystems is expected to have a growing impact on human environment, 
resulting in widespread socio-economic vulnerability. In this perspective, climate 
change adds new complexity to the relationship between environmental degrada-
tion and migration, a relationship which is already complex for several reasons. 
The first reason is the range of environmental phenomena that cause migration 
flows, which are induced both by sudden events, such as natural disasters, and by 
gradual processes of environmental change, but in different ways. To date, event-
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driven displacements have tended to be temporary; wherever possible affected pop-
ulations come back to their homes after the events and their consequences have 
ceased. Differently, gradual processes of environmental deterioration impact on the 
existing livelihood and socioeconomic fabric and may generate different types of 
migration: temporary and/or circular (for example, as a consequence of periods of 
drought), or permanent migration (due to sea level rise or desertification). As a 
consequence of these events and processes, affected persons may move internally 
or internationally. Current studies indicate that quite a large part of environment-
related displacements are taking place within national borders, at first; however, 
there are some indications of an increasing number of environmentally-induced mi-
grants across international borders. Although the exact ‘push and pull factors’ are 
still unclear, recent studies show how today’s Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
are tomorrow’s refugees, asylum seekers and migrants (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre, Global Report on Internal Displacement, 2016 and 2017). Fre-
quently, IDPs are people that simply have not yet crossed an international border; 
for example, around 55 per cent of the Afghan refugees and 85 per cent of the Syr-
ian refugees interviewed in Greece, in early 2016, reported that they had been IDPs 
before crossing the national border.  
Another issue that makes the relationship between migration and the environ-
ment not easy to outline is the difficulty of isolating environmental factors from 
other political, social and economic drivers of migration. In fact, environmental 
factors are usually associated with other social, economic and political factors. As 
regards environmental events, drivers such as governments’ policies and commu-
nities’ resilience to natural disaster contribute to the degree of vulnerability of ge-
ographical areas and of affected communities. Similarly, migration flows generated 
by gradual environmental degradation phenomena, at least at an early or interme-
diate stage, are usually associated with some pull factors, be it social or economic.  
Consequently, it is difficult to differentiate between forced and voluntary migra-
tion. Classifying environmental migration as forced may be relatively uncontrover-
sial in cases of a natural disaster. Similarly, we can say that, at the early and interme-
diate stages of environmental degradation processes, migration is more likely to be 
voluntary and to be used by the affected populations as an ‘adaptation strategy’. 
However, for the most part, the distinction is not clear-cut. There is a complex chain 
of causality between environmental change, loss of economic opportunities and mi-
gration. Furthermore, the decision to move has to be analyzed in the context of viable 
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alternatives. The ability to migrate is a function of both financial and social resources 
and the most vulnerable people will often not be in a position to migrate. 
Given the complexity of the links and interactions between environmental 
change and human mobility, current estimates of the number of people moving in 
response to environmental factors, either directly or indirectly, either within their 
countries or across borders, either permanently or temporarily, vary enormously. In 
this perspective, innovative approaches are being developed to study environmental 
migration and provide insights for informing policies (i.e., International Organiza-
tion for Migration, Global Migration Data Analysis Centre). Further, the complex-
ity of this phenomenon is reflected in the number of expressions used to describe 
it: “environmental refugees”, “climate change migrants”, “climate refugees”, 
“forced environmental migrants”, “environmentally displaced persons”, “disaster 
refugees”, “environmentally motivated migrants”. There are no internationally ac-
cepted definitions for persons moving for environmental reasons. Expressions in 
current use are descriptive terms; they have no legal basis and do not indicate a 
status that confers obligations on States.  
As a matter of fact, people induced to move for environmental reasons do not 
fall entirely within the categories provided by the existing international legal frame-
work and show the limitations of the current paradigm in which migration is largely 
framed. In several international fora, it is increasingly recognized that there are cer-
tain groups of people who move for environmental reasons and are in need of as-
sistance and who currently fall outside the scope of international protection. There 
is a growing acknowledgment that existing gaps need to be bridged. Actually, coun-
tries are left to define their own standards and their own interpretation of existing 
norms and human rights obligations, and they offer varying levels of protection, 
with the risk of engaging in a ‘race to the bottom’. 
Different initiatives are under ways and possible solutions are being discussed 
by the international community to protect the fundamental rights of people induced 
to move for environmental reasons. A wide and complex process is taking place, 
giving rise to a rich and fragmented practice.  
 
The rationale behind the volume on Migration and the Environment: Some Re-
flections on Current Legal Issues and Possible Ways Forward is to provide a com-
prehensive and critical review of the major outcomes, implications and achieve-
ments on the relevant questions of international law on international migration and 
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the environment. The ultimate objective of the volume is to foster the debate among 
experts, scholars and policy makers. To this end, the collected papers analyze from 
different perspectives the link between migration and the environment and the phe-
nomenon of environment-related migration, discuss the extent to which people 
whose movements are induced by environmental factors are protected under the 
existing international legal framework, investigate the main legal issues and nor-
mative gaps and analyze the solutions at stake.  
 
The volume does not aim at covering all the issues connected to the legal ques-
tions related to migration and environment. Nevertheless, we tried to offer to the 
readers a good selection of papers on the subject. 
The first five essays deal with some basic questions: how to deal with a phe-
nomenon relatively ‘new’ through existing legal rules? 
The possible inclusion of the so-called ‘environmental refugees’ under the um-
brella of the 1951 Refugee Convention is dealt with by Mariana Ferolla Vallandro 
do Valle in her paper on “Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other: the Inefficiency of 
Recognizing Refugee Status to Environmentally Displaced Persons”. The “popular-
ization of the term ‘environmental refugees’ started in the 1970s” (p.3), but “despite 
its common usage”, the notion of environmental refugees finds no legal basis under 
international refugee law, especially in the light of the Refugee Convention”. Thus, 
the author analyzes, thoroughly and critically, the proposals for extending the appli-
cation of the 1951 Refugee Convention to environmentally displaced persons, to con-
clude that the expansion of the protection offered by the said convention cannot be a 
solution for ‘filling the gap’ and offering a solution for the problem.  
Fulvia Staiano, in her paper on “State Responsibility for Climate Change under the 
UNFCCC Regime: Challenges and Opportunities for Prevention and Redress”, ex-
plores the 2016 Paris Agreement, which may reinforce some change of perspective, 
when analyzing human mobility caused by climate change, state responsibility and li-
ability under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The issue 
of state responsibility in relation to greenhouse gases is firstly examined, focusing also 
on the broader international law regime on state responsibility. The possibility of using 
climate change litigation, by States or groups of individuals, for “their potential to in-
directly provide protection and redress to displaced individuals as a result of environ-
mental degradation or disasters” (p. 27) is then taken into consideration, to review some 
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of cases dealt with by domestic tribunals (Urgenda v. the Netherlands) and interna-
tional bodies (the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).  
Moving to EU Law, Giuseppe Morgese, in his “Environmental Migrants and 
the EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Is There Any Chance for Protection?”, ex-
amines two out of the three statuses granted in each Member State on the basis of 
EU standards, namely refugee status and subsidiary protection status, to conclude 
that “the mere environmental disaster-related migration” (p. 52) is not enough, per 
se, as an eligibility condition required by EU law for applying refugee or subsidiary 
protection status. After having explored other options, i.e. humanitarian provisions 
in EU law, resettlement programmes, humanitarian admission schemes, private 
sponsorships and protection within Regional Development and Protection Pro-
grammes, the “need for a European ad hoc legal instrument dealing with every as-
pect of the protection of environmental migrants” (p. 73) is sought, although the 
Author is aware of the fact that, “at least in the near future”, such a legal instrument 
will not be adopted. 
The so-called Temporary Protection Directive provides for the third status 
granted by the EU law to international migrants in need of special protection. “Sud-
den-Onset Disasters, Human Displacement, and the Temporary Protection Di-
rective: Space for a Promising Relationship”, by Giovanni Sciaccaluga, analyzes 
this Directive, “expressly created to deal with mass influxes of migrants” (p. 76). 
The Author looks into the provisions of this Directive, which is “complementary to 
the Geneva Convention” (p.79). He also reviews the rare attempts to activate it, and 
the endogenous and external reasons behind the lack of activation. While calling 
for a pragmatic reform of the Directive, Sciaccaluga concludes that it could be ap-
plied to human displacement for environmental reasons. 
An overview of the little-known practice within some extra-European Regional 
Organizations is offered by Maria Vittoria Zecca, in her “The Protection of ‘Envi-
ronmental Refugees’ in Regional Contexts”. Whereas the Author confirms that, 
under existing international law, environmental factors do not lead to the creation 
of the category of “environmental refugees”, Zecca examines the practice of re-
gional organizations, in Africa, in Southern America, and in the Arab Region, to 
assess whether there are attempts “to overcome the limits of the Geneva Conven-
tion” (p. 121). 
The last two papers of the volume focus on very specific issues, geographical 
peculiarities and soft law initiatives. 
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Ana Carolina Barbosa Pereira Matos and Tarin Cristino Frota Mont’Alverne, in 
their “The UN Ocean Conference and the Low-Lying States Situation: Would the 
UN SD Goal 14 Suffice to Avoid a Migratory Emergency?”, analyze the situation 
of the low-lying coastal States, which are “all experiencing some kind of induced 
climate changes negative impacts” (p. 124), including forced migration. The Au-
thors suggest that the vulnerabilities of those States may be reduced by increasing 
resilience, and by making the most out of some instruments, also of soft law. 
“The Nansen Initiative and Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative: New 
Frameworks for More Effective Migrants’ Protection” closes the volume, describ-
ing two initiatives providing “practical, non-binding and voluntary guidelines” to 
help migrants before, during and after emergencies (p. 148). Patrycja Magdalena 
Zgola describes their main features, with the aim of providing “good examples for 
further actions” (p. 166), to be included in future binding instruments. 
 
 
The present volume is another result of the scientific cooperation on the issue 
of Migration and Development between the Department of Law of the University 
of Naples Federico II and the Institute for Research on Innovation and Services for 
Development (IRISS) of the National Research Council of Italy.  
We would like to thank the colleagues who enthusiastically replied to the call 
for papers we launched on February 2017 and made the publication of this volume 
actually possible. 
We are particularly grateful to Adriana Di Stefano, Anna Liguori and Flavia 
Rolando, reviewers of the draft contributions. 
We would like to thank also Giorgia Bevilacqua, for helping us in the pre-print 
phase. Thanks to Angela Petrillo and Stefano Carotenuto, for the graphic project of 
the cover and the assistance in the preparation of camera-ready file, respectively. 
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1. 
SIX OF ONE, HALF A DOZEN OF THE OTHER: 
 THE INEFFICIENCY OF RECOGNIZING  
REFUGEE STATUS  
TO ENVIRONMENTALLY DISPLACED PERSONS  
 
Mariana Ferolla Vallandro do Valle * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUMMARY: 1. Introduction. – 2. The (Non) Recognition of Environmental Refugees under the 
1951 Refugee Convention. – 3. Proposals to Include Environmental Factors in the Refugee 
Definition. – 4. Is the extension of the Refugee Convention the Best Solution? – 4.1. Over-
burdening Host States and the UNHCR. – 4.2. The Causal Link between the Fear of Perse-
cution and Slow-Onset Degradation. – 4.3. The Impossibility of Including Internally Dis-
placed Persons under the Protection of the Refugee Convention. – 5. Conclusions. 
 
1. – Introduction 
In January 2010, an earthquake devastated Haiti, leaving around 230,000 dead 
and 1.5 million displaced.1 As the effects of the earthquake continue to be felt in the 
country, thousands of Haitians keep emigrating and, only in 2015, around 14,000 
 
*
 The author wishes to thank the two anonymous referees of this volume, for reading the manuscript and 
providing useful comments. However, errors and omissions in the contribution are the sole responsibility 
of the author. 
 
1
 “Haiti Earthquake Fast Facts”, CNN, available at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/12/12/world/haiti-
earthquake-fast-facts/index.html>. 
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migrated to Brazil.2 Another 4.1 million persons were displaced in 2013 when Ty-
phoon Haiyan hit the Philippines.3 In 2015, it is estimated that 1.1 million people 
were displaced due to natural hazards, mainly floods, in 33 African States.4 
These are only a few examples of the thousands of individuals who are displaced 
every year, both internally and internationally, due to environmental disasters and deg-
radation. Although exact numbers of environmentally displaced persons may be diffi-
cult to estimate, it is said that they rival the number of refugees.5 More recently, a study 
published by the Norwegian Refugee Council’s Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre has calculated that natural disasters have displaced approximately 26.4 million 
people per year since 2008,6 whereas the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees (“UNHCR”) estimates that there are currently 22.5 million refugees worldwide.7 
The comparisons between refugees and environmentally displaced persons do 
not stop there. Those affected by environmental disasters and degradation are fre-
quently subjected to extreme living conditions that bring about a level of harm com-
parable to or even greater than the one suffered by refugees. Indeed, people facing 
the impacts of environmental hazards may have to deal with contamination of drink-
ing water, shortages of food, proliferation of diseases, inadequate sanitation, lack of 
housing, and many other hardships that amount to a deprivation of their basic rights.  
It is mainly in view of these adversities that individuals affected by environmen-
tal factors are commonly called “environmental refugees”. This expression has long 
been criticised as legally inaccurate, since it is generally accepted that these persons 
do not qualify as refugees under the definition of the 1951 Convention relating to the 
 
2
 VELASCO and MANTOVANI, “Em 10 anos, Número de Imigrantes Aumenta 160% no Brasil, diz PF”, 
G1, 25 June 2016, available at: <http://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2016/06/em-10-anos-numero-de-imi-
grantes-aumenta-160-no-brasil-diz-pf.html>. 
3
 GOLDENBERG, “Natural Disasters Displaced More People than War in 2013, Study Finds”, The 
Guardian, 17 September 2014, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/17/natural-dis-
asters-refugee-people-war-2013-study>.  
4
 KEMP, Africa Report on Internal Displacement, Geneva, 2016, p. 10, available at: <http://www.in-
ternal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2016/2016-Africa-Report/20161209-IDMC-Africa-report-
web-en.pdf>. 
5
 TRINDADE, Direitos humanos e meio-ambiente: paralelo dos sistemas de proteção internacional, 
Porto Alegre, 1993, p. 137. 
6
 YONETANI, Global Estimates 201: people displaced by disasters, Geneva, 2016, p. 11, available at: 
<http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Media/201507-globalEstimates-2015/20150713-
global-estimates-2015-en-v1.pdf>. 
7
 UNHCR, “Figures at Glance”, available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html>. 
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Status of Refugees (“Refugee Convention”). Nevertheless, the term is often em-
ployed with another objective in mind: to argue that the protection environmentally 
displaced persons should be ensured through an amendment to the Refugee Conven-
tion explicitly including a category of environmental refugees. 
This article seeks to demonstrate that this position is flawed and that proposals 
for expanding the Refugee Convention are not an efficient means of providing pro-
tection to these persons. Accordingly, we will firstly analyse the elements of the ref-
ugee definition under the Refugee Convention in order to clarify that, under current 
interpretations, there is no legal basis for granting refugee status on the basis of en-
vironmental factors alone. In the third section, we will present some of the proposals 
for the creation of an “environmental refugees” category under the Refugee Conven-
tion, detailing how the elements of the current refugee definition would be altered in 
these proposals. It is important to clarify that proposals employing the term “envi-
ronmental refugees” or “climate refugees”, but which suggest the creation of a new, 
independent framework of protection instead of an expansion of the Refugee Con-
vention are outside of the scope of this article. Finally, we will discuss the practical 
obstacles for the implementation of these proposals, relating to how the recognition 
of environmental refugees would overburden the refugee protection system, the dif-
ficulties in assessing slow-onset degradation as the cause of persecution, and the fact 
that persons internally displaced by environmental causes would remain excluded 
from protection. 
2. – The (Non) Recognition of Environmental Refugees under the 1951 
Refugee Convention 
The popularization of the term “environmental refugees” started in the 1970s, 
when it was advanced by Lester Brown,8 and has, ever since, been widely employed 
by the media and even scholars to refer to persons displaced mainly due to environ-
mental factors, such as natural disasters or degradation of the environment, either 
naturally-occurring or manmade. Despite its common usage, the notion of environ-
mental refugees finds no legal basis under international refugee law, especially in 
light of the Refugee Convention.9 
 
8
 PEREIRA, “Uma visão brasileira do conceito ‘refugiado ambiental’”, in RAMOS, RODRIGUES, and 
ALMEIDA (eds.), 60 anos de ACNUR: perspectivas de futuro, São Paulo, 2011, p. 221 ff., p. 222. 
9
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 2545. 
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Article 1(A)(2) of the Convention, as amended by its 1967 Protocol (which re-
moved the temporal and geographical limitations from the original refugee defini-
tion), establishes two essential elements for a person to qualify as a refugee. Firstly, 
one must have a well-founded fear of persecution, being unable or unwilling to re-
ceive protection from their State of origin due to such fear. Secondly, the feared 
persecution must be for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group, or political opinion. 
The first element, namely persecution, seems to be the one most evidently lacking 
in cases of migration motivated by environmental factors. Nevertheless, as neither 
the Convention nor its preparatory works provide a concrete definition of persecu-
tion, this criterion must be carefully analysed before reaching a conclusion on 
whether it is met by persons claiming the status of environmental refugees. 
Two main approaches are currently identified to define persecution under the 
Refugee Convention:10 the human rights approach, which equates persecution to se-
rious violations of human rights,11 and the circumstantial approach, under which the 
existence of persecution depends on the circumstances of each case and does not 
necessarily correspond to human rights violations.12 Both approaches seem to have 
been supported by the UNHCR in its Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for De-
termining Refugee Status, which establishes that serious violations of human rights 
due to the Convention’s grounds constitute persecution as well as that “[w]hether 
other prejudicial actions or threats would amount to persecution will depend on the 
circumstances of each case”.13 
 
10
 STOREY, “What Constitutes Persecution? Towards a Working Definition”, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 2014, p. 272 ff., pp. 276-277. 
11
 HATHAWAY, The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd ed., Cambridge, 2014, pp. 193-208; GOODWIN-GILL, 
“The International Law of Refugee Protection”, in FIDDIAN-QASMIYEH et al. (eds.), The Oxford Handbook 
of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, Oxford, 2014, p. 37 ff., p. 39. 
12
 UNHCR, “Statement by Ms. Erika Feller, Director, Department of International Protection, 
UNHCR, SCIFA (Brussels, 6 November 2002)”, 6 November 2002, available at: <http://www.un-
hcr.org/admin/dipstatements/42bab1b52/statement-ms-erika-feller-director-department-international-pro-
tection.html>; EDWARDS, “Age and Gender Dimensions in International Refugee Law”, in FELLER, TÜRK 
and NICHOLSON (eds.), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on In-
ternational Protection, New York, 2003, p. 46 ff., p 50. 
13
 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1, 1979, paras. 
51-52.  
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Given this initial ambiguity, some argue that the UNHCR’s position accepts per-
secution as an absence of State protection, no matter what caused this absence.14 
However, in later attempts to define this concept, the UNHCR referred only to seri-
ous violations of human rights or the cumulative effects of less serious violations, 
such as discrimination, as a basis for persecution.15 Analyses of national case law also 
identify a tendency to refer to disproportionate or discriminatory human rights 
abuses when assessing persecution,16 causing the human rights approach to be the 
dominant view on such definition.17 Accordingly, this will be the approach used in 
this article to evaluate the claims of environmental refugees. 
In human rights law, a violation only occurs when there is an act or omission by 
the State regarding a specific right. This same logic is used when assessing the ex-
istence of persecution. Indeed, as the study conducted by Jacques Vernant in 1951 at 
request of the UNHCR concluded, persecution derives “from the relations between 
the State and its nationals”.18 Even considering that persecution performed by non-
State agents has been increasingly accepted under the Refugee Convention, proof 
that the State was unwilling or unable to provide protection is still necessary in these 
cases19 – that is, a causal link is still required between the harm suffered and some 
sort of human conduct, specifically a lack of protection by the State. 
 
14
 HONG, “Refugees of the 21st Century: Environmental Injustice”, Cornell Journal of Law and Public 
Policy, 2001, p. 323 ff., p. 339. 
15
 UNHCR, La Protection internationale des réfugiés: Interprétation de l’Art. 1 de la Convention rela-
tive au Statut des Réfugiés, 2001, para. 17; UNHCR, Advisory Opinion by UNHCR on the Interpretation 
of the Refugee Definition, 2004, para. 8. 
16
 For analyses evincing the application of the human rights approach in domestic courts, see: VANHEULE, 
“A Comparison of the Judicial Interpretations of the Notion of Refugee”, in CARLIER and VANHEULE (eds.), 
Europe and Refugees: A Challenge?, Den Haag, 1997, p. 91 ff., p. 99. See also FOSTER, International Refugee 
Law and Socio-Economic Rights: Refuge from Deprivation, New York, 2007, pp. 28-31. 
17
 FOSTER, cit. supra note 16, p. 31. 
18
 VERNANT, The Refugee in the Postwar World, New Haven, 1953, pp. 4-5. 
19
 Supreme Court (Canada), Ward v Canada, Judgement of 30 June 1993, pp. 711-712, available at: 
<https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/1023/1/document.do>; House of Lords (United Kingdom), 
Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Judgement of 6 July 2000, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b6e04.html>; High Court (Australia), Minister for Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs v Khawar, Judgement of 11 April 2002, S128/2001, paras. 114-115, available at: 
<http://www.refworld.org/cases,AUS_HC,3deb326b8.html>; Refugee Status Appeals Authority (New 
Zealand), Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, 71427/99, Judgement of 16 August 2000, paras. 60-61, available 
at: <http://www.refworld.org/cases,NZL_RSAA,3ae6b7400.html>. 
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Although natural disasters and degradation often bring about harsh living condi-
tions that could well reach the level of harm necessary for persecution, they do not 
necessarily imply violations of human rights. In these situations, there is no act or 
omission evincing a lack of State protection. Persons who are forced to move in the 
face of an environmental disaster can generally rely on the help and support of their 
State, even if such support is limited.20 In this sense, environmental degradation does 
not constitute persecution per se,21 although nothing prevents it from being used as 
an instrument for persecution by either States or private actors.22 Nevertheless, it may 
be difficult to establish this link between the violation and the State23 and, even if 
persecution is proven in a given situation, the second criterion of the refugee defini-
tion must also be satisfied for an asylum claim to succeed. 
Indeed, the element requiring that persecution be perpetrated by reasons of one 
of the Refugee Convention’s grounds is not fulfilled either in most cases concerning 
“environmental refugees”. Natural disasters make no distinction between nationali-
ties, religions, political opinions, or races, rendering these grounds manifestly inap-
plicable. At first glance, the ground that seems to best support a status of environ-
mental refugees is that of membership of a particular social group; however, the in-
terpretations of what constitutes such a group reject this possibility as well. 
State practice evinces two main approaches for defining a particular social 
group.24 The first one is the protected characteristics approach. According to it, a 
particular social group is one whose members are linked by either an immutable trait, 
a past status that has become immutable due to its historical permanence, or a char-
 
20
 JUBILUT and APOLINÁRIO, “A Necessidade de Proteção Internacional no Âmbito da Migração”, Re-
vista Direito GV, 2010, p. 275 ff., p. 288. 
21
 VERNANT, cit. supra note 18, p. 5. 
22
 RAMOS, Refugiados Ambientais: Em Busca de Reconhecimento pelo Direito Internacional, São 
Paulo, 2011, p. 105. In this sense, some authors have explored cases of man-made environmental harm and 
the possibility of qualifying them as persecution. See: HONG, cit. supra note 14, pp. 332-338; COOPER, 
“Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition”, New York University 
Environmental Law Journal, 1998, p. 480 ff., pp. 519-521. 
23
 MOBERG, “Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons Displaces 
Necessary Protection”, Iowa Law Review, 2009, p. 1107 ff., p. 1121. 
24
 UNHCR, Principes directeurs sur la protection internationale: L’appartenance à un certain groupe 
social dans le cadre de l’Art. 1A(2) de la Convention de 1951 et/ou son Protocole de 1967 relatifs au Statut 
des réfugiés, HCR/GIP/02/02 Rev.1, 2008, paras. 6-7. 
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acteristic or association that is so fundamental to their identity that the members can-
not be required to change it.25 In turn, the social perception approach defines partic-
ular social groups as those whose members, due to a shared characteristic or element, 
are perceived as separate from society in general.26 
Since environmental harm is not an immutable characteristic or one inherent to 
human dignity, the very formulation of the protected characteristics approach ex-
cludes environmental factors as the basis of a particular social group. Although it 
could be argued that persons affected by natural disasters or degradation are seen as 
separate from society and thus qualify as a group under the social perception ap-
proach, this contention cannot be accepted due to one important rule applicable to 
both approaches: the circumstance linking the members of the group cannot be the 
fear of persecution itself.27 Although persecution is helpful to identify a particular 
social group, the latter must exist as such even when persecution is absent. As ex-
plained by McHugh J from the High Court of Australia: 
“[…] while persecutory conduct cannot define the social group, the actions of the perse-
cutors may serve to identify or even cause the creation of a particular social group in society. 
Left-handed men are not a particular social group. But, if they were persecuted because they 
were left-handed, they would no doubt quickly become recognisable in their society as a 
 
25
 Ward v Canada, cit. supra note 19, p. 739; Board of Immigration Appeals (United States), Matter 
of Acosta, Judgement of 1 March 1985, available at: <http://www.ref-
world.org/cases,USA_BIA,3ae6b6b910.html>; Immigration and Protection Tribunal (New Zealand), AC 
(Egypt), Judgement of 25 November 2011, 800015, para. 101, available at: <http://www.ref-
world.org/cases,NZ_IPT,4f424a232.html>; Transvaal Provincial Division (South Africa), Jian-Qiang 
Fang v. Refugee Appeal Board et al, Judgment of 15 November 2006, Case No. 40771/05, available at: 
<http://www.refugeerights.uct.ac.za/usr/refugee/Case_Law_Reader/Fang_v_RAB.pdf>; House Lords 
(United Kingdom), Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department/Regina v. Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal and Another Ex Parte Shah, Judgement of 25 March 1999, available at: <http://www.ref-
world.org/docid/3dec8abe4.html>; Board of Immigration Appeals (United States), In Re C-A-, Judgement 
of 15 June 2006, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/cases,USA_BIA,46979ea02.html>. 
26
 High Court (Australia), A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, Judgment of 24 February 
1997, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/cases,AUS_HC,3ae6b7180.html>; Conseil d’État (France), 
Ourbih, Judgement of 23 June 1997, 171858, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/do-
cid/3ae6b67c14.html>.  
27
 AC (Egypt), cit. supra note 25, para. 101; Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, cit. 
supra note 25; A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, cit. supra note 26; Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit (United States), Bernard Lukwago v. John Ashcroft, Judgment of 14 May 2003, p. 173, avail-
able at: <http://www.uio.no/studier/emner/jus/jus/JUR5530/v07/undervisningsmateriale/Lukwago.pdf>. 
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particular social group. Their persecution for being left-handed would create a public per-
ception that they were a particular social group. But it would be the attribute of being left-
handed and not the persecutory acts that would identify them as a particular social group”.28 
Following this rationale, even if an environmental factor is argued to constitute 
persecution, the social group to which this persecution refers cannot be construed as 
“the people affected by the environmental disaster/degradation” or, as suggested by 
Jessica Cooper, “persons who lack the political power to protect their own environ-
ment”.29 Another trait common to these people has to be proven as well as the fact 
that the persecution is feared because of this trait. Since naturally occurring degra-
dation and disasters are, as mentioned, indiscriminate, the second element of the ref-
ugee definition cannot be met on this basis. 
Given the absence of both elements of the refugee definition, people affected by 
harmful events related to the environment do not enjoy refugee status for the sole 
reason of having suffered this harm. As expressed by the New Zealand Immigration 
and Protection Tribunal, these people still have to independently meet the criteria set 
out in Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention.30 Accordingly, one could qualify 
as a refugee if environmental degradation were used as a means of persecution linked 
to one of the Convention’s grounds, or if, after a natural disaster, the State deliber-
ately committed – by either an act or omission – human rights abuses against the 
people affected so as to amount to persecution due to such grounds.31 For instance, a 
New Zealand tribunal once concluded that people aiding in humanitarian relief work 
in the aftermath of the Cyclone Nargis in Burma were viewed by the State as holding 
a political opinion against the regime and that the arrest of these people amounted to 
persecution, thus qualifying them for refugee status.32 
In light of these considerations, migration due to environmental conditions has 
never been recognized as a possible basis for refugee status under the Convention. 
In New Zealand, several judicial decisions have reiterated this understanding and 
 
28
 A v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, cit. supra note 26. 
29
 COOPER, cit. supra note 22, p. 522. 
30
 Immigration and Protection Tribunal (New Zealand), AF (Kiribati), Judgement of 25 June 2013, 
para. 65, available at: <http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZIPT/2013/800413.html>. 
31
 This last possibility was expressly mentioned by the UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: A UNHCR Perspective, 2008, p. 7. 
32
 Refugee Status Appeals Authority (New Zealand), Refugee Appeal No 76374, Judgement of 28 
October 2009, paras. 40-45, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/cases,NZL_RSAA,4afc31da2.html>. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other … 9 
 
 
denied refugee status to people fleeing the environmental degradation resulting from 
rising ocean levels in Kiribati33 and Tuvalu34 and from impacts of the 2004 tsunami 
in Sri Lanka.35 Australian authorities have also reached this conclusion regarding ap-
plicants from Kiribati,36 Tuvalu,37 and Tonga.38 In one decision, the High Court of 
Australia even stated that “[n]o matter how devastating may be epidemic, natural 
disaster or famine, a person fleeing them is not a refugee within the terms of the 
Convention”,39 a formula repeated by the United Kingdom’s House of Lords.40 The 
 
33
 AF (Kiribati), cit. supra note 33, paras. 56, 72-75; High Court (New Zealand), Ioane Teitiota v. The 
Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, Judgement of 26 November 2013, 
CIV-2013-404-3528, paras. 10-11, 54-55, available at: <https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Docu-
ments/pdf/jdo/56/alfresco/service/api/node/content/workspace/SpacesStore/6f4d600a-373f-4ff8-8ba1-
500fb7cc94b0/6f4d600a-373f-4ff8-8ba1-500fb7cc94b0.pdf>; Court of Appeal (New Zealand), Teitiota v. 
Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, Judgment of 8 May 2014, 
CA50/2014, paras. 21-25, available at: <http://www.nzlii.org/cgi-bin/sino-
disp/nz/cases/NZCA/2014/173.html>. 
34
 Refugee Status Appeals Authority (New Zealand), Refugee Appeal No 72189/2000, 72190/2000, 
72191/2000, 72192/2000, 72193/2000, 72194/2000, 72195/200013-15, Judgement of 17 August 2000, pa-
ras. 13-15, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/cases,NZL_RSAA,4d08cf7f2.html>; Refugee Status 
Appeals Authority (New Zealand), Refugee Appeal No. 72314/2000, Judgment of 19 October 2000, paras. 
13-14, available at: <https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/IPT/Documents/RefugeeProtection/ 
pdf/ref_20001019_72314.pdf>; Refugee Status Appeals Authority (New Zealand), Refugee Appeal No. 
72315/2000, Judgment of 19 October 2000, paras. 13-14, available at: <https://forms.jus-
tice.govt.nz/search/IPT/Documents/RefugeeProtection/pdf/ref_20001019_72315.pdf>; Immigration and 
Protection Tribunal (New Zealand), AC (Tuvalu), Judgement of 4 June 2014, paras. 45-46, available at: 
<https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/IPT/Documents/RefugeeProtection/pdf/ref_20140604_800517.pdf>; 
Immigration and Protection Tribunal (New Zealand), AF (Tuvalu), Judgement of 20 October 2015, paras. 
68-71, available at: <https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/IPT/Documents/RefugeeProtection/pdf/ref 
_20151020_800859.pdf>.  
35
 Refugee Status Appeals Authority (New Zealand), Refugee Appeal No 75766, Judgement of 3 
March 2006, paras. 27-29, available at: <https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Docu-
ments/IPTV2/RefugeeProtection/ref_20060303_75766.pdf>. 
36
 Refugee Review Tribunal (Australia), 0907346, Judgement of 10 December 2009, paras. 51-55, 
available at: <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/RRTA/2009/1168.html>. 
37
 Refugee Review Tribunal (Australia), N99/30231, Judgement of 10 January 2000, available at: 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/RRTA/2000/17>.  
38
 Refugee Review Tribunal (Australia), 1004726, Judgement of 30 September 2010, paras. 45-48, 
available at: <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/RRTA/2010/845.html>.  
39
 A v. Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs, cit. supra note 26. 
40
 House of Lords (United Kingdom), Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AH (Sudan) and 
others, Judgement of 14 November 2007, para. 33, available at: <http://www.bailii.org/ 
uk/cases/UKHL/2007/49.html>. 
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Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit in the United States also dismissed an appli-
cant’s fear of environmental problems by expressing that they were not relevant to 
the fear of future persecution.41 In Brazil, refugee authorities issued an official posi-
tion holding that natural disasters were not a basis for refugee status after multiple 
applications were lodged by Haitian migrants who had left their country after the 
2010 earthquake.42 
Therefore, neither the current framework of the Refugee Convention nor its in-
terpretation and application by States recognize protection to people who left their 
countries of origin exclusively due to environmental factors. Even if one could prove 
that human rights abuses were committed against one of the protected groups under 
the Convention in link with some natural harm, strictly speaking, the people affected 
would still be traditional political refugees, since the environmental event would not 
be the determinative cause of this status. 
3. – Proposals to Include Environmental Factors in the Refugee 
Definition 
Notwithstanding the legal inaccuracy of the term, mentions of “environmental 
refugees” continue to be employed as a means to draw attention to the precarious 
situation of people who are displaced due to environmental degradation and disas-
ters. The latter often deal with extreme poverty conditions, lack of drinking water, 
and insufficient health care, but do not benefit from any special status under Interna-
tional Law. A number of proposals seek to address this problem through the creation 
of international instruments establishing such a status, including an expansion of the 
refugee definition under the Refugee Convention. 
One of the most complete proposals in this regard was presented by the Maldives 
in 2006.43 The project focused on the creation of a protocol to the Refugee Conven-
tion introducing environmental factors, both disasters and deterioration, as causes of 
persecution, regardless of human interference. It is important to note, however, that 
 
41
 Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit (United States), Koliada v. I.N.S., Judgement of 1 August 2001, 
available at: <https://www.ravellaw.com/opinions/09133a1c1b3aaace817246327a6ac6e4>.  
42
 Comitê Nacional para os Refugiados, Ofício nº 042/CONARE/2012, available at: 
<http://www.conectas.org/arquivos-site/multimidia/PDF/65.pdf>.  
43
 Republic of Maldives (Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water), First Meeting on Protocol on 
Environmental Refugees: recognition of Environmental Refugees in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Proto-
col relating to the Status of Refugees, Male, 14-15 August 2006, as cited by RAMOS, cit. supra note 22, pp. 
113-116. 
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the proposal did not seek to alter the level of harm required for a given situation to 
amount to persecution. As such, not every natural hazard would entitle a person to 
refugee status, only those that generate grave impacts. In this sense, the Maldives’ 
proposal provides some examples of what would constitute persecution under the 
expanded definition, including the fear of destruction, damages or loss of one’s life 
as a result of severe environmental hazards or the fear deriving from decisions of 
States, private entities, or both, responsible for the displacement.44 Lastly, the pro-
posed protocol also provided for an extension of the Refugee Convention’s protec-
tion to persons internally displaced by these factors. 
Less specific proposals of creating a category of environmental refugees have been 
advanced by other States as well. Particularly, the Belgium Senate adopted a resolution 
in 2006 requesting the government to promote and support within the United Nations 
the recognition of the status of environmental refugees under the Refugee Conven-
tion,45 which was reiterated in a resolution of the Chamber of Representatives in 2008.46 
In 2009, the Bangladeshi finance minister also called for a revision of the Refugee 
Convention so as to encompass people displaced by climate change.47 
Among scholars, some support this expansion by suggesting that the Refugee 
Convention’s regime is outdated in view of the emergence of new causes for dis-
placement and of new groups in need of international protection.48 The argument is 
that, just as the there was no justification for persons in similar situations of perse-
cution outside of Europe and after the Second World War to be excluded from the 
original refugee protection, resulting in the removal of these restrictions through the 
 
44
 Ibid., p. 116. 
45
 Sénat de Belgique, Proposition de résolution visant à la reconnaissance dans les conventions inter-
nationales du statut de réfugié environnemental (Déposée par M. Philippe Mahoux), 3-1556/1 - 2005/2006, 
p. 5. 
46
 Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Proposition de résolution relative à la prise en considération 
et à la création d’un statut de réfugié environnemental par les Nations-Unies et l’Union européenne (dépo-
sée par M. Jean Cornil et consorts), Doc 52 1451/001, 2008, p. 11. 
47
 GRANT, RANDERSON, and VIDAL, “UK Should Open Borders to Climate Refugees, says Bangladeshi 
minister”, The Guardian, 4 December 2009, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/environ-
ment/2009/nov/30/rich-west-climate-change>.  
48
 HAVARD, “Seeking Protection: Recognition of Environmentally Displaced Persons under Interna-
tional Human Rights Law”, Villanova Environmental Law Journal, 2007, p. 65 ff., pp. 78-79; CONISBEE 
and SIMMS, Environmental Refugees: The Case for Recognition, London, 2003, pp. 32-33; BOON and TRA, 
“Are Environmental Refugees Refused?”, Stud. Tribes Tribals, 2007, p. 85 ff., p. 92. HONG, cit. supra note 
14, pp. 340-343. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 Mariana Ferolla Vallandro do Valle 
 
 
1967 Protocol, nothing justifies the contemporary exclusion of environmental refu-
gees, seeing as the harm they face may well reach the same level as that suffered by 
a traditional refugee.49 
Furthermore, it is argued that governments in the context of environmental harm 
often have no resources or political will to protect the population, or are directly 
responsible for the harm, evincing a need of international protection to environmen-
tally displaced persons.50 A new protocol would thus be called for, formalizing envi-
ronmental factors as persecution and persons affected by these factors as a ground 
for persecution. Hong notes, however, that, in order not to overburden the interna-
tional community, the expansion of refugee status would have to be accompanied by 
specific requirements for environmental refugees, “such as the occurrence of certain 
threshold levels of environmental destruction in the country of origin, and the exist-
ence of specific circumstances rendering the applicants unable to avail themselves 
of their government's protection within a designated period of time”.51 
4. – Is the Extension of the Refugee Convention the Best Solution? 
The Refugee Convention contains one of the most overarching regimes for the 
protection of individuals in International Law. It guarantees in several instances that 
the treatment of refugees may not be less favourable to the one accorded to aliens in 
general52 or even to nationals of the receiving State53 as well as provides refugees with 
the issuance of identity papers, travel documents, and other sorts of administrative 
assistance. Moreover, it establishes the principle of non-refoulement,54 arguably the 
most important guarantee of the Convention, under which a refugee cannot – save 
 
49
 CONISBEE and SIMMS, cit. supra note 48, pp. 30-33; HONG, cit. supra note 14, pp. 340-341. 
50
 CONISBEE and SIMMS, cit. supra note 48, p. 33; HONG, cit. supra note 14, p. 339. 
51
 HONG, cit. supra note 14, p. 340. 
52
 This right finds a general formulation in Art. 7(1) of the Refugee Convention and is specified in 
relation to: rights pertaining to contracts on movable and immovable property (Art. 13); the right of asso-
ciation (Art. 15); the right to engage in wage-earning employment (Art. 17), to self-employment (Art. 18), 
and to engage in liberal professions (Art. 19); the right to housing (Art. 21); education other than elemen-
tary education (Art. 22(2)) and; freedom of movement (Art. 26). 
53
 This is provided in relation to: the right to religion (Art. 4); the protection of artistic rights and 
industrial property (Article 14); access to courts (Art. 16(2)); distribution of products in a rationing system 
(Art. 20); elementary education (Art. 22(1)); public relief and assistance (Art. 23); labour legislation and 
social security (Art. 24) and; fiscal charges (Art. 29). 
54
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, cit. supra note 9, Art. 33. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other … 13 
 
 
for strict exceptions laid down in the Refugee Convention itself – be returned to a 
State where they will be subjected to persecution. 
In light of all of these benefits, it is understandable why some would seek to 
extend this status to as many groups in need of international protection as possible. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the Refugee Convention provides a nearly comprehensive 
system of protection does not necessarily mean that this system will be appropriate 
to every situation or even that it will work efficiently if extended. 
Particularly, the potential extension of refugee status to environmentally dis-
placed persons poses some serious problems that would render their protection under 
the Refugee Convention largely inefficient and risk undermining the refugee protec-
tion system as a whole. This is mainly due to the overburden this inclusion would 
cause to host States and the UNHCR, the difficulties in establishing a causal link 
between the harm suffered and cases of slow-onset degradation, and the fact that 
persons who are internally displaced by environmental factors would not benefit 
from the protection. Each of these factors will be analysed ahead. 
4.1. –.Overburdening Host States and the UNHCR 
One frequently noted feature of the Refugee Convention is its individualistic ap-
proach to the definition of refugee,55 meaning that the criteria of this definition were 
designed for individual procedures of refugee status determination, and not collec-
tive evaluations. It is true, though, that this does not prevent the Convention from 
being applied to large groups, for instance, when there is a mass influx of asylum-
seekers. In these cases, the UNHCR recommends that States apply the notion of 
prima facie refugees56 – that is, granting refugee status to all people in similar situa-
tions relating to objective circumstances in the country of origin, so that any potential 
individual procedures will either confirm this status or exclude specific persons from 
it. Once refugee status is granted through this approach, the affected individuals are 
entitled to the rights provided in the applicable refugee law norms.57 
 
55
 CARLIER, “Droit d’asile et des réfugiés: de la protection aux droits”, Recueil des cours de l’Academie 
de la Haie, 2007, p. 9 ff., pp. 189-190; MAYER, “Pour en finir avec la notion de «réfugiés environnemen-
taux»: critique d’une approche individualiste et universaliste des déplacements causés par des changements 
environnementaux”, Revue internationale de droit et politique du développement durable de McGill, 2011, 
p. 33 ff., pp. 54-55. 
56
 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 11: Prima Facie Recognition of Refugee Status, 
HCR/GIP/15/11, 2015. 
57
 Ibid., para. 7. 
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Were a category of environmental refugees created, prima facie refugee status 
would play an important role in enabling their protection, since people displaced by 
environmental factors – especially environmental disasters – usually migrate in large 
groups. Nevertheless, the notion of prima facie refugees has shown to be insufficient 
to guarantee the full protection to large groups of asylum-seekers even today, when 
there has been no expansion of the Refugee Convention yet. 
Despite its endorsement by the UNHCR, the granting of prima facie refugee sta-
tus is not unanimous among the Refugee Convention’s States-Parties. As noted by 
the High Commissioner, its main application occurs in States in Latin America, 
South Asia, and Africa (although, in the latter case, generally within the framework 
of the Convention of the African Union, which contains specific provisions for col-
lective assessment of refugee status).58 For States that do not apply this method of 
refugee status determination or an equivalent one, asylum-seekers who arrive in a 
mass influx have to wait lengthy periods for the traditional individual assessment 
procedures, during which they face uncertainty regarding their status and cannot rely 
on the substantive protection of the Refugee Convention. 
Moreover, even in States that do apply the prima facie refugee status method or a 
similar form of protection – such as temporary protection, in the European Union –, 
the burden of dealing with mass influxes is often so great that States do not have the 
resources to guarantee the full immediate protection of the Convention.59 With the cur-
rent “refugee crisis”, mainly related to the ongoing armed conflicts in the Middle East, 
this problem has become more evident. Only in Europe, a number of 1,255,600 first-
time asylum-seekers arrived in 201560 and another 1,204,300 in 2016.61 In turn, a study 
published in 2017 by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
has estimated the cost of processing and accommodating asylum-seekers during their 
 
58
 UNHCR, Protection des réfugiés lors d’afflux massifs: cadre général de la protection, EC/GC/01/4, 
2001, para. 7. 
59
 Ibid., para. 8. 
60
 Eurostat, “Record number of over 1.2 million first time asylum seekers registered in 2015”, 4 March 
2016, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-
EN.pdf/790eba01-381c-4163-bcd2-a54959b99ed6>. 
61
 Eurostat, “1.2 million first time asylum seekers registered in 2016”, 16 March 2017, p. 1 ff., pp. 1-
2, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7921609/3-16032017-BP-
EN.pdf/e5fa98bb-5d9d-4297-9168-d07c67d1c9e1>. 
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first year in the host country around €10,000 per application.62 In Germany, this 
amounted to a total of €16 billion (0,5% of its GDP) spent with refugees in 2015, 
whereas Sweden spent €6 billion (1,35% of its GDP) in the same year.63 In 2016, it is 
reported that German expenditures with refugees increased to €20 billion.64 
This strain on States’ resources and difficulties in providing their efficient allo-
cation have resulted in situations of refugees living in conditions well below the 
standard of protection of the Refugee Convention in host States,65 some of which 
have even been recognized by the European Court of Human Rights.66 Outside of 
Europe, there have also been reports about the poor conditions in which refugees are 
received,67 showing that this is not merely a local problem.  
The growing number of refugees and the protracted character of their situation68 
has compromised not only the capacity but also the political will of States, causing 
the latter to harden refugee policies. In the past years, States have increasingly re-
sorted to push-back policies, extraterritorial immigration control, and agreements 
with other States in order to prevent potential asylum-seekers from entering their 
 
62
 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Who Bears the Cost of Integrating Ref-
ugees?”, Migration Policy Debates, 2017, available at: <https://www.oecd.org/els/mig/migration-policy-
debates-13.pdf>. 
63
 Ibid., p. 2. 
64
 DEARDEN, “Germany ‘Spent More than €20bn on Refugees in 2016’ as crisis outstrips state budgets”, 
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territories and thus triggering the application of the Refugee Convention and other 
human rights instruments.69 
In this scenario, it is clear that the international community already has trouble 
guaranteeing protection to refugees as it is. It would therefore be highly unlikely that 
States would agree to undertake new obligations through an expansion of the Refugee 
Convention.70 The fact that the damage caused by environmental disasters may take a 
long time to be reversed and that environmental degradation is often irreversible con-
tributes to this unwillingness, as it would create more protracted refugee situations and 
increase the host States’ burden to comply with the Convention’s obligations. 
Moreover, even if the creation of a category of environmental refugees were suc-
cessful, the problem is a matter of efficiency: environmental refugees would be sub-
jected to the same problems traditional refugees currently face, as described, and 
there would be no guarantee that the protection associated with this new status would 
be effectively ensured. The weight of this problem is highlighted when we consider 
that concerns about overburdening States, and, above all, the UNHCR with an ex-
pansion of refugee status have been expressed well before today’s “refugee crisis”.71 
Another issue with the expansion of refugee status is the concern espoused by the 
UNHCR that, “in the current political environment, [the inclusion of environmental 
refugees] could result in a lowering of protection standards for refugees and even 
undermine the international refugee protection regime altogether”.72 As Kara Moberg 
developed in 2009, the sudden increase in the number of asylum-seekers derived 
from the inclusion of a status of environmental refugees would result in the creation 
by States of obstacles to accessing refugee programs overall,73 including arbitrary 
 
69
 For an assessment of the responsibility of States regarding such policies, see GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN 
and HATHAWAY, “Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence”, Columbia Journal of Trans-
national Law, 2015, p. 235 ff., pp. 235-284. 
70
 BIERMANN and BOAS, “Protecting Climate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol”, Environment, 
2008, p. 8 ff., p. 11; MCADAM, “Swimming against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty 
Is Not the Answer”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2011, p. 2 ff., pp. 16-17. As argued by McAdam, 
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people displaced by climate change?”. 
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barriers to the concession of refugee status,74 long delays for assessing asylum appli-
cations, and more refugee camps.75 All of which, as described, happened with the 
surge in numbers of asylum-seekers in recent years. 
The current refugee situation demonstrates not only a certain precariousness in the 
Refugee Convention’s system, but also that the UNHCR’s fears in allowing more peo-
ple to qualify for refugee status were justified. Expanding the definition of “refugee” 
means nothing if in practice it does not provide the beneficiaries with a higher level of 
international protection or harms the protection of already established refugee catego-
ries. Accordingly, until there are durable solutions in place, proposals of according 
refugee status to environmentally displaced persons remain highly theoretical. 
4.2. – The Causal Link between the Fear of Persecution and Slow-Onset 
Degradation 
According to Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, a refugee must be una-
ble or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of their country of nationality 
owing to a fear of persecution. Under such phrasing, it seems clear that there must 
be a causal link between the fear of persecution and the alleged lack of protection in 
the home State. As such, although the existence of past persecution may strengthen 
one’s claim,76 the assessment of the fear of persecution concerns the possibility of 
future harm, of a risk that the refugee will suffer persecution if they are returned to 
their country.77 
On the matter of how probable the risk of persecution should be, there is no uni-
form approach between States. Whereas some domestic decisions have required a 
very low standard of less than 50% chance of risk,78 others have referred to a balance 
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of probabilities test (whether it is more likely than not that there exists a risk of per-
secution),79 or even to the need of a real risk.80 
The question of which standard of risk is used will be an important factor when 
dealing with slow-onset environmental degradation, for, even if the latter and its re-
sulting harm are included as persecution, the associated risk may not be so evident 
as the cause of displacement. The effects of environmental degradation may take a 
long time to manifest and be confused with other socioeconomic problems, such as 
poverty, overcrowding, and lack of proper housing, which do not necessarily amount 
to persecution under the Refugee Convention. As noted by professors such as Jane 
McAdam and Benoît Mayer, socioeconomic conditions often contribute to environ-
mental degradation and vice-versa, so that it is difficult to point one or the other as 
the decisive factor for the need of protection.81 Even in States that adopt a more leni-
ent approach on the risk of persecution, one would have to verify with a minimum 
degree of certainty that the environmental factor is responsible for the harm and not 
simply, for instance, poor State planning on infrastructure. 
Moreover, even if it can be shown that harm caused by slow-onset degradation is 
taking place, the asylum-seeker must demonstrate that it is the degradation, and not 
other more general socioeconomic problems, that produces the level of harm grave 
enough to be qualified as persecution. Given the overlap between these two condi-
tions, authorities may well conclude that it is not clear that the significant harm de-
rives from the environmental factor, but rather from a lack of infrastructure in the 
country, and that the degradation alone does not sufficiently aggravate the socioec-
onomic conditions so as to amount to persecution. 
Although this problem may seem easier to circumvent, given that, as mentioned, 
some States are more flexible when assessing the risk of persecution, one must bear 
in mind the political unwillingness of States that derives from an increase in the 
number of asylum-seekers, described in the last section, and which may result in 
stricter standards for assessing refugee status. Therefore, especially when coupled 
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21 December 1982, p. 864, available at: <https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/5532/1/docu-
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with the previous considerations on the expansion of refugee status, the recognition 
of environmental factors as causes of persecution may not ensure effective protection 
in cases of slow-onset degradation.  
4.3. – The Impossibility of Including Internally Displaced Persons under the Pro-
tection of the Refugee Convention 
When addressing the plight of environmentally displaced persons, greater atten-
tion is usually given to those who move across borders to seek protection. Neverthe-
less, a 2009 study published by the International Organisation for Migration indi-
cated that, in most situations of both natural disasters and slow-onset degradation, 
displacement usually occurs within the State’s borders, not internationally.82 This is 
true even in States constantly impacted by environmental factors. Particularly, the 
study found that in Bangladesh, where a myriad of environment-related hazards oc-
cur every year – including floods, cyclones, droughts, tidal waves, and others83 –, the 
affected individuals tend to move to areas close to their previous residence.84  
Accordingly, even if environmental factors are included as a cause of persecution 
and the persons affected by them as an individual category of refugees, Article 1(A)(2) 
of the Refugee Convention still requires the person to be outside their State of nationality 
in order to qualify as a refugee. Although some States, such as Canada, with its Refugee 
Abroad Class,85 have established overseas programs in order to facilitate access to asy-
lum to persons who could not yet leave their country of origin, this is merely an ex gratia 
act. States-Parties are not under the obligation to establish similar programs and most of 
them indeed do not. Thus, the recognition of environmental refugees would still exclude 
the vast majority of those adversely affected by environmental factors. 
It could be argued that this issue would be solved by the removal of the cross-
border condition in relation to environmental refugees, as expressed in the Maldives’ 
 
82
 LACZKO and AGHAZARM, Migration, Environment, and Climate Change: assessing the evidence, 
Geneva, 2009, pp. 23, 74. 
83
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proposal. However, the problem then becomes one of effectiveness. 
Even though the Refugee Convention does not contain a specific provision lim-
iting its application to the territory or jurisdiction of States-Parties – unlike other 
human rights instruments86 –, the entire framework of the Convention is based on the 
assumption that the refugee is in the host State’s territory. After all, in order to ensure 
that the refugee is granted a favourable treatment in regards to employment, educa-
tion, housing, social security, and any other rights under the Convention, the State 
must be able to at least control how authorities enforce these guarantees, if not the 
very laws on the matter. If the people in need of protection still find themselves in 
the territory of their State of nationality, how could other States enforce the Refugee 
Convention? Even the principle of non-refoulement, one of the most important guar-
antees of the Convention, would be rendered useless if the refugee is on the same 
territory as the feared persecution. 
As long as the person remains in their State of nationality, only the latter has the 
power to apply the Refugee Convention. However, requiring the home State to do so 
would be illogical, as this State already has a duty to protect its nationals under in-
ternational human rights law, international humanitarian law,87 and, in most cases, 
under its own domestic legislation. Furthermore, applying the Refugee Convention 
in this situation would actually result in a lower standard of protection, since, as 
mentioned, several of its provisions establish that the refugee shall be given a treat-
ment as favourable as the one accorded to aliens in general – which, it is safe to say, 
will not be as favourable as the treatment accorded to nationals. 
In fact, the hardships faced by persons internally displaced by environmental fac-
tors do not derive from the absence of international norms granting them protection 
– since this is already done by various human rights treaties –, but rather by a lack 
of structure, resources, or even political will to apply these norms. Accordingly, an 
effective mechanism of protection should involve more of a technical and financial 
assistance to countries affected by environmental disasters and degradation.88 Not 
only is this sort of assistance outside of the scope of the Refugee Convention, but 
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adding such provisions and others for the inclusion of internally displaced environ-
mental refugees would create so many exceptions and specific rules for this category 
that it would be easier to simply create an entire new instrument. 
It could be argued, though, that internally displaced persons could be effectively 
recognized as refugees through programs such as Canada’s Convention Refugee 
Abroad Class. Nevertheless, this method only provides a certainty that the refugee will 
receive protection once they arrive in the host State, not before that. If one cannot find 
a way to reach this State, the status is useless. Besides, it is not reasonable to suppose 
that States would have a duty to ensure all potential environmental refugees abroad the 
complete means to enter their territory. This would result in long delays for evaluating 
the claims of refugees abroad and considerable costs for funding the refugees’ dis-
placement, which States would be unable and unwilling to afford in the long term. In 
the end, it would bring about the same problems of overburdening host States as pre-
viously discussed, compromising the effectiveness of the refugee protection. 
5. – Conclusions 
The persistent use of the term “environmental refugees”, despite being grounded 
in good intentions, has not been helpful to attempts of increasing the international 
protection of environmentally displaced persons. 
Firstly, because current interpretations of the Refugee Convention do not support 
the existence of such a category. As exposed, the criterion of persecution requires 
that serious human rights violations be committed by a State’s action or omission, 
whereas the criterion of membership of one of the five protected categories does not 
include persons linked solely by the fact they were impacted by natural disasters or 
degradation. Accordingly, the expression “environmental refugees” has no legal ba-
sis and may be even misleading to both jurists and the very people advocates for this 
term seek to protect. 
Secondly, because talks of “environmental refugees” as a means to raise aware-
ness to their situation and to promote amendments to the Refugee Convention ig-
nores the fact that the Convention, as well as other instruments for the protection of 
human rights, cannot be seen as dissociated from the concrete situations it aims to 
address. They must be construed in a way that gives their provisions the greatest 
possible practical effect. After all, subjecting these treaties to modifications that 
seem desirable in theory, but ineffective and inefficient in practice, would be inco-
herent in relation to their very object and purpose of protecting the human person. 
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Whereas, in theory, the more expansive the refugee definition is the better, there 
are several obstacles that render such an expansion realistically unfeasible. As 
demonstrated, the recent surge in numbers of asylum-seekers and the massive char-
acter of their arrivals have generated considerable costs to host States and the 
UNHCR, who have often been unable to provide the appropriate infrastructure to 
accommodate these persons. Furthermore, this situation has led to a political unwill-
ingness of States in accepting to receiving refugees, despite the former’s obligations 
under the Convention. In light of these events, not only is it improbable that States 
would accept an expansion of the Refugee Convention, but also that any environ-
mental refugees would not benefit from higher standards of protection in practice, 
rendering the expansion a dead letter. 
In addition, introducing environmental factors as a cause of persecution is not an 
effective guarantee for the protection of people affected by slow-onset degradation. 
Since the impact of this kind of event may be difficult to establish or even confused 
with more general problems of infrastructure that adversely influence socioeconomic 
conditions, an asylum-seeker may not be able to satisfy the host State’s authorities 
with proof of that the risk or level of harm that motivated the displacement originated 
form the environmental conditions.  
Finally, the creation of an environmental refugees category would still exclude the 
majority of those affected by natural hazards, since they are displaced within the bor-
ders of their country of origin. Since other States cannot effectively exercise power 
over persons who are not in their territory or under their jurisdiction, these internally 
displaced persons could only rely on the protection of their home State, which is al-
ready bound by other more protective instruments in relation to its nationals. 
When weighed against practical considerations, it seems thus unjustifiable to de-
fend an expansion of the Refugee Convention as a solution for the lack of interna-
tional protection regarding environmentally displaced persons. Any proposals to en-
sure this group’s rights should not be restricted to theoretical discussions on how to 
adapt existing regimes of protection, but rather take into account its particular char-
acteristics, such as the collective nature of displacement and the existence of both 
internally and internationally displaced persons, as well as the costs a new protection 
system would bring States. Only when these practical obstacles are addressed can 
the protection of environmentally displaced persons truly be achieved. 
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1 – Introduction 
On 2 November 2016, a briefing paper by the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre highlighted that between 2008 and 2015 an average of 21.5 million people 
per year have been forced to leave their homes due to “disasters brought on by rapid-
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onset weather-related hazards – primarily floods and storms.”1 While the report high-
lighted that the majority of these fluxes resulted in internal displacement, cross-bor-
der movements of displaced individuals are also on the rise. This fact was acknowl-
edged by the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)2 in the context of the adoption of the 
2016 Paris Agreement. In Decision 1/CP.21, the COP envisaged the creation of a 
Task Force on Displacement “to develop recommendations for integrated ap-
proaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse impacts 
of climate change”.3 Two years before, Working Group II of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change had highlighted that “climate change over the 21st century 
is projected to increase displacement of people”, especially in low-income develop-
ing countries exposed to “serious weather events”.4  
Identifying climate change as a driver of temporary or permanent displacement 
is not always easy. First, environmental degradation caused by climate change can 
be one among many push factors for human mobility, together with social, economic 
and cultural reasons. Second, the boundaries between voluntary migration and dis-
placement in the strict sense of the word can be blurred when such movements are 
caused by climate change. Often, environmental degradation may encourage the re-
location of individuals or groups without reaching a sufficient degree of seriousness 
to identify such movements as entirely inevitable and forced. Notwithstanding these 
difficulties, the UNHCR has drawn clear links between climate change and an in-
creased risk of displacement. In 2015, it noted that the majority of people of concern 
for UNHCR live in “climate change hotspots” and risk displacement due to the ef-
fects of climate change.5  
 
1
 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Seizing the momentum: Displacement on the global cli-
mate change agenda, 2 November 2016, p. 3, available at: <http://www.internal-displacement.org/as-
sets/publications/2016/20161102-climate-change.pdf>  
2
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed on 9 May 1992, entered into force 
on 21 March 1994, UNTS 1771, p. 107. 
3
 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first session, held in Paris from 30 November 
to 13 December 2015, 29 January 2016, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, para 49. 
4
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation and Vul-
nerability, Working Group II Summary for Policymakers, 2014, p. 20, available at: 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/> 
5 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”), UNHCR, The Environment & Climate 
Change, October 2015, p. 4, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/561f670a4.html. 
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The establishment of the Task Force on Displacement included actions concerning 
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change among the mechanisms 
to reduce the risk of loss and damage, entrusting this matter to the Executive Commit-
tee of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage. This development 
constitutes a remarkable step forward in a path anticipated by Decision 3/CP.18, 
adopted by the COP in Doha on 8 December 2012.6 The Decision marked a shift of 
perspective from adaptation to loss and damage in relation to climate change-induced 
migration and displacement. Before then, state action in the field of climate change-
induced migration and displacement had been framed as adaptation efforts within the 
UNFCCC regime. Under the Cancun Adaptation Framework, for instance, the COP 
invited all States Parties to adopt measures aimed at enhancing “understanding, coor-
dination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement, migra-
tion, and planned relocation, where appropriate, at the national, regional and interna-
tional levels”.7 In Decision 3/CP.18, on the other hand, the understanding of “how im-
pacts of climate change are affecting patterns of migration, displacement and human 
mobility” was included within expertise on loss and damage.8 
The adoption of the Paris Agreement further reinforced this significant change of 
perspective on human mobility caused by climate change. First, by referring to loss 
and damage rather than adaptation, the COP has acknowledged not only the link 
between displacement and climate change, but also that human displacement as a 
result of climate change cannot be avoided or prevented through mitigation or adap-
tation efforts. It is also significant that rather than focusing on human mobility in 
general, the creation of the Task Force has addressed forced movements of people 
as a result of environmental degradation. Second, and most importantly, the framing 
of climate change-induced displacement as loss and damage raises the question of 
state responsibility and liability under the UNFCCC regime. Decision 1/CP.21 ex-
plicitly states that Art. 8 of the Paris Agreement “does not involve or provide a basis 
for any liability or compensation”. This provision is the result of negotiations for the 
Paris Agreement between developing countries on the one hand and the Umbrella 
 
6
 Decision 3/CP.18, Approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts 
in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to enhance 
adaptive capacity, 8 December 2012, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1. 
7
 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November 
to 10 December 2011, 15 March 2011, para 14(f). 
8
 Ibid., para. 7.  
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Group (generally including the United States, Australia, Canada and the Russian 
Federation among other countries) on the other. While the former requested the in-
clusion of liability and compensation for loss and damage, the Umbrella Group led 
by the United States aimed to remove all references to these matters from the text of 
the Paris Agreement.9 
As a non-binding source clarifying the meaning of the Paris Agreement provi-
sions, Decision 1/CP.21 has not settled the issue of state responsibility (and liability) 
for climate-change related events such as population displacement. Over the last fif-
teen years, both States and groups of individuals particularly affected by climate 
change have raised claims of violations of international law against States with high 
rates of greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions. Others have publicly contemplated to 
do so. So far, such claims have been unsuccessful. However, they raise crucial ques-
tions of state accountability and responsibility for causing environmental damage in 
breach of the UNFCCC regime and other sources of international environmental law.  
The first part of this paper will explore state responsibility in relation to GHG 
emissions, on the grounds of the correlation between such emissions, climate change 
and human displacement. The countries currently most affected by climate change-
related environmental disasters or degradation are not among the biggest contribu-
tors to anthropogenic GHG emissions.10 In fact, as in the case of small island States, 
their contribution to this global issue is often minimal. The allocation of responsibil-
ity for a global problem such as climate change raises questions of distributive jus-
tice. It, then, will enquire on which type of state responsibility – if any – can be 
constructed in relation to climate change-related events (including displacement). It 
will examine the notions of shared responsibility and of common but differentiated 
responsibilities in the light of state obligations under the UNFCCC regime, reflecting 
on their meaning for the purpose of both prevention and reparation. 
A second part of this paper will analyse meaningful attempts at international cli-
mate change litigation by States or groups of individuals. It will enquire on the rea-
 
9
 KREIENKAMP and VANHALA, Climate Change Loss and Damage, Global Governance Institute Brief-
ing Paper, March 2017, p. 7, available at: <https://www.ucl.ac.uk/global-governance/downloads/poli-
cybriefs/policy-brief-loss-and-damage> see also SIEGELE, “Loss and Damage (Article 8)”, in KLEIN et al. 
(eds.), The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Analysis and Commentary, Oxford, 2017, p. 224 ff. 
10
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change, 
Working Group III Contribution to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 2014, available at: <http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg2/> 
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sons for their lack of success, focusing in particular on proof of causation and allo-
cation of responsibility. In this context, a specific attention will also be devoted to 
international law principles that have been often recalled in this context, such as the 
prohibition of transboundary harm, the polluter pays principle and the precautionary 
principle. This section of the paper will analyse their meaning in the realm of climate 
change litigation and their potential to indirectly provide protection and redress to 
displaced individuals as a result of environmental degradation or disasters. 
The described analysis will focus on cross border displacement (permanent or 
temporary) caused by climate change, setting aside internal displacement as well as 
forms of voluntary migration prompted by reasons that include to a greater or lesser 
extent climate change. This paper will not delve into questions of availability and 
quality of scientific evidence of correlation between GHG emissions, climate change 
and events such as environmental degradation and natural disasters which in turn 
generate human displacement. Rather, it rests on the assumption that such a correla-
tion exists and has been sufficiently proven from a scientific point of view, at the 
very least to the point of reaching the threshold required by the precautionary prin-
ciple enshrined in Art. 3(3) UNFCCC.11 A last preliminary remark concerns this pa-
per’s choice of terminology. In particular, the controversial term “environmental ref-
ugees” will be avoided in favour of broader expressions such as “persons displaced 
by climate change-related events” and “climate change-related displacement”.  
2. – Climate Change-Related Displacement in Contemporary 
International Law 
Under contemporary international law, persons displaced due to events related to 
climate change do not enjoy sufficient protection. On the one hand, their inclusion 
under the scope of the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees (Refugee Con-
vention) is virtually absent in state practice. Beyond international refugee law, most 
sources of international human rights law (and the related jurisprudence) also fail to 
trace a link between displacement and climate change in ways that could offer alter-
native avenues of protection to affected individuals.  
 
11
 As will be further discussed in the course of this paper, Art. 3(3) UNFCCC establishes that in pres-
ence of “threats of serious or irreversible damage”, States Parties should not use “lack of full scientific 
certainty” as a reason to postpone “precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes 
of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects”. 
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On the other hand, the Paris Agreement has failed to establish stringent state ob-
ligations in relation to climate change-related displacement. In fact, this source is 
completely void of any reference to such a phenomenon. The only provision that 
explicitly addresses displacement is the abovementioned paragraph 49 of Decision 
1/CP.21, which grounded the establishment of the Task Force on Displacement.  
The limitations of international human rights law in relation to climate change-
related displacement, as thoroughly discussed by Mariana Ferolla Vallandro do Valle 
in her contribution to this volume, mainly rest on the difficulties of including the so-
called “environmental refugees” under the scope of Art. 1(A) of the Refugee Con-
vention. Such difficulties mainly stem from the fact that States of origin may hardly 
be qualified as persecutors themselves in relation to climate change-related events, 12 
and from the strict reliance of Art. 1(A) of the Refugee Convention on specific 
grounds of persecution.13 Such difficulties have also emerged in the context of do-
mestic judgments concerning the recognition of refugee status to persons displaced 
due to climate change – most notably, in New Zealand jurisprudence.14  
The lacunae of international refugee law have prompted the view that interna-
tional human rights law might offer better protections to persons displaced by climate 
 
12
 Climate change-related displacement is often suffered rather than caused by the States of origin of 
displaced individuals. As noted in the introduction to this paper, the States that are currently most affected 
by this phenomenon are not among the major contributors to worldwide GHG emissions. For a worldwide 
picture of climate-changes related displacement, see the Nansen Initiative’s Agenda for the Protection of 
Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change, Annex I, December 2015, 
available at: <https://www.nanseninitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-
VOLUME-2.pdf>. 
13
 Persons displaced by climate change-related events could then be qualified as refugees under the 
Convention only when they would be able to show an unwillingness of their state of origin to protect them 
due to their belonging to one of the protected groups under Art. 1(A). On this matter, see UN High Com-
missioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR, The Environment & Climate Change, cit.,supra note 5,  p. 9. 
14
 See for instance Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand, AC (Tuvalu), Judgment of 4 
June 2014, [2014] NZIPT 800517-520; Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand, AF (Kiribati), 
Judgment of 25 June 2013, [2013] NZIPT 800413; Immigration and Protection Tribunal New Zealand, AD 
(Tuvalu), Judgment of 4 June 2014, [2014] NZIPT 501370-371 (here, the Tribunal granted the appellants 
with a visa on humanitarian grounds); High Court of New Zealand, Ioane Teitiota v The Chief Executive 
of the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment, Judgment of 26 November 2013, [2013] NZHC 
3125; Supreme Court of New Zealand, Ioane Teitiota v The Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business 
Innovation and Employment, Judgment of 20 July 2015, [2015] NZSC 107. For a thorough analysis of this 
jurisprudence, see the paper by FEROLLA VALLANDRO DO VALLE in this volume, at p. 1 ff., and MCADAM, 
“Building International Approaches to Climate Change, Disasters, and Displacement”, Windsor Yearbook 
of Access to Justice, 2016, p. 1 ff., p. 5. 
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change-related events. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence 
has been seen as a particularly promising source of alternative protection in this con-
text. The ECtHR has indeed recognised breaches of the right to life (Art. 2 ECHR) 
and the right the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions (Art. 1 Protocol no. 1) in 
connection with State Parties’ due diligence obligations to prevent environmental 
disasters.15 It has also been argued that under certain circumstances the ECtHR juris-
prudence on Arts. 3 and 8 ECHR (respectively establishing a prohibition of torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to respect of private and family 
life) might be built upon to argue against expulsion orders towards States where in-
dividual applicants would suffer harm due to climate change-related events.16 Re-
gardless of the potential of protection stemming from the ECtHR jurisprudence and 
more broadly by international human rights law, such argumentations concern the 
relationship between individuals (citizens or non-citizens) and States. A possibly 
fruitful cross-fertilisation might arise between this realm and the interpretation of the 
UNFCCC regime by domestic and supranational courts. However, it must not be 
overlooked that the latter source concerns inter-State relationships and that parallels 
might be traced up to a certain extent.  
The next paragraphs, then, will analyse the issue of state responsibility towards 
other States in relation to GHG emissions causing climate change-related events such 
as displacement. This analysis will first focus on the broader international law regime 
of state responsibility, and will then move on to the more specific matter of state 
responsibility for GHG emissions in the UNFCCC regime. 
 
 
 
 
 
15
 MCADAM, “Building International Approaches to Climate Change”, cit. supra note 14, p. 2016. See 
also MCADAM and FERRIS, “Planned Relocations in the Context of Climate change: Unpacking the Legal 
and Conceptual Issues”, Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law, 2015, p. 166 ff., p. 158, 
and case law cited therein; WEWERINKE-SINGH, “State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations Asso-
ciated with Climate Change”, in DUYCK, JODOIN and JOHL, Routledge Handbook of Human Rights and 
Climate Governance, Abingdon (forthcoming). 
16
 SCOTT, “Natural Disasters, Climate Change and Non-Refoulement: What Scope for Resisting Ex-
pulsion under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights?”, International Journal of 
Refugee Law, 2014, p. 404 ff. 
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3. – State Responsibility for Climate Change under the International 
Regime on Responsibility 
The general international law regime on state responsibility constitutes an im-
portant lens of analysis of climate-change related displacement. The traditional un-
derstanding of state responsibility under international law rests on the concept of 
individual responsibility for internationally wrongful acts. As is well known, the In-
ternational Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts (DARSIWA)17 state at Art. 1 that “every internationally 
wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State”. For the 
purpose of identifying an internationally wrongful act, Art. 2 requires that an action 
or omission is attributable to the State under international law, and that such a con-
duct breaches an international obligation of the State. While individual state respon-
sibility is the general rule established by DARSIWA, Art. 47 dictates a specific rule 
for cases where “several States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful 
act”. In this instance, “the responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to 
that act”. The accompanying commentary to DARSIWA clarifies that, in this case, 
the injured State can hold each responsible State accountable for the entire wrongful 
act.18 However, Art. 47 does not include within its scope situations where more than 
one State carry out separate wrongful conducts that contribute to the same damage. 
In this case, indeed, the general rule of individual responsibility applies.19 
In this light, the identification of state responsibility with respect to climate 
change poses several problems. First, the objective element of state responsibility 
requires the commission of an internationally wrongful act. Identifying breaches of 
specific provisions of the Paris Agreement in relation to GHG emissions of States 
Parties is not an easy task. Many of its provisions establish obligations of result that 
need further interpretation and clarification. Art. 4(1), for instance, states that Parties 
“aim to reach” global peaking of GHG emissions “as soon as possible”, and to un-
dertake “rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science”. Sim-
ilarly, Art. 4(3) requires NDCs to reflect States Parties’ “highest possible ambition”. 
Furthermore, some scholars have cast doubts over the possibility to speak of state 
 
17
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, November 2011. 
18
 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, p. 124. 
19
 Ibid., p. 125. 
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responsibility at all for sources assisted by compliance mechanisms of a quasi-judi-
cial nature.20 Both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement have been cited as 
paradigmatic in this sense, where it would be best to refer to “shared accountabil-
ity”.21 This notion would apply to cases where “a multiplicity of actors is held to 
account for conduct in contravention of international norms, but where this does not 
necessarily involve international responsibility for internationally wrongful acts in 
its formal meaning”.22 
Regardless of such a distinction, shared responsibility or accountability are not 
necessarily more appropriate concepts than independent responsibility in the context 
of climate change. The effects of GHG emissions are felt globally. Climate change 
is the result of a combination of all States’ emissions, and thus the related environ-
mental damage (such as floods, droughts, sea-level rise and so forth) are not directly 
attributable to any State in particular. Rather, all States contribute to this global issue 
through their respective GHG emissions - although to different degrees. This poses 
the question of whether a State Party’s emission of GHG in breach of the Paris 
Agreement23 may give rise to its liability vis-à-vis affected States even if damages 
caused by climate change (including human displacement) are not entirely attributa-
ble to the former. As shown above, Art. 47 of DARSIWA only admits this possibility 
when the action of multiple States can be identified as a single internationally wrong-
ful act. However, this definition is ill-fitted for GHG emissions, which are more ap-
propriately framed as separate acts than generate the same damage (i.e., climate 
change). In such situations, framed as instances of “cumulative responsibility”, re-
course to parallel individual attribution has been deemed as the best approach in ju-
dicial realms. Indeed, this avoid incurring in inadmissibility of claims due to the fail-
ure to raise claims against all responsible or accountable States.24 
 
20
 NOLLKAEMPER and JACOBS, “Shared Responsibility in International Law: A Conceptual Frame-
work”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 2013, p. 359 ff., p. 369. On the compliance mechanism 
established by Art. 15 of the Paris Agreement, see also VOIGT, “The Compliance and Implementation 
Mechanism of the Paris Agreement”, Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law, 2016, p. 161 ff. 
21
 PEEL, “Climate Change”, in NOLLKAEMPER and PLAKOKEFALOS (eds.), The Practice of Shared Re-
sponsibility in International Law, Cambridge, 2017, p. 1009 ff., pp. 1038-1039. 
22
 NOLLKAEMPER and JACOBS, “Shared Responsibility”, cit. supra note 20, p. 369. 
23
 Such breaches may consist, for instance, in the adoption of nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs) that are inadequate to the albeit generic standards set by the Agreement, or in a failure of the State 
Party to respect its own NDCs, or even in a failure to set NDCs altogether. 
24
 NOLLKAEMPER and JACOBS, “Shared Responsibility”, cit. supra note 20, pp. 388 – 389 and p. 425. 
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Against this background, the concept of common but differentiated responsibili-
ties embraced by the UNFCCC regime might offer a middle ground between indi-
vidual and shared responsibility. The next paragraph will explore the meaning of this 
founding principle of the UNFCCC regime for the construction of state liability for 
environmental damages and displacement caused by climate change. 
4. – Common but Differentiated Responsibilities under the UNFCCC 
Regime 
The UNFCCC regime, and the notion of common but differentiated responsibil-
ities on which it is based, have been a source of particular interest among scholarly 
studies on the potential of international environmental law to offer protection to per-
sons displaced by climate change-related events. 
The concept of common but differentiated responsibilities already grounded the 
UNFCCC, whose Art. 3(1) prompts all States Parties to “protect the climate system 
for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity 
and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respec-
tive capabilities”. Its Art. 4 enumerates various obligations for States Parties under 
this general principle. These include, among other things, the implementation of re-
gional mitigation programmes for anthropogenic emissions, promotion and cooper-
ation with respect of technologies and practise aimed at reducing GHG emissions, 
cooperation in preparing for adaptation to climate change, and so forth. In the light 
of common but differentiated responsibilities, the UNFCCC also sets aside devel-
oped country Parties and other Parties in its Annex I. Only for such countries, Art. 
4(2) envisages an obligation to adopt national policies and measures aimed at limit-
ing their GHG emissions and thus mitigate climate change.  
While not a new concept in international treaty law, common but differentiated 
responsibilities were explicitly mentioned for the first time in a multilateral environ-
mental treaty on the occasion of the adoption of the UNFCCC.25 Thus, one of its found-
ing principles is that while the responsibility for the protection of the climate system 
is shared among all States, their respective contribution to solving the issue of climate 
change should be differentiated depending on their capabilities.26 The Kyoto Protocol 
 
25
 STONE, “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law”, The American Journal 
of International Law, 2004, p. 276 ff., p. 279. 
26
 CARLANE, GRAY, and TARASOFSKY, “International Climate Change Law: Mapping the Field”, in 
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to the UNFCCC27 further specified this concept by referring it to GHG emission tar-
gets. Despite a single explicit mention of common but differentiated responsibilities 
(under Art. 10), the Kyoto Protocol is entirely permeated by this principle.28 Indeed, 
many of the obligations established under this source are exclusively referred to State 
Parties included in Annex I. Most notably, Art. 3 binds these States to keep their GHG 
emissions below their assigned amounts pursuant Annex B to the Protocol.  
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities was further reinstated 
by the Paris Agreement. Pursuant its Art. 2(a), one of the objectives of this source is 
to “hold the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-
industrial levels” to reduce the impact of climate change. To pursue this aim, the Paris 
Agreement established much less stringent obligations than the Kyoto Protocol, leav-
ing States Parties with greater discretion with respect to GHG emission targets. Under 
the Agreement, all Parties are required to communicate nationally determined contri-
butions (NDCs) to the global response to climate change. Although such contributions 
are defined by Art. 3 as “ambitious efforts” representing a “progression over time”, 
the Agreement essentially leaves States Parties free to determine their respective con-
tribution with respect to reduction of GHG emissions, adaptation efforts, financial con-
tributions to developing countries, technology sharing, capacity-building and so forth. 
In addition to a frequent use of non-binding expressions such as “should” or “may”, it 
is possible to observe that many of the binding obligations included in the Agreement 
are clear obligations of conduct. Art. 4, for instance, requires States Parties to “aim to 
reach” global peaking of GHG emissions “as soon as possible” and “to undertake rapid 
reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science”.  
With specific reference to NDCs, Art. 4 of the Paris Agreement establishes sev-
eral procedural obligations. State Parties shall prepare successive NDCs that repre-
sent a progression over their previous ones (para 3), communicate them every five 
years (para 9) and account for them (para 13). It has been argued that these proce-
dural rules are not matched by any specific obligation for State Parties to implement 
or achieve their own NDCs.29 This view is essentially based on the fact that Art. 4(2) 
 
CARLANE, K. GRAY and TARASOFSKY (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law, 
Oxford, 2016, p. 3 ff., p. 14 ff. 
27
 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, signed on 11 
December 1997, entered into force on 16 February 2005, UNTS 2303, p. 162. 
28
 On this point, see BODANSKY, BRUNNÉE, RAJAMANI, International Climate Change Law, Oxford, 
2017, p. 165 ff. 
29
 BODANSKY, “The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement”, 25 Review of European Community and 
International Environmental Law, 2016, p. 142 ff., pp. 145-146. 
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of the Paris Agreement requires State Parties to “pursue domestic mitigation 
measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of [NDCs]”, rather than explicitly 
including a state obligation to implement NDCs and achieve their specific content. 
However, the language of Art. 4(2) should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
State Parties are entirely free to disregard their own NDCs. Art. 4(2) establishes a 
clear obligation of conduct that can be breached by actions or omissions of States 
Parties that are incompatible with the goals they themselves have set in their NDCs.  
The concept of common but differentiated responsibilities in the context of the 
UNFCCC regime has attracted the interest of international law scholars as a potential 
source of state liability for environmental damage caused by climate change. The 
main proposition in this context concerns the development of a form of responsibility 
of States with the highest levels of GHG emissions towards those States most af-
fected by phenomena linked to climate change, including human displacement.30  
This principle also inspired proposals for an international treaty law instrument 
(in the form of a Protocol to the UNFCCC31 or as a self-standing treaty32) that would 
specifically address the issue of climate-change related displacement, also by regu-
lating compensation for costs related to the management of this phenomenon. In 
these theoretical constructions, the principle of common but differentiated responsi-
bilities has been understood as a burden-sharing criterion whereby developed coun-
tries would bear a higher proportion of costs due to their significant contribution to 
climate change.33 However, using the principle of common but differentiated respon-
sibilities to construe responsibility for dealing with climate-change related displace-
ment appears a quite far-fetched interpretation. It has been rightly noted that “alt-
hough it is tempting to allocate responsibility based on the UNFCCC principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’, that principle was developed to clarify 
 
30
 MAYER, “Climate Change, Migration, and International Law in Southeast Asia”, in KOH et al. (eds.), 
Adaptation to Climate Change: ASEAN and Comparative Perspectives, Singapore, 2016, p. 337 ff., pp. 
346-347. 
31
 BIERMANN and BOAS, “Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global Governance System to 
Protect Climate Refugees”, Global Environmental Politics, 2010, p. 60 ff. 
32
 DOCHERTY and GIANNINI, “Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Climate Change 
Refugees’, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2009, p. 349 ff.; HODGKINSON and YOUNG, “‘In the Face of 
Looming Catastrophe’: A Convention for Climate-Change-Displaced Persons”, in GERRARD and WANNIER 
(eds.), Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate, Cambridge, 2013, p. 299 ff. 
33
 BIERMANN and BOAS, “Preparing for a Warmer World”, cit. supra note 31, p. 76; DOCHERTY and 
GIANNINI, “Confronting a Rising Tide”, cit. supra note 32, pp. 346-347; HODGKINSON and YOUNG, “‘In 
the Face of Looming Catastrophe’”, cit. supra note 32, p. 318. 
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who needed to reduce emissions causing the overall problem”34 and that “using that 
principle to assign responsibility to one country for the effects experienced by spe-
cific individuals strains traditional notions of causation”.35  
This criticism holds true even after the adoption of the Paris Agreement. In fact, 
the shift marked by Decision 1/CP.21 in the framing of climate-change related dis-
placement – from adaptation to loss and damage – made the construction of common 
but differentiated responsibilities under comment even more unlikely. In this light, 
the optimism generated by the obligation under Art. 4(4) UNFCCC for developed 
country Parties to “assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulner-
able to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those 
adverse effects” no longer appears justifiable.36 After Decision 1/CP.21, any state 
action aimed at facing the consequences of climate change-related displacement (and 
the associated costs) may no longer be framed as adaption efforts, but rather as ef-
forts to address loss and damage. Therefore, it appears that such activities may no 
longer be included within the scope of Art. 4(4) UNFCCC.  
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, then, does not pro-
vide a sufficiently stable ground to construe a common state responsibility or liability 
for climate-change related damage. Even extensive interpretations of the Paris 
Agreement and more broadly of the UNFCCC may hardly generate an obligation for 
developing country Parties to compensate or cover the cost of human displacement 
incurred by States disproportionally affected by climate change.  
Nonetheless, efforts to obtain redress for climate-change related displacement 
and damage have multiplied in the last fifteen years at domestic and international 
level. Such efforts reflect a broad unease with the current lack of provisions on state 
responsibility and liability for events caused to GHG emissions. In this light, claims 
for redress have relied on different principles of international environmental law in 
an effort to expand the scope of existing provisions on state responsibility. The next 
 
34
 MCANANEY, “Sinking Islands? Formulating a Realistic Solution to Climate Change Displacement”, 
New York University Law Review, 2012, p. 1172 ff., p. 1193. 
35
 Id. 
36
 On this point, see KUUSIPALO, “Exiled by Emissions: Climate Change Related Displacement and Mi-
gration in International Law: Gaps in Global Governance and the Role of the UN Climate Convention”, Ver-
mont Journal of Environmental Law, 2017, p. 614 ff., pp. 637-639, who argues that Art. 4(4) UNFCCC may 
be interpreted as generating obligations for developed country Parties to provide financial assistance to coun-
tries most affected by “climate-induced migration”, or at least suggest a “soft-law liability” in this field. 
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paragraphs will examine significant examples of climate change litigation (or at-
tempts thereof), reflecting on their significance, their pitfalls and their perspectives 
of success in the near future.  
5. – Climate Change Litigation in Domestic Jurisdictions 
On 24 June 2015, the Hague District Court issued a landmark judgement that has 
attracted great attention among international and environmental law scholars. In Ur-
genda v. the Netherlands,37 the Court upheld the claim of a citizens’ platform (Ur-
genda) that the Netherlands had failed to meet its duty of care towards its citizens by 
establishing reduction targets for GHG emissions that were insufficient in the light 
of its domestic and international obligations. The latter included, among other 
sources, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol as well as the “no harm” principle. 
The Court observed that while these norms did not directly grant rights to Urgenda, 
they “still [held] meaning” for the purpose of defining the scope of the States’ duty 
of care and the discretionary power to which it was entitled to.38 
The UNFCCC, while not considered as having a direct effect, was used by the 
Court as a key interpretative tool to determine the scope of such duty of care in rela-
tion to the State’s obligation to take precautionary measures for its citizens to face 
climate change.39 First, the Court observed that by becoming a Party to the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol, the State had “accepted its responsibility for the national 
emission level” as well as “the obligation to reduce this emission level as much as 
needed to prevent dangerous climate change”.40 Second, it rejected the State’s view 
whereby its contribution to global emissions was minor and a reduction in national 
emission would not contribute significantly to the 2° target set by the Cancun Agree-
ments in the context of the 2010 Climate Conference.41 Indeed, the Court held that 
“climate change is a global problem and therefore requires global accountability”.42 
 
37
 Urgenda Foundation (on behalf of 886 individuals) v The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of In-
frastructure and the Environment), judgment of 24 June 2015, ILDC 2456 (NL 2015).  
38
 Ibid., para 4.52. 
39
 Ibid., paras 4.63 – 4.64. A specific mention was made in the judgment of the principle of fairness, 
the precautionary principle and the sustainability principle underlying Arts. 2 and 3 UNFCCC. 
40
 4.66 
41
 Decision 1/CP.16 
42
 Urgenda v. the Netherlands, cit. supra note 37, para 4.79. please verify cross-reference rules 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Responsibility for Climate Change under the UNFCCC Regime … 37 
 
 
This interpretation recalled the concept of common but differentiated responsibili-
ties. The state obligation to adopt precautionary measures in application of the duty 
of care was established regardless of its actual contribution to global GHG emissions, 
recalling “both a joint and an individual responsibility of the signatories of the 
[UNFCCC]”.43 
The Urgenda judgment drew significant criticism. The discussed conclusions 
seem in contradiction with the fact that, by admission of the Court itself, the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol only bound the Netherlands in its relationship with 
other States and do not entail any rights for private individuals or legal persons.44 
Nonetheless, the Urgenda judgment constitutes an interesting example of judicial 
interpretation of otherwise generic concepts – such as in this case the duty of care – 
in the light of international environmental law. It is also noteworthy that the Court’s 
implicit reliance on common but differentiated responsibilities in relation to reduc-
tion of GHG emissions allowed it to set aside issue of causation. Thus, the claimant 
was not required to prove a minimum level of contribution by the Netherlands to the 
global issue of climate change. A similar reasoning had been carried out by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).45 Here, 
the UNFCCC did not play such an important role as in Urgenda. The Supreme Court 
deemed it a non-binding treaty, and remarked the lack of participation of the U.S. to 
the Kyoto Protocol. However, it briefly cited UNFCCC standards in support of its 
rebuttal of the EPA’s view that GHG emissions caused by motor vehicles contributed 
minimally to global warming. The Supreme Court also ruled that regardless of the 
entity of the U.S. contribution to GHG concentrations, federal courts have jurisdic-
tion over determine whether the EPA’s refusal to take steps to slow or reduce global 
warming by regulating GHG emissions. 
While certainly significant, the discussed domestic judgments contribute only in 
part to the enquiry on the potential for success of claims for redress and reparation 
 
43
 Id. 
44
 Ibid 4.42. On this point, see DE GRAAF and JANS, “The Urgenda Decision: Netherlands Liable for 
Role in Causing Dangerous Global Climate Change”, Journal of Environmental Law, 2015, p. 517 ff., pp. 
525-526, who argue that the Urgenda judgment is at odds with Arts. 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution. 
The authors highlight that, according to these constitutional norms, only provisions of international treaties 
which may be binding on all persons by virtue of their content may generate rights for individuals.  
45
 Supreme Court of the United States, Massachusetts, et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et 
al., Judgment of 2 April 2007, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). For a commentary on this judgment, see also GALVÃO 
FERREIRA, “‘Common But Differentiated Responsibilities’ in the National Courts: Lessons from Urgenda 
v. The Netherlands”, Transnational Environmental Law, 2016, p. 329 ff.  
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for harm caused by climate change (including human displacement). First, the matter 
of damages was not discussed at all, because both Urgenda and Massachusetts v. 
EPA concerned requests of judicial orders either directly or indirectly imposing a 
reduction of GHG emissions as mitigation measures.  
Second, both cases lack a transboundary dimension. In Urgenda, the considera-
tions of the Hague High Court were limited to the relationship between the Nether-
lands and its own citizens. The Court held that there was no need to rule on Urgenda’s 
claims concerning the rights of current and future generations in countries other than 
the Netherlands, deeming sufficient to analyse the question of the State’s duty of care 
within the Dutch territory.46 In Massachusetts v. EPA, standing was only recognised 
to the State of Massachusetts and not to the other petitioners, which included other 
U.S. States as well as local governments and private organisations.47 On the other 
hand, an interesting yet isolated case concerning the transboundary harm caused by 
emissions in a certain State has concerned the opposition of the Federated States of 
Micronesia to the expansion of a coal-fired power plant in the Czech Republic. Mi-
cronesia requested the Czech Ministry of Environment to initiate a transboundary 
environmental impact assessment, arguing that an expansion would negatively affect 
their territory. Such a request was never brought before domestic courts, but this case 
is nonetheless a telling example of recognition of the interest of a State in the matter 
of the transboundary effects of emission levels which significantly contribute to en-
vironmental damage on its territory. Indeed, while it ultimately authorised the 
planned extension, the Ministry recognised Micronesia as an affected State and re-
quired the company in charge of this operation to adopt compensation measures for 
the increase in emissions implied in the project.48 
 
 
 
 
 
46
 Urgenda v. the Netherlands, cit., paras 4.91 and 4.92. 
47
 The Supreme Court considered that the State of Massachusetts had a special position and interest in 
the petition, and focused on the risk of harm to the State due to the EPA’s refusal to regulate GHG emissions 
(Massachusetts v. EPA, cit., pp. 15-18). 
48
 On this case, see BODANSKY, BRUNNÉE and RAJAMANI, International Climate Change Law, cit. 
supra note 28, pp. 47-49; THORNTON, “Compensatory Justice for Climate Change Displacees under Inter-
national Law: Fault-Based and No-Fault Approaches”, Irish Yearbook of International Law, 2011, p. 25 
ff., pp. 34-35. 
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6. – Climate Justice in a Human Rights Context: Examples from the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
At supranational level, the most significant attempts to ground climate justice 
claims on environmental law principles or general principles of international law 
have been made before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. This par-
agraph will focus on two petitions respectively submitted by the Inuit against the 
United States and the Athabaskan people against Canada. Such populations are al-
ready heavily affected by climate change. As emphasized in both petitions, temper-
ature increase is particularly fast in the Arctic, causing changes in the weather, snow 
quantity and quality, ice conditions and the integrity of the landscape. These phe-
nomena have already generated forced relocations and are likely to further impact 
Arctic populations in the near future.  
On 7 December 2005, a petition on behalf of all Inuit of the Arctic regions of the 
United States and Canada was submitted to the Commission (Inuit Petition), seeking 
relief from a series of violations resulting from global warming.49 The petition for relief 
claimed that several human rights of the Inuit had been breached. Most notably for our 
purposes, the petitioners lamented a violation of their right to residence, movement 
and inviolability of the home. They submitted that climate change-related events such 
as storms, permafrost melt, coastal erosion, and landslides were destroying their areas 
of settlement, causing damages to homes, infrastructure and communities.50 
For obvious reasons, the petition was mostly based on international human rights 
law. Several sources in this realm were cited as standards for the purpose of the in-
terpretation of relevant provisions of the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man51 and the American Convention on Human Rights.52 For instance, the 
petition referred to the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence on environ-
mental pollution to argue that international human rights law draws a connection 
between the right to the inviolability of the home, the right to private life and the 
right to a clean and safe environment. Such cases, however, did not analyse the issue 
 
49
 Petition to the Inter American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Re-
sulting from Global 
Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States, 7 December 2005. 
50
 Ibid., pp. 94-95. 
51
 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted on 2 May 1948. 
52
 American Convention on Human Rights, adopted on 22 November 1969. 
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of state responsibility in relation to the transboundary effects of its polluting activi-
ties. Rather, the ECtHR had recognised breaches of citizens’ rights to private and 
family life under Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) due 
to State Parties’ failure to protect them from polluting activities carried out on the 
national territory. 
Despite this focus on international human rights law, the UNFCCC also consti-
tuted an important reference in the petition. The UNFCCC was included among the 
international treaties that the Commission should take into account when interpreting 
the American Declaration and the American Convention. More specifically, the 
UNFCCC was cited as the international standard against which the Commission 
would have to assess the United States’ respect of their due diligence obligations in 
relation to climate change and mitigation of GHG emissions. In the petitioners’ view, 
the fact that the United States had breached its international obligations in relation 
to climate change “further [reinforced] the conclusion that the United States is vio-
lating rights protected by the American Declaration”.53 The petitioners argued that 
the United States was breaching its obligation under Art. 4(2)(b) UNFCCC to return 
its GHG emissions to 1990 levels. In their view, the United States’ failure to take 
any steps in this direction amounted to a violation of its obligation to implement the 
UNFCCC in good faith and in the light of its objectives.  
In addition to the UNFCCC, the petitioners referred to the United States’ breach 
of the customary international law norm consisting in the obligation to avoid trans-
boundary harm. To this end, they cited landmark judgments of the International 
Court of Justice54 as well as several international treaty law sources – including the 
Preamble of the UNFCCC itself, where it recalls that “States have (…) the responsi-
bility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage 
to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion”. The United States’ failure to minimise the transboundary environmental im-
pact of climate change on the Arctic contributed in the petitioners’ view to the 
claimed human rights violations. 
Lastly, the petitioners lamented a breach of the precautionary principle as en-
shrined in Art. 3(3) UNFCCC. The latter provides that a lack of full scientific cer-
tainty should not constitute a valid reason for postponing precautionary measures to 
 
53
 Ibid., p. 97. 
54
 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Albania), Judgment of 25 
March 1948; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Responsibility for Climate Change under the UNFCCC Regime … 41 
 
 
anticipate, prevent and minimize the causes of climate change or mitigate its effects. 
The petitioners observed that even accepting the U.S. governments’ allegations of 
scientific uncertainty in climate science, an obligation to take precautionary 
measures would still stand.  
Differently than the domestic judgments analysed in the previous section, the 
Inuit petition also faced the question of reparations. The request to provide an appro-
priate remedy and redress included both the limitation of GHG emissions and the 
payment of reparations for the harm caused by them. These requests rested on the 
polluter pays principle (whereby those responsible for polluting activities must bear 
the cost of the related environmental harm)55 and on the general principle whereby 
States’ breaches of international law generate a duty to make reparations.56 The Inter-
American Commission ultimately refused to process the petition, holding that the 
information provided in the Rules did not allow a determination of “whether the al-
leged facts would tend to characterize a violation of rights protected by the American 
Declaration”.57  
The Inuit Petition, while unsuccessful, raised interesting points concerning the 
application of the prohibition of transboundary harm to the issue of state responsi-
bility for climate change-related events. Together with the precautionary principle, 
this prohibition may constitute an important reference in support of the identification 
of state responsibility for failure to curb GHG emissions and for the related breaches 
of human rights caused by climate change. This would also apply to provisions of 
the American Convention that have a specific relevance for the issue of climate 
change-related displacement, such as the right to reside in one’s State under Art. 22 
or the right to respect of one’s home under Art. 11(2). Such an interpretation would 
indirectly allow a judicial implementation of key principles grounding the UNFCCC 
regime by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights – a process which may be 
replicated in other regional human rights law contexts as well.  
 
55
 On this point, see CHRISTIANSEN, Climate Conflicts: A Case of International Environmental and 
Humanitarian Law, Lüneburg, 2015, who emphasizes that the polluter pays principle was purposefully not 
included in the UNFCCC nor in the Kyoto Protocol, in favour of the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities (p. 64 ff. and p. 93 ff.) 
56
 Corfu Channel, cit. supra note 54; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment 
of 25 September 1977. 
57
 On this point, see DE LA ROSA JAIMES, “Climate Change and Human Rights Litigation in Europe and 
the Americas”, Seattle Journal of Environmental Law, 2015, p. 198 ff., pp. 191-193. 
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In this sense, the more recent petition submitted by the Arctic Athabaskan Coun-
cil (Athabaskan petition)58 before the Inter-American Commission could bear some 
fruitful results. The petition, currently under consideration before the Commission, 
claimed that Canada had breached several human rights recognised by the American 
Declaration, namely the right to culture, property, means of subsistence and health. 
In support of this view, it also relied on the precautionary principle as well as the 
obligation to avoid transboundary harm, specifically citing the UNFCCC in relation 
to the latter. The petitioners argued that Canada, despite agreeing to the language of 
the UNFCCC, had failed to ensure that its black carbon emissions would not cause 
environmental harm outside of its borders and jurisdiction. These violations, in turn, 
had caused the lamented human rights violations.  
The focus of the Athabaskan petition on black carbon emissions might raise the 
chances of obtaining at least an admissibility review by the Inter-American Commis-
sion in comparison to the Inuit petition.  
Differently than GHG emissions, which cause damages at global level regardless 
where they originate, black carbon emissions produce a stronger impact on nearby 
areas. Therefore, establishing causation is easier for the latter form of pollution. Can-
ada was identified as the state responsible for environmental damage in the Arctic 
because black carbon emissions near this area have a greater chance of depositing on 
Arctic ice and snow. At the same time, an eventual decision of admissibility or even 
a judgment by the IACtHR on the petition under review would provide important 
insights on the meaning and scope of the prohibition of transboundary harm for the 
broader matter of climate change. However, whether and to what extent this principle 
might be interpreted so as to construe a form of state responsibility in relation to 
GHG emissions causing climate change is a complex matter. The next paragraph will 
carry out a closer examination of this question, also with specific reference to climate 
change-related displacement.  
 
 
58
 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations of the 
Rights of Arctic Athabaskan Peoples Resulting from Rapid Arctic Warming and Melting Caused by Emis-
sions of Black Carbon by Canada, 23 April 2013. For a more in-depth analysis of the petition, see DE LA 
ROSA JAIMES, “Climate Change and Human Rights Litigation”, cit. supra note 57, pp. 193-195; DE LA ROSA 
JAIMES, “The Arctic Athabaskan Petition: Where Accelerated Arctic Warming Meets Human Rights”, Cal-
ifornia Western International Law Journal, 2015, p. 213 ff. 
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7. – The Potential of Contentious and Advisory Jurisdiction of the ICJ in 
the Field of Climate Justice  
The prohibition of transboundary harm is a widely recognised principle of inter-
national environmental law. While its status of customary international law is still 
debated,59 it has been widely established and developed in international law and ju-
risprudence. Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,60 Principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration61 and the Preamble to the UNFCCC reproduce verbatim the same princi-
ple, whereby States have the “responsibility to ensure that activities within their ju-
risdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”. This principle was also reinstated 
by the International Law Association’s Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to 
Climate Change62, also in connection with GHG emissions. Draft Article 7A(2) en-
visages a state obligation to exercise due diligence also by taking appropriate 
measures to “anticipate, prevent or minimise the causes of climate change, especially 
through effective measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions”. 
The prohibition of transboundary harm has been consistently established in the 
context of international arbitration (starting from the landmark Trail Smelter case)63 
as well as of the ICJ jurisprudence. In its Advisory Opinion on Legality of the Threat 
or Use of Nuclear Weapons64, the ICJ identified a general state obligation “to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond national control” as “part of the corpus of international law 
 
59
 GLICKENHAUS, “Potential ICJ Advisory Opinion: Duties to Prevent Transboundary Harm from GHG 
Emission”, New York University Environmental Law Journal, 2015, p. 117 ff., pp. 137-139. 
60
 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 16 June 
1972, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973). According to Principle 21, States have “the responsibility to 
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction”.  
61
 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I). Principle 2 of the Declaration reproduces verbatim Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration.  
62
 International Law Association, Committee on Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, Decla-
ration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, Resolution 2/2014. 
63
 Trail Smelter case (United States v. Canada), decision of 6 April 1938 and 11 March 1941, UN Report 
of International Arbitral Awards, Vol. III, pp. 1905-1982. See also Award in the Arbitration regarding the 
Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
decision of 24 May 2005, UN Report of International Arbitral Awards Vol. XXVII, pp. 35-125.  
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relating to environment”.65 In its Pulp Mills judgment,66 moreover, the ICJ further 
refined a principle previously established in the Corfu Channel case,67 stating that the 
state obligation not to knowingly allow the use of its territory for acts contrary to the 
rights of other States also included an obligation to “use all the means of its disposal 
in order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in any area under its 
jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the environment of another State”.68  
The difficulty of applying the prohibition of transboundary harm in the realm of 
GHG emissions and climate change stems from the context in which such a principle 
has been conceived and applied. In particular, all the cited contentious cases on trans-
boundary pollution examined by the ICJ and in the context of international arbitra-
tion concerned polluting activities carried out in one State and affecting a neighbour-
ing State. On the other hand, as clarified in this paper, the harm caused by such emis-
sions (i.e., climate change and the related environmental events, also leading to hu-
man displacement) is not attributable to an individual State but is rather the result of 
the behaviour of a plurality of States. The nature of the damage, then, is global rather 
than strictly transboundary.69  
Despite such difficulties, there is potential for a fruitful application of the prohi-
bition of transboundary harm to the issue of climate-change related harm, including 
human displacement. There is little question that the forced relocation of population 
within or outside of national borders is a form of harm not only for involved individ-
uals but for their affected States as well. The case of small State islands is a fitting 
illustration of this argument. Here, coastal erosion, sea level rise and inundations are 
displacing communities, affecting livelihoods and producing socio-economic costs 
that aggravate the vulnerability of such States.70  
In 2002, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu announced its intention to raise claims 
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 Ibid., para 29. 
66
 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), judgment of 20 April 2010. 
67
 Corfu Channel, cit. supra note 54. 
68
 Pulp Mills, cit. supra note 66, para 101. 
69
 On this point, see PEEL, “Climate Change”, cit., p. 1031; SCHWARTE and FRANK, ‘The International 
Law Association's Legal Principles on Climate Change and Climate Liability under Public International 
Law’, Climate Law, 2014, p. 201 ff., pp. 207-208 
70
 NURSE et al., “Small Islands”, in Barros et al. (eds.), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, 
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before the ICJ against Australia and the United States for their refusal to sign the 
Kyoto Protocol.71 This intention was not pursued further, but the declarations of the 
Prime Minister did raise the question of whether and to what extent the ICJ might be 
the appropriate realm to address claims raised by States that risk to be entirely sub-
merged due to sea-level caused by climate change.  
In 2011, this question was taken up by Palau. Addressing the UN General As-
sembly, President Johnson Toribiong explicitly invoked the prohibition of trans-
boundary harm (characterising it as a norm of customary international law) in rela-
tion to the impacts of climate change on the population of Palau.72 President Toribi-
ong highlighted that this “existential threat (…) exemplifies the issue of transbound-
ary harm”,73 citing Security Council Resolution 63/28174 in support. Against this 
background, it anticipated that Palau and the Republic of the Marshall Islands would 
seek an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ “on the responsibilities of States under in-
ternational law to ensure that activities carried out under their jurisdiction or control 
that emit greenhouse gases do not damage other States”.75 
It is regrettable that an actual request for an Advisory Opinion did not follow the 
cited statement. The exercise of the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ would have of-
fered important clarifications as to the possibility to define GHG emissions as trans-
boundary harm for the purpose of construing state responsibility in this realm. At the 
same time, pursuing an Advisory Opinion rather than a contentious claim would have 
allowed to set aside complex questions discussed in this paper, such as the issue of 
allocating responsibility to a single State for a global problem and the need to ground 
and define claims of reparation for the suffered environmental loss and damage.76 
This paper’s analysis of previous attempts at climate justice also suggests that rele-
vant sources within the UNFCCC regime (including the Paris Agreement) might play 
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an important role in this context. At the very least, this regime serves as a crucial 
indication of the existence of links between the principle of transboundary harm and 
state obligations to curb their GHG emissions in international treaty law. 
8. – Concluding Remarks 
Climate change-related displacement challenges the traditional understanding of 
state responsibility in international treaty and customary law. As other types of envi-
ronmental damage caused by GHG emissions, climate change-related displacement 
raises questions of allocation of accountability and responsibility that cannot be en-
tirely answered by the current regime of state responsibility. This paper has shown that 
even extensive interpretations of the founding principles of such a regime, such as the 
concept of shared responsibility, are capable at the moment to meet the need for redress 
that is clearly emerging in domestic and supranational jurisprudence. At the same time, 
the UNFCCC regime, which is specifically targeted at establishing state obligations in 
relation to climate change caused by GHG emissions, does not provide for definitive 
solutions with this respect. The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities 
appears to be too linked to adaptation efforts to be used as a criterion of the allocation 
of state responsibility for climate change-related harm.  
Yet, the examined judicial efforts to raise claims against States who are strong emit-
ters of GHG for the purpose of obtaining reparations and redress suggest that it is only a 
matter of time before constructions of state responsibility for climate change-related 
damage start are proposed by supranational and domestic courts. In fact, the Urgenda 
judgment by the Hague District Court already initiated this process. While a judicial 
dialogue between domestic courts might offer interesting cues, an Advisory Opinion by 
the ICJ is the most desirable development in this realm. From the point of view of cli-
mate change-related displacement, there is no doubt that an Advisory Opinion would 
provide invaluable cues for international environmental law and jurisprudence on how 
to address claims raised by individuals against States as well as inter-State climate 
change litigation. The shift of climate change-related displacement from the framework 
of adaptation to that of loss and damage in the Paris Agreement suggests an awareness 
that this phenomenon may no longer be prevented, but must be dealt with as an adverse 
effect of climate change. This change in perspective makes it even more urgent for in-
ternational law and jurisprudence to create a legal framework on state responsibility that 
is capable to respond to calls for climate justice coming from States and populations that 
are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.  
BRUNO, PALOMBINO, ROSSI (eds.), Migration and the Environment: Some Reflections on Current Legal Issues and 
Possible Ways Forward, Rome, CNR Edizioni, 2017, ISBN 978 88 8080 277 8, pp. 47-73. 
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1. – Introduction 
It is known that environmental change may affect migration both directly and 
indirectly. Directly, because natural disasters, drought, famines, and rising sea levels 
are able to force people to relocate from their home territories; indirectly, due to the 
fact that even slow environmental events may affect migration in combination with 
other factors (wars, conflicts over natural resources, etc.). Although environmental 
change-induced migrations (ECIMs) are not a new phenomenon, in the recent years 
it has been experienced an increasing deterioration of environment that is likely to 
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play an important role on worldwide cross-border migration flows1. 
Nonetheless, the notion of “migration due to environmental factors” is a contro-
versial one due to existing uncertainties about the real impact of these factors on 
migration flows. From the one hand, there are little doubts that an earthquake (or any 
rapid-onset climate events) is likely to force people to move from the place they live 
in. From the other hand, however, it seems more difficult to assess movements in 
case of slow-onset climate events (i.e. drought, desertification, rising sea level), that 
often are not the only reason to migration decisions. Such an uncertainty has two 
main consequences: firstly, it is difficult to reach an international definition of “mi-
grant due to environmental factors”; secondly, it is equally difficult to find appropri-
ate and shared legislative responses.  
At international level, there is still not a common legal definition of environmen-
tal migrants owing to two main problems: on the one side, most persons moving in 
the context of environmental events are likely to stay in their country or region of 
origin; on the other side, even when crossing borders, they usually are strictly speak-
ing neither refugees nor economic migrants. Several documents refer them to envi-
ronmental or climate refugees, pointing out their fear of suffering a physical danger 
in the home territory2; others refer to environmental induced population movements, 
to environmentally displaced persons, to forced environmental migrants and to en-
vironmentally induced migrants, each of them highlighting a specific part of the phe-
nomenon3. International Organisation for Migrants (IOM) refers to environmental 
migrants as “persons or groups of persons who, for compelling reasons of sudden or 
progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their lives or living 
conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either tem-
porarily or permanently, and who move either within their country or abroad”4. The 
 
1
 See in general LACZKO and AGHAZARM (eds.), Migration, Environment and Climate Change: As-
sessing the Evidence, Geneva, 2009; GUBBIOTTI et al., Profughi Ambientali. Cambiamento climatico e 
migrazioni forzate, Dossier Legambiente, 2013, available at: <www.legambiente.it>. 
2
 See NESPOR, “I rifugiati ambientali”, Federalismi.it, 21 February 2007; CARUSO and VENDITTO, “Il 
futuro del Mediterraneo. Studio preliminare sui rifugiati ambientali”, in VALLERI, PACE and GIRONE (eds.), 
Il Mediterraneo: uno studio e una passione, Bari, 2012, p. 251 ff.; BUSH, “Redefining Environmental Re-
fugees”, Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 2013, p. 553 ff. 
3
 See KRALER, CERNEI and NOACK, Climate Refugees” - Legal and Policy Responses to Environmen-
tally Induced Migration, Brussels, 2011, pp. 28-31; and PICCHI, “Climate Change and the Protection of 
Human Rights: The Issue of Climate Refugees”, US-China Law Review, 2016, p. 576 ff., pp. 579-581. 
4
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latter definition seems to be broad enough to include a vast majority of those affected 
by ECIMs and would better fit our purposes: this is the reason why, in this contribu-
tion, we will refer to “environmental migrants” (EMs). 
The lack of a worldwide legal definition of EM is reflected in the absence of a 
common legal answer to ECIMs at both international and national level5. While some 
commentators stress the need of the extension of the scope of the 1951 Geneva Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugee (“Refugee Convention” or “RC”)6, others 
call for broadening the scope of the non-binding 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement7. Further options refer to the need for a new international treaty on the 
status of environmental migrants, the addition of an ad hoc protocol to the 1992 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Changes (UNFCCC)8, the broad-
ening of a human rights approach, or the use of temporary protection and resettle-
ment schemes at national level9.  
So, it is not surprising that even in the European Union (EU) there is not a legal 
instrument explicitly allowing EMs to stay temporarily or permanently in the EU 
territory. It is true that, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon (1st Decem-
ber 2009), “Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of [the ob-
jective of, among others,] combating climate change” (Article 191(1) TFEU) and 
that the European Commission has repeatedly stressed the relevance of the climate 
 
5
 See PERRINI, “Migrazione circolare e tutela internazionale ed europea dei migranti ambientali”, Fe-
deralismi.it, 21 July 2017, p. 2.  
6
 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, in 189 U.N.T.S., p. 137 ff. See also the 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, in 606 U.N.T.S., p. 267 ff. 
7
 Available at: <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IDPersons/Pages/Standards.aspx>. 
8
 Available at: <http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php>. 
9
 In literature see MCCUE, “Environmental Refugees: Applying International Environmental Law to 
Involuntary Migration”, The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 1993, p. 151 ff.; 
WILLIAMS, “Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in International Law”, Law & Pol-
icy, 2008, p. 502 ff.; DOCHERTY and GIANNINI, “Confronting a Rising Tide: A Proposal for a Convention 
on Climate Change Refugees”, Harvard Environmental Law Review, 2009, p. 349 ff.; ZETTER, “The role 
of legal and normative frameworks for the protection of environmentally displaced people”, in LACZKO 
and AGHAZARM (eds.), cit. supra note 1, p. 385 ff.; DEWITTE, “At the Water’s Edge: Legal Protections and 
Funding for a New Generation of Climate Change Refugees”, Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, 2010, p. 
211 ff.; DUONG, “When Islands Drown: The Plight of Climate Change Refugees and Recourse to Interna-
tional Human Rights Law”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 2010, p. 1239 ff.; 
LANGE, “Climate Refugees Require Relocation Assistance: Guaranteeing Adequate Land Assets through 
Treaties Based on the National Adaptation Programmes of Action”, Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal, 
2010, p. 613 ff.; LOMBARDO and TOVO, “Il problema dei “rifugiati climatici” nel diritto dell’Unione Eu-
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change-migration connection10, the EU itself being involved in the “Nansen initia-
tive”11, in the Steering Group of the Platform on Disaster Displacement12 and also 
being party to the UNFCCC. But, for the time being, due to the reluctant approach 
of the Member States (“MS”), EU migration law regulates neither the definition and 
acquisition of the status of EM nor the content of protection, notwithstanding Arti-
cles 77 to 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU) are de-
signed in a broad enough manner to handle with it. 
This contribution aims at examining legal options to fill the protection gap af-
fecting environmental migrants in the EU. Starting from a discussion about the (lim-
ited) scope of application of EU harmonised protection statuses, options based on 
humanitarian grounds and on EU human rights obligations will be evaluated. We 
will thus take a closer look to further means of protection within (resettlement pro-
grammes, humanitarian admission schemes, private sponsorship) and outside (Re-
gional Development and Protection Programmes) the EU territory. Eventually, it will 
be clear that existing means of protection in the EU are very limited in scope and not 
designed to fill in a satisfactory way the protection gap of EMs. 
2. – Protection under EU Asylum Law 
International law only acknowledges small groups of forced migrants suitable to 
be formally protected in States other than their own, namely refugees (and stateless 
persons) in accordance to the RC and people eligible for some kind of complemen-
tary protection. In the EU, there are three harmonised protection statuses (i.e. statuses 
granted in each MS on the basis of EU standards), namely refugee status, subsidiary 
protection status and temporary protection status. Thus, the question is whether or 
not EMs are suitable to be protected in the EU according to these statuses. 
 
10
 Communication, The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, 18 November 2011, COM(2011) 
743 final, p. 7; Communication, An EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change, 16 April 2013, 
COM(2013) 216 final, and its accompanying Staff Working Document, Climate Change, Environmental 
Degradation, and Migration, 16 April 2013, SWD(2013) 138 final; Communication, A European Agenda 
on Migration, 13 May 2015, COM(2015) 240 final, p. 7. See MAYRHOFER and AMMER, “People Moving 
in the Context of Environmental Change: The Cautious Approach of the European Union”, European Jour-
nal of Migration and Law, 2014, p. 389 ff., pp. 393-429.  
11
 The Nansen Initiative, launched in 2012, aims at building an international consensus on a Protection 
Agenda addressing the needs of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and the effects 
of climate change. Available at: <https://www.nanseninitiative.org>. 
12
 Launched in May 2016 to follow up on the work of the Nansen Initiative and its Protection Agenda. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental Migrants and the EU Immigration and Asylum Law … 51 
 
 
To begin with, Directive 2011/95/EU (“Qualification Directive” or “QD”)13, that 
have been implemented by MS in their domestic jurisdiction, draws a distinction 
between refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection in the EU. 
The conditions for granting the refugee status largely correspond to the definition 
of Article 1A(2) RC14. Article 2(d) QD stresses that  
“‘refugee’ means a third-country national [or a stateless person] who, owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion 
or membership of a particular social group, is outside the country of nationality [or the coun-
try of former habitual residence] and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of that country”. 
It does seem hard to bring EMs onto the definition of refugee15. Like the RC, the 
QD does require an identifiable human prosecutor that must be a government actor 
or a non-State actor that the government is unwilling or unable to control (Article 6). 
It also needs a causal link between environmental event and action or omission di-
rectly imputable to the State of origin suitable to cause a well-founded (individual) 
fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or 
membership of a particular social group (Article 10). Unfortunately, the key point is 
that environmental events are indiscriminate by nature, are usually not of (direct) 
human origin and do not differentiate on the above five reasons. Maybe it could be 
possible, under specific conditions, to include EMs into the notion of “particular so-
cial group”, but it would happen in very few cases, namely where environmental 
 
13
 Directive 2011/95/EU, of 13 December 2011, on standards for the qualification of third-country 
nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees 
or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, in OJ L 337, 
20 December 2011, pp. 9-26. 
14
 According to Article 1A(2): “the term ‘refugee’ shall apply to any person who […] owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country […]”. See ALEXANDER and SIMON, “Unable to 
Return in the 1951 Refugee Convention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change”, Florida Journal of In-
ternational Law, 2014, p. 531 ff. 
15
 According to NI, “A Nation Going under: Legal Protection for Climate Change Refugees”, Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Review, 2015, p. 329 ff., p. 343 in note 115, the drafters of 
the RC knowingly declined to extend refugee status to the victims of natural calamities. Contra COOPER, 
“Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition”, N.Y.U. Environmental 
Law Journal, 1998, p. 480 ff. 
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disasters are linked to some extent to governmental actions or omissions. For in-
stance, in Teitiota the High Court of New Zealand refused to recognize the refugee 
status to the applicant, a forced migrant from the low-lying Kiribati Islands, due to 
the lack of an identifiable actor and a proper persecution according to the RC16. On 
the contrary, if one can prove that a governmental action or omission has caused the 
environmental harmful event, at least the above causal link should be recognized: in 
Budayeva, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that there had been a 
violation of Article 2 (right to life) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) owing to the Russia’s failure to protect the life of the applicants, residents 
of the town of Tyrnauz, from mudslides which destructed their homes17. 
Although apparently EMs may be qualified as refugees only under strict condi-
tions, we cannot say that it is not possible at all: in order to achieve it, an asylum-
seeker does need to fulfil all the eligibility conditions required by Articles 1A(2) RC 
and 2(d) QD, not being enough the mere environmental disaster-related migration. 
Similarly, it would be hard to qualify EMs under the other protection status set out 
in the QD, namely subsidiary protection status applicable to individuals who, despite 
not qualifying as refugees, can nevertheless claim the protection18. Although an EM 
claiming subsidiary protection should prove a more favourable “real risk of suffering 
serious harm” as defined in Article 15 QD19, it must be stressed anyway that the three 
 
16
 High Court (New Zealand), Teitiota v. Chief Executive of Ministry of Business, Innovation and Em-
ployment, Judgement of 26 November 2013, available at: <http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/ 
2013/3125.html>. It is worth nothing that both Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have declined to grant 
leave to appeal. See NI, cit. supra note 15, pp. 336-344. 
17
 Budayeva and Others v. Russia, Applications Nos. 15339/02, 21166/02, 20058/02, 11673/02 and 
15343/02, Judgement of 20 March 2008. See MCADAM, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and Interna-
tional Law, Oxford-New York, 2012, pp. 59-60; CIERVO, “I rifugiati invisibili. Brevi note sul riconosci-
mento giuridico di una nuova categoria di richiedenti asilo”, in ALTIERO and MARANO (eds.), Crisi am-
bientale e migrazioni forzate, Roma, 2016, p. 255 ff., pp. 261-263. 
18
 According to Article 2(f) QD, “‘person eligible for subsidiary protection’ means a third-country 
national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds 
have been shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in 
the case of a stateless person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm […] and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of 
the protection of that country”. See BATTJES, “Subsidiary Protection and Other Alternative Forms of Pro-
tection”, in CHETAIL and BAULOZ (eds.), Research Handbook on International Law and Migration, Chel-
tenham-Northampton, 2014, p. 541 ff., pp. 550-556. 
19
 Under which “[s]erious harm consists of: (a) the death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the country of origin; or (c) serious and individual 
threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or 
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situations enumerated in the above-mentioned provision are hardly applicable to EMs. 
To begin with, Articles 15(a) QD deals with the risk of suffering a death penalty 
or execution, thus imposing upon MS a specific obligation to grant subsidiary pro-
tection to individuals facing a risk of being subject to death penalty in the receiving 
State: as such, this provision seems not to be applicable to environmental disaster in 
the absence of a death sentence. Nor the actual or potential adverse effects of natural 
disasters could be easily considered as “indiscriminate violence in situations of in-
ternational or internal armed conflict” according to Article 15(c) QD, except in cases 
where environmental factors induce or worsen such conflicts20. 
Talking about the risk of “torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment” according to Article 15(b) QD, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that 
this provision corresponds in essence to Article 3 ECHR and the ECtHR case-law is 
of relevance in interpreting the scope of the provision21. The Court has so far identi-
fied three situations in which removal bans applies to third-country individuals22. The 
first and more frequent one is linked to the risk of serious harm due to direct and 
intentional infliction by State or non-State actors in the receiving country23. The sec-
ond category is resulting from naturally occurring damages24, but the ECtHR set a 
high threshold for these types of cases, having the situation to be very exceptional 
and humanitarian considerations be compelling25. Under the third category, the Court 
held that Contracting States of the ECHR must not issue a removal order where direct 
 
internal armed conflict”. 
20
 See MAYRHOFER and AMMER, cit. supra note 10, p. 409. 
21
 See case C-465/07, Elgafaji, ECR, 200,9 I-921, para. 28. 
22
 According to which “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”. See MAYRHOFER and AMMER, cit. supra note 10, pp. 413-418, and SCOTT, “Natural Disas-
ters, Climate Change and Non-Refoulement: What Scope for Resisting Expulsion under Articles 3 and 8 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights?”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2014, p. 404 ff., pp. 
412-416. 
23
 In Soering v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, Judgement of 7 July 1989, the Court 
held that an absolute prohibition of non-refoulement applied owing to the mere extradition of the applicant 
from a Contracting State of the ECHR to a receiving country where he would have faced a real risk of 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: see also Chahal v. The United Kingdom, Appli-
cation No. 22414/93, Judgement of 15 November 1996, and Saadi v. Italy, Application no. 37201/06, 
Judgement of 28 February 2008. 
24
 In D. v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 30240/96, Judgement of 2 May 1997, the applicant, 
a terminally-ill man, if expelled would not have received palliative care as adequate as in the Contracting 
State. 
25
 N. v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 26565/05, Judgement of 27 May 2008, para. 42. 
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and indirect actions of State or non-State actors in the receiving territory are seen as 
the predominant cause of a natural disaster that the removing individual would face26.  
In view of the above, it would be quite hard for EMs to seek subsidiary protection 
under Article 15(b) QD. The first category of Article 3 ECHR situations is very un-
like to apply owing to the lack of a direct and intentional harm by State or non-State 
actors in the majority of environmental events. Nor the provision is likely to play a 
role under the second category, absent those very exceptional and individual circum-
stances required to establish a claim in most environmental disaster cases, that are 
indiscriminate in nature. Even the third category is unlikely to apply, unless there 
can be alleged substantial evidence of human predominant cause: otherwise, the en-
vironmental event is likely to be seen as a purely natural occurring one27. To sum up, 
ECtHR case-law shows little room for claims where socioeconomic or environmen-
tal conditions in the receiving country would suffice per se to integrate an inhuman 
or degrading treatment28. Perhaps, the only possibility for protecting EMs according 
to Articles 15(b) QD and 3 ECHR, under specific conditions, could stem from situ-
ations of complete lack of food, water and housing if they are returned to countries 
affected by huge environmental disasters29. 
If that is not enough, chances to apply refugee or subsidiary protection status to 
EMs are further complicated by two circumstances. On the one hand, under the op-
tional provision of Article 8(1) QD,  
“[…] MS may determine that an applicant is not in need of international protection if in 
a part of the country of origin, he or she: (a) has no well-founded fear of being persecuted or 
is not at real risk of suffering serious harm; or (b) has access to protection against persecution 
or serious harm; and he or she can safely and legally travel to and gain admittance to that 
part of the country and can reasonably be expected to settle there”. So, in the case of such an 
“internal alternative”  
 
26
 Sufi and Elmi v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 8319/07, Judgement of 28 June 2011, para. 
282. 
27
 In Sufi and Elmi, the ECtHR noted that the humanitarian situation was not solely due to naturally 
occurring phenomena, such as drought, but also a result of the actions or inactions of state parties to the 
conflict in Somalia. 
28
 See MAYRHOFER and AMMER, cit. supra note 10, p. 417. 
29
 Ibid., p. 418. See also MCADAM, cit. supra note 17, p. 76.  
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(i.e. another part of the country of origin not affected by the alleged climate 
event), EMs are reasonably expected to relocate within their home country and thus 
not allowed to claim international protection elsewhere. Such a provision seems to 
play an important role in protection status determination within those MS that have 
opted-in on it, owing to the fact that there are very few cases where a State of origin 
has been entirely concerned by an environmental harmful event30. On the other hand, 
it must be recalled that asylum-seekers could anyway be excluded from refugee or 
subsidiary protection status according to Articles 12 and 17 QD. 
Given the substantial limitations of the QD, one should pay attention to another 
kind of protection, namely temporary protection set out in Council Directive 
2001/55/EC, of 20 July 2001 (“Temporary Protection Directive” or “TPD”)31.  
At first sight, such a protection seems to be more promising when dealing with 
EMs. Indeed, the whole procedure aims at providing “immediate and temporary pro-
tection” regardless of any international protection status determination (Article 2(a)). 
Furthermore, TPD does not refer to the narrow definitions of refugees or persons 
eligible for subsidiary protection, but to “displaced persons”, namely “third-country 
nationals or stateless persons who have had to leave their country or region of origin, 
or have been evacuated, […] and are unable to return in safe and durable conditions 
because of the situation prevailing in that country” (Article 2(b)). Finally, unlike the 
QD, the TPD does contain only a non-exhaustive list of cases for temporary protec-
tion, thus giving room to a broader implementation of the Directive. 
Notwithstanding these positive elements, however, there are others that run coun-
ter an application in the case of EMs32. First of all, we are dealing with a “procedure 
of exceptional character” applicable only “in the event of a mass influx or imminent 
mass influx” (Article 2(a)), inapplicable as such to persons moving individually or 
in small groups. Secondly, the temporary protection can be acknowledged by a MS 
 
30
 See KRALER, CERNEI and NOACK, cit. supra note 3, p. 52. On the internal alternative see EATON, 
“The Internal Protection Alternative Under European Union Law: Examining the Recast Qualification Di-
rective”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2012, p. 765 ff., and NÍ GHRÁINNE, “The Internal Protection 
Alternative Inquiry and Human Rights Considerations - Irrelevant or Indispensable?”, International Journal 
of Refugee Law, 2015, p. 29 ff. 
31
 Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the 
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Mem-
ber States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, in OJ L 212, 7 August 2001, 
pp. 12-23. See BATTJES, cit. supra note 18, pp. 557-558. In this volume, see SCIACCALUGA, infra p. 77 ff. 
32
 See MAYRHOFER and AMMER, cit. supra note 10, pp. 406-407. 
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only on the outcome of a complex procedure involving an EU Council Decision es-
tablishing the existence of a mass influx, based on a proposal from the Commission. 
But the major obstacle is represented by the long-lasting absence of MS political will 
to resort to such a procedure (mainly because of the resulting distribution of tempo-
rarily protected persons among MS themselves), which is the reason why the TPD 
mechanism has never been used so far. 
The same holds true for those “provisional measures” set out in Article 78(3) 
TFEU, insofar as the Council could adopt them “in the event of one or more Member 
States being confronted with an emergency situation characterised by a sudden in-
flow of nationals of third countries”, thus excluding EMs moving on individual or in 
small group basis. As explained in Slovak and Hungary v Council (the so called “re-
location case”), indeed, such non-legislative measures could be adopted on a tempo-
rary basis in case of “an inflow of nationals of third countries (…), even though it 
takes place in the context of a migration crisis spanning a number of years, [that] 
makes the normal functioning of the EU common asylum system impossible”33 and 
are mainly inspired by an intra-EU solidarity rationale. 
3. – Protection on Humanitarian Grounds 
Owing to the difficulties in relying on the above-mentioned provisions in order 
to protect EMs, attention should be paid to further provision related to EU immigra-
tion law, namely those concerning the entry, stay on and protection from removal of 
third-country nationals from the MS territory for humanitarian reasons. According 
to Recital 15 of the QD, “[t]hose third-country nationals or stateless persons who are 
allowed to remain in the territories of the Member States for reasons not due to a 
need for international protection but on a discretionary basis on compassionate or 
humanitarian grounds fall outside the scope” of the QD itself. Moreover, as ex-
plained below and unlike EU harmonised protection statuses, these humanitarian 
provisions are non-mandatory, thus allowing Member States to deal with different 
national humanitarian practices.  
Starting with entry provisions, it should be recalled that nationals from countries 
listed in the Annex 1 to the Regulation No. 539/2001 are subject to a visa requirement 
 
33
 Case C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council of the European Union 
(Judgement), ECLI:EU:C:2017:631, para. 114.  
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prior to enter the EU territory34. Short-stay visas are subject to the Regulation No. 
810/2009 (“Visa Code” or “VC”)35; by contrast, long-stay visas are issued by Mem-
ber States under their domestic immigration law. As a general rule, a short-stay visa 
may be issued by MS consulates or representations in third States in specific cases 
and subject to a positive decision on admissibility criteria set out in the VC36, includ-
ing the fact that the applicant does not present a risk of illegal immigration and must 
prove his intention to leave the territory of the MS before the expiry of the visa. Thus, 
short-stay visas do not allow third-country nationals to enter in any case and stay 
indefinitely on the territory of MS.  
The Visa Code does not contain special provisions concerning the entry and stay 
of EMs. However, some key articles dealing with humanitarian-related situations37 
could be interpreted in order to meet their needs. On the one hand, Article 19(4) VC 
states that, by way of derogation, a visa application that does not meet the above-men-
tioned admissibility criteria “may be considered admissible on humanitarian grounds”. 
On the other hand, Article 25(1)(a) VC recalls that a MS, even when another MS is 
objecting to a third-country national visa application38, may exceptionally issue a so-
called “visa with limited territorial validity”39 when necessary “on humanitarian 
grounds”. Furthermore, an issued short-stay visa shall be prolonged “where the com-
petent authority of a Member State considers that a visa holder has provided proof of 
[…] humanitarian reasons preventing him from leaving the territory of the Member 
States before the expiry of the period of validity of or the duration of stay authorised 
 
34
 Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, of 15 March 2001, listing the third countries whose nationals must be 
in possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement, in OJ L 81, 21 March 2001, pp. 1-7. On the contrary, nationals from countries on the list in 
Annex II of the Regulation are exempt from that requirement. EU nationals and nationals from countries that 
are part of the Schengen Area (and their family members) have the right to enter without prior authorisation. 
35
 Regulation (EC) No. 810/2009, of 13 July 2009, establishing a Community Code on Visas, in OJ L 
243, 15 September 2009, pp. 1-58. A “short stay” is intended as not exceeding 90 days in any 180-day period. 
36
 For instance, possession of a valid travel document, justification of the purpose and conditions of the 
visit, non-listing of the applicant in the Schengen Information System, not posing a threat to public policy, 
internal security, public health or the international relations of the MS, possession of a travel insurance. 
37
 See HEIN and DE DONATO, Exploring Avenues for Protected Entry in Europe, Abbiategrasso (MI), 
2012, available at: <https://cir-onlus.org/images/pdf/ET%20VOLUME%20FINALE%20OK.pdf. 
p0001.pdf>; NEVILLE and RIGON, Towards an EU humanitarian visa scheme?, EP Policy Department C: 
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, PE 556.950, Brussels, 2016. 
38
 The Visa Code sets out a system of “prior consultation” of all EU Member States before issuing a 
visa for nationals from particular third countries or in particular cases. 
39
 Such visas are valid for one or more (but less than all) of the Schengen States.  
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by the visa” (Article 33(1) VC). Finally, in the case of a visa application at the external 
border, under Article 35(2) VC “the requirement that the applicant be in possession of 
travel medical insurance may be waived […] for humanitarian reasons”. 
Apart from such “protected entry” provisions, to which most of the MS resorts on 
an exceptional basis40, it should therefore be noted that Regulation 2016/399 
(“Schengen Borders Code” or “SBC”)41 provides in a manner consistent to VC. Under 
Article 6(5)(c) SBC, third-country nationals who do not meet all the conditions to enter 
the Schengen Area may be allowed by a MS to enter its territory “on humanitarian 
grounds, on grounds of national interest or because of international obligations”. 
EU immigration law allows MS to resort to humanitarian grounds also against 
the removal of illegally staying third-country nationals. Following Article 6(4) of the 
Directive 2008/115/EC (“Return Directive”)42, “Member States may at any moment 
decide to grant an autonomous residence permit or other authorisation offering a 
right to stay for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons to a third-country na-
tional staying illegally on their territory”. 
The question thus is whether or not these humanitarian grounds are ample enough 
to deal with environmental disasters and to let EMs to enter, stay on and not be re-
moved from the territory of the EU Member States. Unfortunately, the VC does not 
go further in defining such grounds and, until now, no further measure has been 
adopted by the EU legislature with regard to uniform short-stay or, even more, long-
stay visas on these reasons. Similarly, neither the Schengen Borders Code nor the 
Return Directive go into details of the humanitarian grounds according to their pro-
visions. In X and X v. Belgium, a humanitarian visa case, Advocate General Men-
gozzi in its Opinion held that humanitarian grounds as referred to in Article 25(1) 
VC should be a concept of EU law and must not be exclusive to a Member State43, 
but the European Court of Justice has taken a different view stating that “the appli-
cations [for such visas] fall solely within the scope of national law”44. 
 
40
 With reference to the Italian situation, see HEIN and DE DONATO, cit. supra note 36, pp. 44-45. 
41
 Regulation (EU) 2016/399, of 9 March 2016, on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement 
of persons across borders, in OJ L 77, 23 March 2016, pp. 1-52. 
42
 Directive 2008/115/EC, of 16 December 2008, on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, in OJ L 348, 24 December 2008, pp. 98-107 
43
 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. Belgium (Opinion), ECLI:EU:C:2017:93, para. 130. 
44
 Case C-638/16 PPU, X and X v. Belgium (Judgement), ECLI:EU:C:2017:173, para. 44. See 
BROUWER, “The European Court of Justice on Humanitarian Visas: Legal integrity vs. political opportun-
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Should that prove to be the case, then we shall conclude that the exact scope of 
application of these humanitarian grounds – eventually including environmental ones 
– lies within the competence of the MS. Similarly, decisions whether to let third-coun-
try nationals to enter, stay on and not be removed on such humanitarian grounds are 
also a matter of the competent national authorities, because of the fact that all the afore-
mentioned provision in the VC, the SBC and the RD are non-mandatory. 
The lack of EU mandatory provisions does not mean that MS themselves cannot 
introduce specific provisions in their domestic legal order45. It has to be recalled that 
the majority of EU States have not a legislation in place applicable, at least in part, 
to EMs. Some exceptions are, for instance, Sections 88a(1) and 109(1) of the Finnish 
Aliens Act, that provide for humanitarian protection in case of environmental catas-
trophe and temporary protection for environmental disaster; moreover, Section 2(3) 
of Chapter 4 of the Swedish Aliens Act provides residence permits for persons una-
ble to return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster. 
In Italy, under Article 5(6) of the Legislative Decree No. 286/1998, a residence 
permit can be granted to third-country nationals or stateless persons that do not sat-
isfy the conditions of stay on national territory according to international agreements 
but to whom there are serious reasons of humanitarian nature or resulting from con-
stitutional or international obligations of the Italian State. Such a humanitarian per-
mit may be granted also to third-country nationals whose requests for refugee or 
subsidiary protection status have been denied but to whom the same serious reasons 
arise. Article 5(6) has been implemented, for instance, in the occasion of a major 
natural disasters in Bangladesh, namely the Sidr cyclone46.  
Moreover, Article 20 of the Italian Legislative Decree No. 286/1998 provides for 
 
ism?”, 16 March 2017, available at: <https://www.ceps.eu/publications/european-court-justice-humanitar-
ian-visas-legal-integrity-vs-political-opportunism>; CAGGIANO, “Are You Syrious? Il diritto europeo delle 
migrazioni dopo la fine dell’emergenza alla frontiera orientale dell’Unione”, Freedom, Security & Justice: 
European Legal Studies, 2017, p. 7 ff., pp. 14-16; FAVILLI, “Visti umanitari e protezione internazionale: 
così vicini così lontani”, Diritti umani e diritto internazionale, 2017, p. 553 ff. 
45
 See EUROPEAN MIGRATION NETWORK, The different national practices concerning granting of non-
EU harmonised protection statuses, December 2010, available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/home-af-
fairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-stud-
ies/non-eu-harmonised-protection-status/0_emn_synthesis_report_noneuharmonised_finalversion_janu-
ary2011_en.pdf>. 
46
 See BRAMBILLA, “Migrazioni indotte da cause ambientali: quale tutela nell’ambito dell’ordinamento 
giuridico europeo e nazionale?”, Diritto Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 2017, pp. 15-16. 
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collective reception measures in the case of exceptional events, establishing tempo-
rary protection for relevant humanitarian needs for, among others, natural disasters. 
The latter provision has been implemented, for instance, in 2011 leading to the issue 
of residence permits to nationals of North Africa States during the events of the so-
called “Arab Spring”47. 
4. – Protection from Removal According to Relevant Human Rights Law  
Now we should pay attention to another kind of protection of EMs, namely that 
against removal orders from the territory of the MS according to relevant human 
rights law applicable in the EU (and MS themselves). Human rights law is of para-
mount importance to EMs in view of the fact that it sets out minimum standards of 
protection to every individual within the State jurisdiction, leading in some cases to 
an absolute protection against the refoulement beyond the refugee category48. 
As widely known, the principle of non-refoulement incorporated in Article 33(1) 
RC, under which refugees must not be returned to a country where their life or free-
dom would be threatened due to their race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is a key element of EU asylum law49. 
Under Article 78 TFEU, the EU must ensure “compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement” according to the RC and other relevant treaties50. Article 21 QD stipu-
lates that “Member States shall respect the principle of non-refoulement in accord-
ance with their international obligations”. Unfortunately, both Article 33 RC and 
Article 21 QD are not of absolute nature, allowing for the removal of a refugee when 
he poses a threat to the security of the host State or when, after the commission of a 
serious crime, he is a danger to the host community.  
 
47
 See COSSA, “Rifugiati climatici: le politiche e la normativa internazionale e dell’Unione Europea”, 
in ALTIERO and MARANO (eds.), cit. supra note 17, p. 269 ff., p. 276. 
48
 See MCADAM, cit. supra note 17, pp. 52-53. 
49
 See in general WALLACE, “The Principle of Non-Refoulement in International Refugee Law”, in 
CHETAIL and BAULOZ (eds.), Research Handbook on International Law and Migration, Cheltenham-
Northampton, 2014, p. 417 ff. 
50
 Including the ECHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 
(whose Article 7 states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment”) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment of 10 December 1984 (the Article 3 of which stresses that “[n]o State Party shall expel, 
return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”). 
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In turn, Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (“Charter”), 
which has the same legal value as the Treaties, stipulates that Member States are 
bound by an absolute prohibition of any return of an individual “to a State where 
there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture 
or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”. Article 19(2) Charter stems 
from the ECtHR case-law related to Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR51 and, according 
to Article 52(3) Charter, “the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as 
those laid down by the [ECHR itself]”. Moreover, according to Article 6(3) of the 
Treaty on European Union (“TUE”), “[f]undamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
[ECHR] shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law”. 
So, the question is to assess whether, and to what extent, fundamental rights as 
enshrined in the ECHR and according to the ECtHR case-law, together with Charter 
provisions, prohibit decisions to remove EMs from the territory of the MS because 
of environmental events in the returning countries. 
In Section 2, we have already examined the prohibition set out in Article 3 ECHR 
and its role in assessing the existence of a “serious harm” according to Article 15(b) 
QD: as a consequence, EU Member States are required to grant subsidiary protection 
status to EMs only under specific circumstances, according to the ECtHR case-law. 
But Article 3 ECHR does play a much wider role due to its applicability not only to 
beneficiaries of international protection but to any third-country national, irrespec-
tive of his personal status, the existence of persecution or any other condition. In this 
respect, under the same conditions set out in the aforementioned ECtHR case-law, 
MS would anyway be denied the possibility of issuing removal orders against every 
EMs facing a risk to be subject to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
due to environmental harmful events. 
The same reasoning does apply to removal bans owing to the duty of the Member 
States to safeguard the lives of third-country individuals, according to Article 2 
 
51
 It must be stressed that the ECHR does not explicitly provide for non-refoulement. However, the 
ECtHR has recognised this principle through its case-law, by deriving from Article 1 ECHR an implicit 
obligation of Contracting States to protect migrants against refoulement. 
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ECHR (right to life)52 and Articles 253 and 3(1)54 of the Charter. It has to be recalled 
that the absolute right to life enshrined in Article 2 ECHR is wider than the mere 
prohibition of death penalty or execution – leading as such to subsidiarity protection 
status according to Article 15(a) QD – and includes other forbidden conducts as, for 
instance, the use of lethal force or the disappearance of persons by the State. Not-
withstanding the ECtHR tends to examine relevant cases either under Article 2 or 3 
ECHR, a removal from the territory of a Contracting State is absolutely prohibited 
par ricochet where it would expose an individual to a real risk of loss of life55. A key 
difference between Articles 2 and 3 lies in the fact that, under the former provision, 
the prospect of death as a consequence of return decision must be quite a certain one, 
unlike Article 3 where “substantial grounds” are enough. Should that prove to be the 
case, it seems that, at least in Article 2 stand-alone cases, EMs would face a higher 
threshold to prove the causal link between environmental harmful event and risk of 
death, especially in the case of a viable internal relocation alternative. 
Finally, one should pay attention to Article 8(1) ECHR (right to respect for 
private and family life), according to which “[e]veryone has the right to respect for 
his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”. The right referred to 
in this provision has often been invoked as a protection against refoulement of mi-
grants in cases not involving the risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. The 
ECtHR provided a broad interpretation of Article 8, for instance covering situations 
where third-country nationals are threatened with removal (or are removed) and 
that could have serious repercussions for their existing family life, or where, absent 
such a family, the circumstances of applicants’ private life alone may justify the 
protection from refoulement. 
 
52
 According to which “(1) Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived 
of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime 
for which this penalty is provided by law. (2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in con-
travention of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the 
escape of a person lawfully detained; (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or 
insurrection”. Nowadays, the prohibition of death penalty is of absolute character in most European States 
according to Protocols No. 6 (abolition of the death penalty) and No. 13 (abolition of the death penalty in 
all circumstances) to the ECHR. 
53
 Under which “1. Everyone has the right to life. 2. No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, 
or executed”. 
54
 According to which “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his or her physical and mental integrity”. 
55
 Z and T v. The United Kingdom, Application No. 27034/05, Judgement of 28 February 2006, para. 
6: “[the Article 3 analysis from Soering] applies equally to the risk of violations of Article 2”. 
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It must be recalled that, unlike Articles 2 and 3, Article 8 ECHR is not of an 
absolute character, interferences by public authorities being possible “in accordance 
with the law and [when] necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedoms of others” (para 2). It means that removal orders will be 
possible but only where they would result in a justified interference with third-coun-
try nationals’ right to respect for private or family life. In particular, removals will 
be allowed in situations of emergency under the conditions of legality, proportional-
ity and necessity established by the ECtHR case-law. In order to strike a fair balance 
between the interests of the State and the rights of the individual, the Court has taken 
into consideration many aspects including the individual’s family situation, the best 
interest of children, the time spent in the removing State, the seriousness of the of-
fence, the level of social and cultural ties in the latter State, etc. 
So far, the ECtHR held that there had been numbers of violations of Article 8 
ECHR in environmental cases, none of which however has implied a removal ban in 
a third country affected by a climate disaster. Nor it could be easy for EMs to rely on 
Article 8 case-law in the future, owing to the less weight the ECtHR usually places on 
the seriousness of the difficulties that a third-country national is likely to face in the 
receiving State, compared for instance with difficulties faced by his family in the same 
receiving State56. Thus, even if EMs could hypothetically rely on the argument related 
to the impact of removal according to Article 8 ECHR, it seems that stand-alone claims 
based on the fact that their right to “physical and moral integrity” would be adversely 
affected by environmental events in the receiving State are likely to have little prospect 
of success, in particular where dealing with a proper internal alternative. 
Anyway, it must be pointed out that any removal bans applicable to EMs, accord-
ing to human rights provisions, would be a “narrow” kind of protection. This is the 
reason why MS would only be precluded from removing concerned individuals from 
their home territory, but not bound to automatically grant them an international pro-
tection status. Article 9(1)(a) of the Return Directive stresses that “Member States 
shall postpone removal […] when it would violate the principle of non-refoulement” 
 
56
 For relevant case-law, see SCOTT, cit. supra note 22, p. 418. 
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but does not go further in putting on MS an obligation to grant international protec-
tion. At least, there could be issued residence permits on humanitarian reasons57, gen-
erally on a non-mandatory basis according to Article 6(4) of the Return Directive. 
For instance, in the Sidr cyclone case, Italian authorities only approved removal bans 
of Bengali nationals according to “justified reasons” under Article 14(5-ter) of the 
Legislative Decree No. 286/199858, but they did not grant those nationals humanitar-
ian permits for a long time59. 
5. – Protection under Resettlement Programmes, Humanitarian 
Admission Schemes and Private Sponsorship 
While EU provision on international protection, humanitarian statuses and pro-
tection from refoulement according to human rights law, where applicable to EMs, 
assume that third-country nationals have previously entered legally or illegally the 
territory of the Member States, or are going to enter it, there are further options ap-
plicable to EMs not already present in the EU, namely resettlement programs, hu-
manitarian admission schemes, private sponsorship and local integration under Re-
gional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPP). 
First of all, we need to assess the opportunities of resettlement to fill the protection 
gap of EMs. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), “[r]esettlement is the transfer of refugees from the country in which they 
have sought asylum to another State that has agreed to admit them as refugees and to 
grant them permanent settlement and the opportunity for eventual citizenship”60. Re-
settlement is one of the three durable solutions – together with voluntary repatriation 
and local integration – identified by UNHCR as adequate means to end the cycle of 
displacement by resolving refugees’ plight so that they can lead normal lives61. 
 
57
 See for instance Article 28(d) of the Italian Decree of the President of the Republic No. 394/1999.  
58
 According to which “[t]he infringement of the [removal order] is punished, unless there is a justified 
reason, with a fine from 10,000 to 20,000 Euros […]” (emphasis added). 
59
 See BRAMBILLA, cit. supra note 45, p. 15. 
60
 See UNHCR, Resettlement Handbook, Geneva, 2011, p. 36. See also PERRIN-MCNAMARA, Refugee 
Resettlement in the EU: Between Shared Standards and Diversity in Legal and Policy Frames, San Dome-
nico di Fiesole (FI), 2013, available at: <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/29400>. 
61
 Ibid., p. 28. See also MORGESE, “Solidarietà e ripartizione degli oneri in materia di asilo nell’Unione 
europea”, in CAGGIANO (a cura di), I percorsi giuridici per l’integrazione. Migranti e titolari di protezione 
internazionale tra diritto dell’Unione e ordinamento italiano, Torino, 2014, p. 365 ff., pp. 396-400; and 
ZIECK, “The Limitations of Voluntary Repatriation and Resettlement of Refugees”, in CHETAIL and 
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The European Commission has begun to discuss resettlement quite recently, 
stressing since 2000 the need for an EU-wide scheme as a way to ensure more orderly 
and managed entry in the EU for persons in need of international protection62. In 
2012, the EU issued a Decision on a Joint EU Resettlement Programme, consisting 
in setting common priorities instead of different MS national priorities and including 
financial support (under ERF Regulation) to MS willing to resettle targeted individ-
uals from third countries63. Under the 2012 Decision, targeted individuals are persons 
from countries/regions identified for Regional (Development and) Protection Pro-
grammes, persons belonging to a vulnerable group falling within the UNHCR reset-
tlement criteria64, and persons from a geographical location on the list of common 
EU priorities for 2013.  
In 2014, the EU approved the AMIF Regulation, repealing the ERF Regulation65. 
Under Article 2(a) of the AMIF Regulation, “‘resettlement’ means the process 
whereby, on a request from the [UNHCR] based on a person’s need for international 
protection, third-country nationals are transferred from a third country and estab-
lished in a Member State where they are permitted to reside with” an international 
protection status or any other status which offers similar rights and benefits. Accord-
ing to Article 17, “Member States shall […] receive every two years an additional 
amount […] based on a lump sum […] for each resettled person”. Targeted persons 
 
BAULOZ (eds.), Research Handbook on International Law and Migration, Cheltenham-Northampton, 
2014, p. 562 ff., pp. 574-580. 
62
 Communication, Towards More Accessible, Equitable and Managed Asylum Systems, 3 June 2003, 
COM(2003) 315 final; Communication, On the managed entry in the EU of persons in need of International 
Protection and the enhancement of the protection capacity of the regions of origin “Improving Access to 
Durable Solutions”, 4 June 2004, COM(2004) 410 final. See PAPADOPOULOU et al., Comparative Study on 
the Best Practices for the Integration of Resettled Refugees in the EU Member States, requested by the EP 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, PE 474.393, Brussels, 2013, pp. 12-20, available at: 
< http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474393/IPOL-LIBE_ET(2013)474393 
_EN.pdf.>. 
63
 Decision No. 281/2012/EU, of 29 March 2012, amending Decision No 573/2007/EC establishing 
the European Refugee Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as part of the General programme “Solidarity and 
Management of Migration Flows”, in OJ L 92, 30 March 2012, pp. 1-3. 
64
 For instance, women and children at risk, unaccompanied minors, survivors of violence and torture, 
persons having serious medical needs, persons in need of emergency or urgent resettlement for legal or 
physical protection needs. 
65
 Regulation (EU) No. 516/2014, of 16 April 2014, establishing the Asylum, Migration and Integration 
Fund, amending Council Decision 2008/381/EC and repealing Decisions No. 573/2007/EC and No. 
575/2007/EC and Decision 2007/435/EC, in OJ L 150, 20 May 2014, pp. 168-194. 
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are those from a country or region designated for the implementation of a R(D)PP, 
those from a country or region which has been identified in the UNHCR resettlement 
forecast and where Union common action would have a significant impact on ad-
dressing the protection needs, and those belonging to a specific category falling 
within the UNHCR resettlement criteria. 
In 2015, as part of the EU response to the so-called “refugee crisis” according to 
the European Agenda on Migration that inter alia called the EU to step up its reset-
tlement efforts66, the Commission adopted Recommendation No. 2015/914 on a Eu-
ropean resettlement scheme67. According to its Paragraph 2, the term “resettlement” 
refers to the transfer of “individual displaced persons in clear need of international 
protection”, on request of the UNHCR, from a third country to a Member State, in 
agreement with the latter, with the objective of protecting against refoulement and 
admitting and granting the right to stay and any other rights similar to those granted 
to a beneficiary of international protection. The Recommendation called on Member 
States to resettle 20.000 persons over a two-year period, but JHA Council had 
adopted conclusions on resettling 22.504 displaced persons68. MS agreed that they 
would have taken account of priority regions including North Africa, the Middle 
East, and the Horn of Africa. 
To date, several Member States have implemented permanent or ad hoc national 
resettlement programmes69. As to Italy, the first national resettlement project, the Ol-
tremare I project (2007-2008) resulted in the resettlement of 39 Eritrean refugees 
from Libya; as to the Oltremare II project (2008- 2009), it resettled further 30 Eri-
trean refugees from Libya. During the period 2009-2011, it has been implemented 
an ad hoc resettlement programme, the Reinsediamento a sud, aimed at resettling 
 
66
 See COM(2015) 240 final, p. 5. 
67
 Recommendation (EU) 2015/914, of 8 June 2015, on a European resettlement scheme, in OJ L 148, 
13 June 2015, p. 32-37. 
68
 JHA Council, Conclusions of 20 July 2015. See MORGESE, “Recenti iniziative dell’Unione europea 
per affrontare la crisi dei rifugiati”, Diritto Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, 2015, p. 15 ff., pp. 28-31. 
69
 See EUROPEAN MIGRATION NETWORK, Resettlement and Humanitarian Admission Programmes in 
Europe - what works?, 9 November 2016, available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf-
fairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/emn-studies-
00_resettlement_synthesis_report_final_en.pdf>. 
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179 Palestinian recognized refugees living in a camp situated at the Syrian-Iraqi bor-
der70. In 2011-2015, Italy has resettled a number of 766 individuals within resettle-
ment (and humanitarian admission) schemes. 
In the light of the above, it seems that resettlement schemes could hardly fill the 
protection gap of persons displaced by environmental events. Indeed, they could not 
be considered “targeted persons” both under Article 17 of the AMIF Regulation or 
Paragraph 2 of the Recommendation No. 2015/914 as long as they are not suitable 
to international protection (i.e. refugees according to the RC and beneficiaries of 
subsidiary protection under the QD), no matter if at national level they do not obtain 
a proper refugee or subsidiary protection status but any other status which offers 
similar rights and benefits under national and Union law71. Partially different seemed 
to be the Preparatory Action on Emergency Resettlement (PAER)72, that had com-
plemented in 2012 the former ERF with the aim of quickly targeting persons recog-
nised by the UNHCR as being in need of urgent international protection for the rea-
sons of having fallen victims of a natural disaster, armed conflict, or being otherwise 
in extremely vulnerable situations threatening their life, and that are resettled in MS 
with a permanent residence status: the reference to different situations as natural dis-
aster seemed to expand the scope of that emergency resettlement scheme beyond 
persons in need of international protection as such. Notwithstanding that, the PAER 
financial tool has only allowed for the first wave of resettlement from Syria in 2012 
and not for environmental displaced persons. 
As if that were not enough, the major obstacles of resettlement programmes lie 
in the facts that, for the time being, they are still under-funded and implemented on 
a voluntary basis only, which leaves their little practical usefulness in the “willing 
hands” of the Member States. Nor the proposed regulation establishing a Union Re-
settlement Framework73, not yet in force, is likely to change substantially this situa-
tion. It is true that this proposal aims at creating a common EU policy on resettlement 
with a permanent framework and common procedures, and defines resettlement as 
 
70
 See PAPADOPOULOU et al., cit. supra note 61, pp. 77-80.  
71
 For a national review of different granted statuses see EUROPEAN MIGRATION NETWORK, cit. supra 
note 68, pp. 29-30. 
72
 Decision No. C(2012) 7046, of 10 October 2012, concerning the adoption of the Work Programme 
serving as financing decision for 2012 for the Preparatory Action - Enable the resettlement of refugees 
during emergency situations to be financed under budget line 18 March 2017. 
73
 13 July 2016, COM(2016) 468 final. 
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“the admission of third-country nationals and stateless persons in need of interna-
tional protection from a third country to which or within which they have been dis-
placed to the territory of the Member States with a view to granting them interna-
tional protection”, thus including internally displaced people. However is also true 
that, according to the proposal, not only the scope of application of EU resettlement 
framework will be still unduly limited to asylum-seekers74 but also Member States 
will remain free to decide how many persons to be resettled each year. 
More promising are humanitarian admission schemes (“HAS”) offered by Mem-
ber States and sometimes financed by the EU budget. According to Article 2(b) of 
the AMIF Regulation, HAS consist in a process – similar to resettlement but, for 
several reasons, not fully adhering to its definition – whereby “a Member State ad-
mits a number of third-country nationals to stay on its territory for a temporary period 
of time in order to protect them from urgent humanitarian crises due to events such 
as political developments or conflicts”. While some MS have in place either (perma-
nent or ad hoc) resettlement programmes or HAS only, there are others (like Ger-
many, France and the UK) with both of them. 
It should be stressed that HAS could also be put in place by the EU itself. In 
December 2015, the European Commission presented a Recommendation for a vol-
untary humanitarian admission scheme with Turkey for persons displaced by the 
conflict in Syria75, an expedited process (compared to resettlement) where Member 
States would admit, on a voluntary basis, those persons in need of international pro-
tection based on a recommendation by the UNHCR following a referral by Turkey, 
with the aim of refocusing resettlement efforts primarily on Jordan and Lebanon76. 
The key difference between resettlement programmes and HAS is that the latter 
have a much broader scope of application, i.e. not limited to individuals in need of 
international protection as such but opened to any third-country national facing ur-
gent humanitarian crisis. Thus, HAS seems to be a better fit for the specific protec-
 
74
 According to the proposal, “[t]he possibility for resettlement is foreseen for those third-country na-
tionals or stateless persons who have been displaced not only to another country but also within their own 
country due to a well-founded fear of persecution or due to substantial grounds for believing that they 
would face a real risk of suffering serious harm”. 
75
 Recommendation C(2015) 9490, of 15 December 2015, for a voluntary humanitarian admission 
scheme with Turkey. See FERNÁNDEZ ARRIBAS, “Again in the Hands of States: A New EU Unfeasible Plan 
to Face Refugee Crisis? Commission Recommendation for a Voluntary Humanitarian Admission Scheme 
with Turkey”, European Papers, 2016, p. 343 ff. 
76
 See MORGESE, cit. supra note 67, pp. 31-34. 
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tion needs of EMs. By contrast, like resettlement programmes, HAS are on a volun-
tary basis, thus not compelling MS to put them into place. 
In must be pointed out that the 2015 European Agenda on Migration has called 
on Member States to use to the full any other legal avenue available to individuals 
in need of protection, including private/non-governmental sponsorships. In the sub-
sequent Communication of April 2016, the Commission sets out steps to be taken in 
order to ensure and enhance safe and legal migration routes, calling on MS to explore 
the possibility of complementing resettlement and HAS by other initiatives such as 
private sponsorship, that could take several forms (from scholarships for students 
and academics to integration support for sponsored family members)77.  
Private sponsorship is likely to be a viable alternative for admitting EMs in the 
territory of the Member States owing to the fact that “the costs of sponsorship and 
settlement support for persons in need of protection can be supported by private 
groups or organisations”, thus both helping to raise public awareness and support for 
admitted individuals and allowing for a more welcoming environment as local com-
munities are usually involved. Most of all, private sponsorship is very likely to over-
come legal and political obstacles set by resettlement and, in part, HAS, thus giving 
EMs a realistic mean of protection. For instance, in Italy have been recently signed 
two protocols on “humanitarian corridors” as a result of a Memorandum of Under-
standing between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the 
Ministry of Interior and some religious entities (the Italian Episcopal Conference, 
Community of Sant’Egidio, Federation of Evangelical Churches in Italy, and Tavola 
Valdese). These two protocols aim at the protected entry in Italy for 1.500 displaced 
persons from Lebanon, Ethiopia and other African States, whose selection, entry and 
reception are supervised by the religious entities themselves78. 
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 Towards a Reform of the Common European Asylum System and Enhancing Legal Avenues to 
Europe, 6 April 2016, COM(2016) 197 final, pp. 15-16. 
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 See in detail MOROZZO DELLA ROCCA, “I due Protocolli d’intesa sui ‘corridoi umanitari’ tra alcuni 
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6. – Protection within Regional Development and Protection 
Programmes 
As stated above, most individuals moving due to environmental events are very 
likely to remain within their country or region of origin. For this reason, we briefly 
mention another way of protecting EMs that involves the EU support for regions and 
countries of origin (and transit) in their efforts to assist and protect displaced persons 
in general, namely Regional Development and Protection Programmes (RDPPs)79. 
Such programmes, launched in 2005 as Regional Protection Programmes 
(RPPs)80, were designed to enhance the capacity of areas close to regions of origin or 
transit of refugees, in cooperation with UNHCR and host third countries. The goal 
was (and still is) to support refugees by developing financial, legal and technical 
assistance to enhance capacities of local institutions and actors, and promoting the 
conditions for local integration as one of the three aforementioned durable solu-
tions81. RPPs were intended to be flexible and situation specific policy toolboxes, 
consistent with EU humanitarian and development policies, and including practical 
actions such as enhancement of national refugee determination status capacities, ac-
cess to asylum, technical assistance to institutions, public awareness activities on 
refugee protection, promotion of resettlement, etc. The 2005 Communication 
launched two pilot RPPs in the Newly Independent States (Ukraine, Belarus and 
Moldova) and in the Great Lakes Region (mainly focused on Tanzania). In 2010, 
two other RPPs were launched in the Horn of Africa (as a region of origin) and in 
North Africa (as a region of transit). 
By contrast, in more recent RDPPs the traditional “protection component” of RPP 
model has been supplemented by a “socioeconomic development component” aimed 
at fostering economic opportunities and livelihood capacity of refugees through em-
ployment generation and business development, on the one side, and strengthening 
local ownership and the overall social cohesion in host countries, on the other side. So 
far, RDPPs have been initiated in the Middle East (2014), as part of the response to the 
Syria crisis, and again in the Horn of Africa and in North Africa (2015). 
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 See PAPADOPOULOU, Regional Protection Programmes: An Effective Policy Tool?, Discussion Pa-
per, DOMAID project, January 2015; CORTINOVIS, Reshaping the External Dimension of EU Asylum Po-
licy: the Difficult Quest for a Comprehensive Approach, Ismu Paper, January 2017, pp.10-11; MORGESE, 
“I programmi di (sviluppo e) protezione regionale dell’Unione europea: uno strumento efficace per i rifu-
giati africani?”, Federalismi.it, 21 July 2017.  
80
 Communication on regional protection programmes, 1 September 2005, COM(2005) 388 final. 
81
 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Environmental Migrants and the EU Immigration and Asylum Law … 71 
 
 
While it seems that RDPPs could represent one of the best solution to meet the 
protection needs of EMs, it must be borne in mind that, unlike all other above-men-
tioned EU protection provisions, RDPPs suffer from some specific problems. In the 
first place, they are not normative but cooperative in nature: thus, as long as the exist-
ing framework remains unchanged, these programmes are only intended to “induce” 
third countries to grant protection and foster local integration for environmental dis-
placed persons, but the EU cannot act in a more direct way. Furthermore, R(D)PPs 
encompass projects not always part of a coherent policy framework and not adequately 
funded82, notwithstanding some improvements in more recent African RDPP. 
Moreover, protection under RDPPs cannot always be available in regions of origin 
or transit for all EMs and, even when available, cannot address all the challenges facing 
those persons and their host countries. Above all, it must be borne in mind that these 
programmes must not constitute a way of allocating the responsibility of processing 
asylum claims to third countries. Thus, hosting areas within RDPP third States must 
not be considered as “safe havens” from an extraterritorial processing standpoint (i.e. 
allowing MS to escape their obligations under refugee and asylum law). 
7. – Conclusions 
This contribution has discussed some legal options with the aim to protect EMs 
within the EU, none of which however has proven to be fully satisfactory. It depends, 
as seen above, on the absence of a common legal definition of environment-related 
migrant which, at the time being, mirrors the lack of a common understanding of 
such a matter within the International Community as a whole. Nor the EU and its 
MS, despite a number of statements stressing the need to further explore the impact 
of climate change on migration and displacement, had provided so far a proper solu-
tion within the European regional area. 
First of all, the legal framework for international protection according to the 
Qualification Directive has shown to be inadequate. Neither the refugee status, based 
on the provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention, nor the subsidiary protection sta-
tus are fit for purposes of EMs: in the former case, due to the absence, in most envi-
ronmental cases, of eligibility conditions required by Articles 1A(2) RC and 2(d) 
QD; in the latter, owing to the fact that conditions under Article 15 QD are unlike to 
be reached according to the relevant ECtHR case-law; in both cases, provisions of 
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the QD on internal alternative and exclusion from international protection are addi-
tional hindrances. By the way, the proposed replacement of the QD with a Regula-
tion83 neither expands the notion of refugee nor explicitly include environmental dis-
aster as a “serious harm” for the purpose of subsidiary protection. Also the Tempo-
rary Directive looks like unsatisfactory, as long as the trigger mechanism remains 
the same, as well as temporary measures according to Article 78(3) TFUE are mainly 
inspired by an intra-EU solidarity rationale. 
In turn, humanitarian provisions in the Visa Code, the Schengen Borders Code 
and the Return Directive would seem to be a viable legal instrument for EMs, if it 
weren’t that they are non-mandatory and thus let MS free to use them in a manner 
consistent with their (restrictive) national immigration policies. Moreover, it has to 
be pointed out that, from an EM perspective, it would be sometimes hard to visit a 
consulate to apply for such a visa, diplomatic representations being located in States 
capitals not always easily accessible in case of a rapid-onset environmental disaster. 
Nor a EU compulsory legal instrument on humanitarian protection, whether or not 
including an environmental provision, has even appeared on the horizon: in this re-
gard, Italian provisions on humanitarian permit and collective reception for natural 
disasters might serve as a model in the future. 
Furthermore, EU provisions on protection against removal orders from the terri-
tory of the MS according to relevant human rights law applicable in the EU are not 
a valid solution for all cases, because of the inherent features of environmental 
events, the above-mentioned ECtHR case-law on Articles 2, 3 and 8 ECHR, the need 
of a previous entry of EMs, and the fact that those provisions are a second best solu-
tion (i.e. granting removal bans but not always residence permits). 
Finally, the remaining options might be useful only in specific cases. While re-
settlement programmes are reserved for persons in need of international protection 
only (being also under-funded and implemented on a voluntary basis), humanitarian 
admission schemes look like more promising but still under-funded. Private spon-
sorships (like Italian humanitarian corridors) are proving to be a prominent solution 
for the future, as long as they would be allowed by MS in a manner consistent to the 
protection needs of EMs. By contrast, the cooperative nature of the RDPPs, along 
with the fact that they are under-funded, not always available in every region of 
 
83
 13 July 2016, COM(2016) 466 final. See PEERS, “The new EU law on refugees takes shape: More 
Harmonisation but Less Protection?”, EU Law Analysis, 23 July 2017, available at: <http://eulawanaly-
sis.blogspot.it/2017/07/the-new-eu-law-on-refugees-takes-shape.html>. 
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origin and, above all, not to be considered as safe havens for MS wishing to put in 
place extraterritorial processing of protection claims, substantially limit the useful-
ness of these programmes for EMs.  
As a conclusion, we stress the need for a European ad hoc legal instrument deal-
ing with every aspect of the protection of environmental migrants, no matter if it take 
the form of an extension of the notion of subsidiarity protection, or a new temporary 
protection instrument, as well as a comprehensive humanitarian protection provision 
or a specific HAS. In other terms, the EU should lead rather than adapt to the inter-
national environmental migration debate, officially recognising EMs as vulnerable 
persons in need of protection84. Unfortunately, due to the refugee crisis starting from 
2015 and the persistent (if not exacerbated) reluctance of MS to implement such a 
legislation for political reasons, it seems that such a legal instrument is unlikely to 
be put into place at least in the near future.  
 
 
84
 See COURNIL and TABAU (coords.), Human rights and climate change: European Union policy op-
tions, requested by the EP Subcommittee on Human Rights, PE 457.066, Brussels, 2012, pp. 68-69; 
MAYRHOFER and AMMER, cit. supra note 10, p. 391. 
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1. – Introduction 
The current migration phenomenon has put under severe pressure the Common 
European Asylum System (“CEAS”).1 Facing unprecedented challenges, the Euro-
pean Union’s reaction is far from univocal: it is on the contrary highly diversified, 
 
*
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1
 The legal instruments composing the CEAS are: Directive 2011/95/EU (Qualification Directive), in 
OJ L 304/12, 30.9.2004; Directive 2013/33/EU (Reception Directive), in OJ L 180/96, 29 June 2013; Di-
rective 2013/32/EU (Procedures Directive), in OJ L 180/60, 29.6.2013; EU Regulation 604/2013 (Dublin 
III Regulation), in OJ L 180/31, 29.6.2013; and EU Regulation 603/2013 (Eurodac Regulation), in OJ L 
180/1, 29 June 2013. See, on the subject, DUBOLINO, “L’identificazione dello Stato competente all’esame 
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with some Member States (“MS”) enabling reception policies for immigrants, and 
others trying to enshrine the possibilities of access to their territories.2 
The EU is therefore asked to review some of its migration and asylum policies, 
with the aim of more efficiently dealing with a crisis capable of shaking the very basis 
of the European integration process.3 That is why a strengthening of the CEAS pres-
ently appears as a non-indifferent priority. In this context, it might appear surprising, 
at least at a first glance, that Directive 2001/55/CE on temporary protection, the so-
called Temporary Protection Directive (“TPD”),4 is not taken into consideration at all.  
The instrument was expressly created to deal with mass influxes of migrants in 
the EU, and although the current crisis could effortlessly be defined as a mass influx, 
the possible activation of the TPD is not even being discussed at the EU level. In-
deed, with regard to Article 1 of this instrument, which states:  
“the purpose of this Directive is to establish minimum standards for giving temporary 
protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who are 
unable to return to their country of origin and to promote a balance of effort between Member 
States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving such persons”,  
 
di una domanda di asilo: dalla Convenzione di Dublino al nuovo regolamento”, Diritto dell’Unione eu-
ropea, 2004, p. 811 ff.; FAHEY, “Joining the Dots: External Norms, AFSJ Directives and the EU’s Role in 
the Global Legal Order”, European Law Review, 2016, p. 105 ff.; MANANASHVILI, “The Diffusion of the 
EU Asylum Acquis in the Eastern Neighbourhood: A Test for the EU’s Normative Power”, European For-
eign Affairs Review, 2015, p.187 ff.; LAMBERT, MCADAM, FULLERTON (eds.), The Global Reach of Euro-
pean Refugee Law, Cambridge, 2013; DEN HEIJER, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum, Cambridge, 2013. 
2
 In a nutshell, it is to remember that Germany has decided to open its borders and to grant uncondi-
tioned assistance to Syrian forced migrants, whereas other States have opted for an embitterment of border 
controls and reception policies for third-State individuals.  
3
 As witnessed, for instance, by the success of “leave”, on 23 June 2016, in the UK’s referendum on 
Brexit, in which the topic of migrants and/or asylum seekers has played a significant role. See inter alia 
SAVASTANO, “Prime osservazioni sul diritto di recedere dall’Unione europea”, Federalismi.it, 25 Novem-
ber 2015, available at: <http://federalismi.it/nv14/articolo-documento.cfm?artid=30808 >; HARVEY, “‘In 
the Light of the Guidelines’: Brexit and the European Council”, European Law Blog, 7 October 2016, 
available at: < http://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/04/04/in-light-of-the-guidelines-brexit-and-the-european-
council-revisited/>.  
4
 Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protec-
tion in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts 
between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, in OJ L 212/12, 
7 August 2001. 
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it is reasonable to wonder why European institutions are currently not even men-
tioning the TPD in the 2015 European Agenda on Migration,5 and in the more recent 
Commission’s Communication titled ‘Towards a reform of the Common European 
Asylum System and enhancing legal avenues to Europe’.6 
This work, starting from what already outlined by the relevant doctrine,7 exam-
ines the reasons explaining the lack of activation of the TPD, and aims at showing 
that some significant modifications should be studied to realistically hope in its fu-
ture activation. In this sense, the paper looks on the one hand – and in a comparative 
way – at the US Temporary Protection Status (“TPS”), and, on the other hand, it 
argues that a disaster-oriented evolution of the TPD might increase its chances of 
future utilization, and meet at the same time the objective of granting some sort of 
protection for people fleeing sudden-onset environmental disasters. 
2. – The TPD: Structure, Goals, and Attempts of activation 
 
The TPD, adopted in 2001, was the first European piece of legislation dealing 
with asylum policies after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, 
that communitarized the subject, by imposing – with reference to temporary protec-
tion – the adoption within five years of “minimum standards for giving temporary 
 
5
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A European Agenda on Migration (Brus-
sels, 13 May 2015, COM(2015) 240 final). 
6
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Towards a reform 
of the Common European Asylum System and enhancing legal avenues to Europe (Brussels, 6 April 2016, 
COM(2016) 197 final).  
7
 See, generally, INELI-CIGER, “Time to Activate the Temporary Protection Directive”, European Jour-
nal of Migration and Law, 2016, p. 18 ff.; BEIRENS., MAAS, PETRONELLA, VAN DER VELDEN, “Study on 
the Temporary Protection Directive: Final Report”, European Commission Directorate-General for Migra-
tion and Home Affair, January 2016, available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaf-
fairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/asylum/temporary-protection/docs/final_report_evaluation_tpd 
_en.pdf>; INELI-CIGER, “Has the Temporary Protection Directive Become Obsolete? An Examination of 
the Directive and its Lack of Implementation in View of the Recent Asylum Crisis in the Mediterranean”, 
in BALOUZ, INELI-CIGER, SINGER, STOYANOVA (eds.), Seeking Asylum in the European Union: Selected 
Protection Issues Raised by the Second Phase of the Common European Asylum System, Leiden, Boston, 
2015; ARENAS, “The Concept of 'Mass Influx of Displaced Persons' in the European Directive Establishing 
the Temporary Protection System”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2005, p. 7 ff.; 
NOTARBARTOLO DI SCIARA, “Temporary Protection Directive, Dead Letter or Still Option for the Future? 
An Overview on The Reasons Behind its Lack of Implementation”, Eurojus.it – Rivista, 2 December 215, 
available at: <http://rivista.eurojus.it/temporary-protection-directive-dead-letter-or-still-option-for-the-fu-
ture-an-overview-on-the-reasons-behind-its-lack-of-implementation/>. 
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protection to displaced persons from third countries who cannot return to their coun-
try of origin and for persons who otherwise need international protection”.8 
The TPD establishes a legal framework to be applied in case the Union is willing 
to provide some categories of third-country displaced persons – forced to massively 
emigrate because of armed conflicts, endemic violence, and/or the risk of systematic 
violations of their human rights (Article 2) – with a temporary protection regime. 
The TPD’s protection system can last at most for three years (Article 4), and envis-
ages a burden-sharing mechanism according to which all MS should host the re-
gime’s beneficiaries “in a spirit of Community solidarity”, depending on their na-
tional reception capabilities (Articles 25 and 26). The instrument, which is one of a 
kind since it codifies a “new” form of international protection,9 introduces an excep-
tional procedure which can be activated by a qualified majority by the Council upon 
proposal by the Commission (Article 5). It aims at coping with emergency migration 
phenomena that cannot be managed through normal migration and asylum policies. 
The TPD is hence complementary to the “classical” asylum policy of the Union, 
whose cornerstone is the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
(henceforth: the Geneva Convention).10 
The notion of “mass influx of displaced persons” is the instrument’s most delicate 
and discussed element. Before the adoption of the TPD such a concept had never 
enjoyed autonomous legal consideration,11 since international refugee law, as disci-
plined under the Geneva Convention, essentially aims at protecting individuals from 
 
8
 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty of the European Union, the Treaties establishing the Eu-
ropean Communities and certain related acts, adoption 2 October 1997, entry into force 1st May 1999, Art. 
63(2a). As regards current primary EU law, see Art. 78(2c) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union. It is worth noting that the evolution of primary EU law has brought significant renovation as 
regards the EU competence on the subject: whereas the previous disposition only conferred to the EU 
institutions to adopt “minimum standards”, the EU is currently enabled to enact common procedures on 
asylum matters. See in this regard, POCAR, BARUFFI, Commentario breve ai Trattati dell’Unione europea, 
II ed., Padova, 2014, p. 480.  
9
 See PERLUSS, HARTMAN, “Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm”, Virginia Journal 
of International Law, 1985-1986, pp. 551-626. 
10
 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (adoption 28 July 1951, entry into force 22 April 1954) 
to be read in conjunction with the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (adoption 31 January 1957, 
entry into force 4 October 1967). See, inter alia, GAUCI, GIUFFRÉ., TSOURDI (eds.), Exploring the bounda-
ries of refugee law: current protection challenges, Leiden, 2015; FIDDIAN-QASMIYEH, LOESCHER, LONG, 
SIGONA (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, Oxford, 2014; 
SILINGENBERG, The Reception of Asylum Seekers under International Law. Between Sovereignty and Equa-
lity, Oxford, 2014; LENZERINI, Asilo e diritti umani: l’evoluzione del diritto d’asilo nel diritto internazio-
nale, Milan, 2009; GOODWIN-GILL, MCADAM, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford, 2007. 
11
 In this sense, ARENAS, The Concept of 'Mass Influx of Displaced Persons' in the European Directive 
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the well-founded fear of being subject to persecutions in their home country because 
of some inherent characteristic of their own (more precisely, due to reasons linked 
to race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion).12 Quite the opposite, the TPD leaves the discriminatory and individual ele-
ments behind, so as to provide with international protection entire categories of per-
sons – therefore via a collective assessment approach –13 relying on the danger that 
these would experience in their country of origin: the necessity of a determined dis-
criminatory motive as a “justification” of the dangers and persecutions feared is 
therefore not directly significant to the international protection offered by the TPD. 
This is why the instrument is complementary to the Geneva Convention, which 
offers, for clear historic reasons, a refugee definition anchored to the period in which 
it was adopted.14 The classical definition of refugee under international law is conse-
quently nowadays limited if compared to the totality of individuals who actually need 
international protection.15 It is in this sense that we should consider instruments such 
as the TPD or the Qualification Directive (where it enables subsidiary protection),16 
namely instruments granting international protection within the EU to individuals 
that do not fall within the classical definition of refugee.17  
 
Establishing the Temporary Protection System, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2005, p. 437. See 
also NOTARBARTOLO DI SCIARA, cit. supra note 7, p. 1. 
12
 Art. 1(A)2 of the 1951 Geneva Convention.  
13
 Even though the assessment procedures are evidently different, it is useful to underline that in prac-
tice (at least) part of the refugee status assessments under the Geneva Convention are, prima facie, con-
ducted on a collective rather than individual basis (see in this sense also NOTARBARTOLO DI SCIARA, cit. 
supra note 7, p. 2. Such a trend – at least in those States that are less equipped as regards reception facili-
ties– is often due to the impossibility to determine the individual statuses in case a State has to deal with 
tens of thousands of persons – if not even more – immigrating in its territory in the most disparate (and 
desperate) situations. In this sense, one of the ground weaknesses of the TPD already emerges: if one of its 
main aims is to provide relief to MS national asylum systems in exceptional cases, it is important to under-
line how, de facto, the practice of collective assessments, theoretically exclusive to the TPD system, is also 
disseminated in the application of “classical” refugee protection systems. 
14
 In this regard, FITZPATRICK, “Temporary Protection of Refugees: Elements of a Formalized Re-
gime”, The American Journal of International Law, 2000, p. 280. 
15
 For a first analysis concerning the question of the categories that, even though not falling within the 
classical definition of refugee, need international protection, see ex multis  MARTIN (ed.), The New Asylum-
Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s, Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 1988. 
16
 Qualification Directive (2011/95/EU). See, in particular, Chapter V.  
17
 Since the Fifties, the question concerning the enlarging of the “classical” definition has covered a 
relevant role in the doctrine and in States’ practice. Indeed, the Final Act of the Conference adopting the 
Geneva Convention provided that: “The Conference expresses the hope that the Convention […] will have 
value as an example exceeding its contractual scope and that all nations will be guided by it in granting so 
far as possible to persons in their territory as refugees and who would not be covered by the terms of the 
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Thanks to the TPD’s adoption, the Union enjoys a legal framework whose main 
objective is, alongside with the obvious humanitarian considerations, to grant a “safety 
valve” to MS national asylum systems in the hypothesis they are put under severe 
pressure by non-conventional migration fluxes. The collective assessment approach in 
presence of mass asylum applications phenomena is indeed thought to lighten MS’ 
financial and administrative burdens normally dedicated to individual assessment pro-
cedures.18 If, for instance, the TPD were activated to protect Syrian residents fleeing 
the current civil war, the sole requisite of citizenship or continuous Syrian residence 
would suffice to enter the protection regime. It would then be unnecessary to examine 
the individual status of every single protection seeker. Such an approach – de facto 
unilaterally adopted by Germany in 2015 –19 would lighten the burdens necessary to 
complete the examination of individual cases. The German Federal Government, when 
disposing the prohibition of deportation to Syria because of humanitarian considera-
tions,20 has allowed for the release of temporary residence permits also for Syrians 
whose asylum applications had been denied or not been presented at all.  
So, briefly, significant elements differentiate the Geneva Convention and the 
TPD: while the latter grants international protection (for instance substantially lim-
ited)21 only for a pre-determined period of time (one year, up to a maximum of three 
 
Convention, the treatment for which it provides” (Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipo-
tentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, para. IV, Recomm. E). According to some schol-
ars (see SPIJKERBOER, “Subsidiarity in Asylum Law: the Personal Scope of International Protection”, in 
BOUTEILLET-PACQUET (eds.), Subsidiary Protection of Refugees in the European Union: Complementing 
the Geneva Convention?, Bruxelles, 2002), p. 19 ff., such declaration is the legal basis for the subsequent 
development of international protection legal frameworks which operate on a subsidiary or complementary 
level to the Geneva Convention. In any case, it seems possible to argue that this disposition aimed (and 
still aims) at encouraging States to create ex novo international protection instruments which have to en-
large the realm of those who should be provided with international assistance. The TPD, a sui generis piece 
of legislation, is beyond doubt one of these. 
18
 In similar terms see FITZPATRICK, cit. supra note 14, p. 280; see also INELI-CIGER, “Time to activate 
the Temporary Protection Directive”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 2016, p. 32. 
19
 In this sense see MUNARI, “The Perfect Storm on EU Asylum Law: The Need to Rethink the Dublin 
Regime”, Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale, 2016, p. 536 ff. 
20
 On the grounds of Section 25 (Aufenthalt aus humanitären Gründen) of the Gesetz über den Aufen-
thalt, die Erwerbstätigkeit und die Integration von Ausländern im Bundesgebiet. More information are 
available at: <http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/Germany/asylum-procedure/treatment-spe-
cific-nationalities#footnote4_nllq8t0>. Note that the German provisions implementing the TPD are to be 
found in Section 24 of the above-mentioned act. Its application relies on the Council’s decision to activate 
the TPD, as disciplined by the Directive itself. 
21
 See Chapter III of the Directive [Please indicate which Directive]. In a nutshell, TPD protected indi-
viduals benefit from residence and working permits, access to educational and/or professional programmes, 
housing, and – depending on their economic situation – social assistance (food sustenance and medical care). 
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years),22 the former allows for more incisive and prolonged assistance, which is for 
sure more favourable for those who are entitled to it, and, consequently, evidently 
more “burdensome” for the host country. Thus, the Union’s interest in activating the 
TPD appears clear in case of a mass influx of displaced persons. Thanks to the in-
strument, MS could protect entire groups of persons just for a limited period, hence 
undertaking politically sustainable paths. 
Apart from that – and again in the view of the “relief” to national asylum systems 
– it is furthermore sobering to consider Article 2(a) of the Directive, according to 
which temporary protection should be granted “in particular if there is also a risk that 
the asylum system will be unable to process this influx without adverse effects for its 
efficient operation, in the interests of the persons concerned and other persons request-
ing protection”. It is today sufficiently clear that the efficient operation of some MS 
national asylum systems is compromised. In the light of what has been assessed, for 
instance, by the Strasbourg Court and the ECJ in the cases N.S.,23 M.S.S. vs. Belgium 
and Greece,24 and B.A.C. vs. Greece,25 it can be concluded that the Greek system is 
incapable of working in the correct way (namely in the full respect of the non-re-
foulement principle and of the fundamental rights of asylum seekers). At the same 
time, the ECHtR judgment in case Tarakhel vs. Switzerland26 has raised doubts con-
cerning Italy’s capability to face the current migration fluxes without compromising 
the correct functioning of its national reception system. Moreover, it remains to be 
seen how asylum polices enacted in Hungary27 can be conciliated with a correct appli-
cation of the legal obligations to which MS and the Union have agreed. In this regard, 
 
22
 TPD, Art. 4. 
23
 Case C-411/10, N.S. and Others, ECR, 21 December 2011. 
24
 M.S.S. vs. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, Judgement of 21 January 2011. 
25
 B.A.C. v. Greece, Application No. 11981/15, Judgment of 13 October 2016. 
26
 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, Application No. 29217/12, Judgment of 4 November 2014, para. 115. On 
which see CERNA, “Introductory Note to Tarakhel vs. Switzerland (Eur. Ct. H.R.)”, International Legal 
Materials, 2015, p. 367 ff.; VICINI, “Regolamento Dublino e principio di ‘non-refoulement’, ‘the neverend-
ing story’: il caso ‘Tarakhel c. Svizzera’”, La Comunità Internazionale, 2015, p. 203. 
27
 In this sense, see declarations by DALHUISEN, Director of Amnesty International's Europe and Cen-
tral Asia programme: “L'Ungheria si è trasformata di fatto in un paese nel quale la protezione dei rifugiati 
non è prevista, in evidente contrasto coi suoi obblighi sui diritti umani e con l'ovvia necessità di lavorare 
insieme agli altri stati membri dell'Unione europea e ai paesi balcanici per trovare una soluzione collettiva 
e umana alla crisi in corso”, available at: <http://www.amnesty.it/crisi-dei-rifugiati-Unione-europea-am-
monisca-formalmente-Ungheria>. See also a Gall L., Human Rights Watch Researcher for Eastern Europe 
and Western Balkans, Dispatches: Hungary Puts Asylum Seekers at Risk, available at: 
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/08/13/dispatches-hungary-puts-asylum-seekers-risk>. Further doubts 
relating the legality of the new Hungarian policies on migration and asylum may be inferred by the Com-
mission’s behaviour, that on  10 December 2015 sent Budapest a notice of default, starting an infringement 
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there is even some scholar maintaining that “[t]he level of protection introduced by the 
Temporary Protection Directive [would] be higher than the protection available today 
for many asylum seekers and refugees in Italy, Hungary and Greece”.28 
Ultimately, also in the light of Article 2(a), the reasons why the TPD might be acti-
vated in response to the current “refugee crisis” appear clear: (i) in a relatively brief 
period, third country individuals have massively entered the Union, (ii) often because of 
endemic violence or armed conflicts occurring in their home countries, and (iii) their 
need for international protection has compromised the correct functioning of different 
MS asylum systems. And yet, within the European institutions attempts to activate the 
TPD are rare and, when undertaken, they result in silent failures. As the TPD is meant 
to face exceptional events, its lack of utilization should not be a surprising factor itself: 
nonetheless an analysis of the past attempts of activation may be useful so as to argue 
why even a future activation of the instrument appears unrealistic. 
The first incisive attempt29 to activate the TPD dates back to 2011, after the col-
lapse of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia and Ghedaffi’s in Libya, which determined the 
structural failure of controls at the borders of the two countries, with many African 
inhabitants starting to reach Italian or Maltese coasts.30 In May 2011, after the arrival 
in few months of about 26.000 individuals on the island of Lampedusa,31 two mem-
bers of the European Parliament started to lobby the Commission to activate its ex-
clusive power of proposal of activation of the TPD. Their aim consisted in granting 
access to temporary international protection to the maritime migrants, and in redis-
tributing them among MS “in a spirit of Community solidarity” in compliance with 
the burden-sharing mechanism which is established by Chapter VI of the Directive32 
(as well as in accordance with Article 80 of the TFEU, which declares that policies 
on asylum and immigration “shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility”).33  
 
procedure against Hungary (see press release, available at: <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-
6228_en.htm>. Note that there has subsequently been no following to the procedure. 
28
 INELI-CIGER, Time to activate the Temporary Protection Directive, cit. supra note 18, p. 32. 
29
 For an exhaustive analysis of the cases that could/should have brought to a TPD’s activation in the 
past, see BEIRENS, MAAS, PETRONELLA, VAN DER VELDEN, cit. supra note 7, Chapter 5. 
30
 See INELI-CIGER, “Has the Temporary Protection Directive Become Obsolete? An Examination of 
the Directive and its Lack of Implementation in View of the Recent Asylum Crisis in the Mediterranean”, 
cit. supra note 7, pp. 225-247. 
31
 Ibid, p. 238. 
32
 See, in particular, TPD Art. 25(1), and Art. 26(1) and 26(2). 
33
 In this regard, see point 93 of Case C-411/10, N.S. and Others, ECR (above note 23): “ In addition, 
Article 80 TFEU provides that asylum policy and its implementation are to be governed by the principle 
of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member 
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The Commission answered that the situation could not be considered as a “mass 
influx”, and that there were hence no sufficient reasons to propose an activation of 
the TPD to the Council. Former Commissioner Malmström’s argumentations appear 
in this sense enlightening:  
“At this point we cannot see a mass influx of migrants to Europe even though some of 
our MS are under severe pressure. The temporary mechanism is one tool that could be used 
in the future, if necessary, but we have not yet reached that situation”.34 
It is then today legitimate to wonder when and how it may be possible to talk 
about a mass influx of displaced persons under the TPD: the European institutions 
are not willing to do that even after the exponential increase of immigrants and asy-
lum seekers who entered the EU as a result of the civil war in Syria, and of the rising 
of the so-called Islamic State within the Fertile Crescent area.  
So, ultimately, there was no mass influx in 2011 – when some tens of thousands 
reached few MS –35 and there is still no mass influx in the current period, when the 
Union as a whole with all its MS are trying to deal with the arrival of hundreds of 
thousands of individuals in need. 
This contingency raises profound doubts as to existence tout court within the 
competent authorities of the willingness to activate the Directive. An evident di-
lemma emerges: in case a circumscribed and punctual mass influx putting under “se-
vere pressure” just few national asylum systems – as it was the case in 2011 –, it 
seems unlikely that those MS which are not directly involved in the crisis will be 
willing to accept the displaced persons’ relocation and resettlement mechanism 
which is provided for by Chapter VI of the TPD, and this is essentially because the 
situation appears manageable without resorting to the instrument; on the other hand, 
in the hypothesis of a mass influx as the current one, which involves the majority of 
MS, the reaction does not go in favour of granting international temporary protection 
to some categories of individuals, it tends rather to circumscribe (with some excep-
tions) as much as possible the migratory fluxes. 
 
States. Directive 2001/55 is an example of that solidarity but, as was stated at the hearing, the solidarity 
mechanisms which it contains apply only to wholly exceptional situations falling within the scope of that 
directive, that is to say, a mass influx of displaced persons”. 
34
 MALMSTRÖM, cit. supra note 30, p. 238. In similar terms, see also Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, 
Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council of the European Union, ECR, 6 September 2017, points 256 ff.  
35
 In similar terms see again INELI-CIGER, Time to activate the Temporary Protection Directive, cit. 
supra note 7, p. 32: “If the current migration crisis in Europe does not qualify as a mass influx situation, it 
is hard to imagine what would qualify as one”. 
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It appears then that the TPD’s system is ontologically flawed by a fatal short 
circuit, whose effect is to limit decisively the probability of activation of the instru-
ment. 
3. – The TPD: Reasons Behind the Lack of Activation 
This part of the work analyses the reasons underlying the present lack of activa-
tion of the Directive. For analytical purpose, the section is divided in two parts. The 
first one focuses on TPD’s “endogenous factors”: terminological and structural char-
acteristics that render it unfit to be applied to migration phenomena surging from 
political collapse or civil war undergoing in a third country. The second one focuses 
on “external factors”: general and political contingencies that render the TPD’s acti-
vation far from probable as it currently stands and is interpreted. The analysis serves 
then to better understand how to enhance the instrument’s chances of activation. 
3.1 – Endogenous Factors 
The TPD describes a mass influx as “[the] arrival in the Community of a large 
number of displaced persons, who come from a specific country or geographical area, 
whether their arrival in the Community was spontaneous or aided, for example through 
an evacuation programme”. Whereas the definition of displaced persons, contained in 
Article 2(c), results sufficiently clear (since it encompasses classical refugees, those 
who are entitle to subsidiary protection under the Qualification Directive,36 and, more 
generally, all those fleeing endemic violence, armed conflict, and generalized viola-
tions of human rights), the notion of “mass influx” remains ambiguous. 
Through a joint examination of the TPD and of the Commission’s Explanatory 
Memorandum,37 we can nonetheless identify at least three elements characterizing the 
existence of such an influx:38 (i) the displaced persons must come from an easily identi-
fiable geographic area (as a State or a particular region), (ii) the arrivals’ intensity must 
 
36
 See generally MCADAM, “The European Union Qualification Directive: The Creation of a Subsidiary 
Protection Regime”, International Journal of Refugee Law, 2005, pp. 461-516; ZWAAN, The Qualification 
Directive: central themes, problem issues, and implementation in selected member states, Wolf Legal Pub-
lishers, Nijmegen, 2007.  
37
 Proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals and stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protec-
tion /* COM/2001/0510 final – CNS 2001/0207 */. 
38
 In this sense NOTARBARTOLO DI SCIARA, cit. supra note 7; ARENAS, cit. supra note 7. 
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be exceptional, and (iii) the normal reception and asylum mechanisms must reveal them-
selves not up to the task of correctly absorbing the migratory phenomenon.39  
The necessity of identifying a circumscribed geographical zone of origin entails 
that the TPD regime cannot be applied to influxes of migrants and asylum seekers 
originating from various and heterogeneous third States. It appears thus legitimate to 
raise doubts about the potential activation of the TPD for migrants who come in the 
EU via maritime routes from North African coasts, since these work as the point of 
departure for individuals of many and different nationalities, ethnicities, religions, 
etc. It seems therefore too complex to delineate with sufficient accuracy the charac-
teristics of the particular group that should be covered by the European temporary 
protection regime. In more direct terms, it would not appear justifiable, for instance, 
to grant protection to Libyan residents and not to those who, even though entering 
Europe in similar conditions (or even on the same boat), come from Sudan, Eritrea, 
or Somalia. Such a neat distinction between categories of individuals who often suf-
fer from very similar human rights violations does not appear easily justifiable.  
An alternative scenario, similar in its effects but opposite in its premises, would 
on the other hand see the Union adopting a broad interpretation of the notion “spe-
cific geographical area”, considering as a unique region the whole area of North Af-
rica and of the Horn of Africa. This would most likely lead to extremely harsh inter-
nal oppositions in Europe for the fear of an unsustainable migratory wave. In a nut-
shell, it is possible to maintain that the group(s) of individuals that reach the EU 
through the Mediterranean Sea lack(s) the “geographical requirement” that is neces-
sary to the activation of the TPD.  
If this is true for migrants coming from North Africa, the same appears less inci-
sive with respect to those fleeing the Syrian civil war. In this case, it is beyond dis-
pute that the EU is facing an exceptional influx, originating from a “specific geo-
graphical area”, and that is forcing some categories to flee their original regions be-
cause of the most brutal and systematic violations of their fundamental rights. Not-
withstanding such considerations, the absence, within the TPD, of objective criteria 
capable of identifying clearly the existence of a mass influx attributes to the Council 
a broad margin of appreciation when it is called to decide on the Directive’s activa-
tion.40 And exactly because of the ambiguity surrounding a central notion of the in-
 
39
 The UNHCR has adopted a very similar point of view in this regard. See UNHCR, UNHCR Com-
mentary on the Draft Directive on Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx, 15 September 2000, 
point 3, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/437c5ca74.html>.  
40
 It is relevant to specify that at the time of the creation of the TPD, the adoption of a large notion of 
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strument, the Council’s decision seems, in the end, almost exclusively bound to con-
siderations of political utility rather than to the application of the law.41  
In this sense, in 2005, years before the current migration phenomenon and the 
economic crisis that hit several EU countries, an insightful scholar was considering 
these problems, putting in doubt the very effectiveness of the TPD’s system.42 After 
more than ten years, it remains difficult to contest the validity of these points. 
One further and frequently underestimated element makes the potential activa-
tion of the TPD even more remote, and this is the “fear” that the regime might ulti-
mately become long-lasting, thereby losing its temporary (and thus politically sus-
tainable) character. Such factor is particularly relevant in the hypothesis of a TPD’s 
activation for categories fleeing conflicts of indefinable duration (at least a priori), 
such as those today existing in Syria and Libya. Since the TPD offers temporary 
protection, the interest behind its activation would of course consist in the possibility 
of assisting the displaced only for a brief period of time, with the guarantee of repat-
riating them once the predetermined lapse of time has exhausted (one year, to a max-
imum of three). If the Union and the MS cannot enjoy this certainty, the specific 
interest standing behind the activation of the Directive disappears, since MS would 
risk taking a no-way-out path by granting (probable) long-lasting protection. 
Crisis as those in Syria and Libya are events whose end is not easy to hypothe-
size, and this uncertainty does not allow European institutions to activate the TPD 
without disproportionate concerns relating to the duration of the protection that its 
MS should be granting. In this sense, Article 6(2) of the Directive is highly relevant:  
“The Council Decision [determining the suspension of the regime before the pro-
grammed period] shall be based on the establishment of the fact that the situation in the 
country of origin is such as to permit the safe and durable return of those granted temporary 
protection with due respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and MS' obligations 
regarding non-refoulement”.  
If this disposition is valid for the termination of the temporary protection regime 
before its natural ending, it is not easy to understand why the (would be) protected 
 
mass influx was intended to grant flexibility, and thus more application chances of the instrument. See in 
this sense BEIRENS et al., cit. supra note 7, p. 2. 
41
 See in this sense BEIRENS, MAAS, PETRONALLA, VAN DER VELDEN, cit. supra note 7, p. 2: “The 
procedure to activate the TPD is subject to, and ultimately hampered by, political debates at each step of 
the procedure. In sum, this makes for a potentially lengthy and cumbersome procedure, with little chance 
of attaining a qualified majority in the Council”. 
42
 ARENAS, cit. supra note 7, p. 438. 
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categories could be repatriated (even in case of expiration of the predetermined pe-
riod), in unsafe, violent, and unstable situations. In other terms, we should wonder 
why MS would want to activate the Directive for entire groups of individuals fleeing 
a situation of political collapse (civil war, ethnic cleansing, brutal persecutions to the 
detriment of certain minorities, etc), if they are not sufficiently certain about the im-
provement – in one up to three years – of the situation in the area of origin of the 
displaced. If – hypothetically – the TPD had been activated in 2012 to protect Syrian 
citizens, a “safe and durable return” could still not be granted nowadays after five 
years. If this had been the case, MS would now be forced either to extend the duration 
of the temporary protection or to incur in a violation of the non-refoulement principle 
by repatriating the subjects in unsafe conditions. It appears in the end clear that to 
avoid a similar and not unlikely impasse, MS have a particular interest in not acti-
vating at all the TPD. 43 
3.2. – External Factors 
Moving forward, a framework comparison between the political conditions the 
EU is nowadays living in and the ones experienced in 2001, year of adoption of the 
TPD, offers some insights to understand the TPD’s lack of activation. Two main 
events that took place make the Directive far less attractive than it was in the past. 
First, the increase in the Union’s MS from 15 to 28 makes it harder to reach the 
consensus that is necessary to activate the Directive.44 If, of course, proportions have 
not changed, it is equally evident how it is more difficult to reach the sufficient votes 
nowadays, since the number of national political interests to be taken into consider-
ation (moreover concerning highly politicized and sensitive issues like migration and 
international protection) has in fact almost doubled since 2001. 
Second, the impact that the economic and financial crisis that is still influencing 
 
43
 In case of an extension of the TPD regime beyond its predetermined time limits, its beneficiaries 
would de facto enter a legal vacuum, since EU law does not provide for a similar circumstance. An appli-
cation of Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents would at a first glance be imaginable, since it provides for the grant-
ing of the status of long-term residents to third-country citizens that have legally and continuously stayed 
within a MS for five years. However, notwithstanding the relevant time gap (it suffices to remember the 
TPD lasts as most for 3 years whereas Directive 2003/109 applies after 5), it is worth highlighting that the 
latter, according to Art. 3(2) specifically prohibits its application to third-country individuals allowed to 
stay in a MS on temporary protection grounds. 
44
 Note that Denmark is not bound by the Directive, as stated in the perambulatory clause nr. 26: “In 
accordance with Arts. 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of Denmark, annexed to the Treaty on Euro-
pean Union and to the Treaty establishing the European Community, Denmark is not participating in the 
adoption of this Directive, and is therefore not bound by it nor subject to its application”. 
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part of the Western world should not be underestimated. Political balances in many 
nations have shifted radically: in comparison to the first years of the millennium, many 
European States are experiencing a slowing down (if not even an inversion) of their 
economic growth. It is sobering to remember that from 2008 to 2014 the GPD in 
Greece has decreased by 33%, in Spain and Hungary by 15%, in Italy, the UK and 
Czech Republic by 10%,45 and that an economic recovery still appears remote in sev-
eral European countries. In a similar climate, nationalist political forces, often radically 
adverse to policies of assistance for third-country individuals, have found fertile soil. 
This environment, moreover exacerbated by significant public safety concerns, 
renders the space for a system such as the TPD’s always narrower. It appears quite 
evident that a temporary protection system aimed at protecting entire categories of 
individuals radically collides with the policies undertaken in several EU countries, 
such as Hungary, Austria, Croatia, and Slovenia, that have, for instance, built – or tried 
to build – barbed wire walls at their borders to slow down or stop influxes of migrants. 
A further (and more general) factor that may explain the lack of willingness in 
activating the TPD is enshrined in the notion of “pull-factor”. It is diffusely believed 
that the activation of the instrument would increase the attractive factor of the Union, 
thereby intensifying the immigration phenomenon, and worsening – rather than re-
lieving – national asylum systems’ conditions. Where studies on migration issues 
find that an increase of the pull-factors may increase immigration into a specific 
area,46 it appears reasonable to believe that the activation of the TPD would contribute 
to the intensification of immigration into the EU. 
Notwithstanding this relevant point, it is to underline that the “attractive compo-
nent” is, for those fleeing armed conflict and systemic violations of their human rights, 
quite marginal if compared to push-factors.47 “[P]ersons fleeing armed conflict or vio-
lence do not necessarily look for a wealthier State or a State with better welfare condi-
tions to flee to, but are in search of a secure place free from violence and persecution”.48  
Data regarding the number of migrants and asylum seekers fleeing the Syrian 
conflict seem to confirm such conclusions: the vast majority of the displaced is cur-
rently hosted in Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, while only about 10% of Syrian forced 
emigrants has applied for asylum within the EU. Nonetheless, if the analysis shifts 
 
45
 Data source are available at: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>. 
46
 See ex multis: Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Push and 
Pull Factors of international Migration: A Comparative Report, European Communities, 2000, available 
at: <https://www.nidi.nl/shared/content/output/2000/eurostat-2000-theme1-pushpull.pdf>. 
47
 See THIELEMANN, “How Effective are National and EU Policies in the Area of Forced Migration”, 
Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2012, pp. 21-37. 
48
 INELI-CIGER, cit. supra note 7, p. 234. 
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on this 10%, an interesting element emerges: from April 2011 to April 2016, accord-
ing to UNHCR data, 800.509 Syrians have applied for asylum in the EU, with more 
than 60% shared between Germany (401.018) and Sweden (110.333), 25% among 
Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, and the Netherlands, and less than 15% among the re-
maining MS.49 What appears here relevant is the comparison between the number of 
asylum applications in Germany and the other countries that did not undertake the 
policies of broad reception that were mentioned at the beginning of this work: this 
comparison suggests that the pull-factor of temporary protection policies – such the 
one unilaterally enacted by the German government – may have a significant impact 
on the number of asylum applications. So, in the particular cases in which the TPD 
should be acting – namely in situations of exceptional humanitarian crisis – the im-
portance of the “attractive component” (although unquestionably marginal if com-
pared to push-factors), should not be underestimated when thinking about the 
chances of activation of the Directive.  
In conclusion, it seems possible to maintain that the TPD – as currently structured 
– suffers from excessive maximalism,50 incompatible with the present Zeitgeist. The 
idea of granting immediate (though temporary) protection to entire categories of dis-
placed persons to be shared among MS in the name of the principle of solidarity was 
perhaps sustainable at the beginning of the millennium. The same system appears 
today all but sustainable. 
4. – The Way Forward: A Disaster-Oriented TPD? 
Assuming the necessity within EU law of an effective legal framework disciplin-
ing temporary protection, the final part of this paper tries to identify how and when 
the Directive could be realistically activated. One possible way to do that would con-
sist in starting to consider the TPD as an instrument potentially able to address envi-
ronmental displacement caused by sudden-onset disasters, namely events whose neg-
ative effects can arguably be restored in relatively brief periods (and whose intensity 
and frequency is expected to increase due to climate change, thereby posing an in-
creasing challenge to the international community as a whole). 
 
49
 For more information about data regarding migratory fluxes from Syria, visit <http://data.un-
hcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php>. 
50
 In this regard see INELI-CIGER, cit. supra note 7, p. 227: “it can be concluded that the Directive has 
the potential to protect a broad range of individuals coming to the Eu when a mass influx situation occurs”. 
It is thus reasonable to wonder if the totality of individuals that may potentially be covered by the TPD is 
excessively broad. 
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To draw some inspirational elements from an effective temporary protection re-
gime conceived (also) to grant protection to victims of natural disasters, a glance at the 
US Temporary Protection Status (TPS) seems useful.51 The TPS lies like the TPD on a 
complementary level to the Geneva Convention,52 but unlike the European instrument 
(which allows the admission within the EU to third-country individuals) it simply pro-
hibits repatriation (non-refoulement) of subjects who are already in the USA. When 
activated,53 the TPS applies to individuals already physically present in the US, and 
who – even though not falling within the classical definition of refugee – need tempo-
rary protection because of some event occurring in their country of origin. 
More precisely, the TPS can be activated in three hypothesis: (i) in case of armed 
conflicts seriously threatening the physical safety of the foreigner subject to the hy-
pothetical repatriation, (ii) when a foreign State asks for the activation of the regime 
because temporarily unable to manage the repatriation of its citizens because of a 
natural disaster, (iii) if the foreign State faces extraordinary and temporary conditions 
that do now allow for a secure repatriation.  
In such circumstances, the Secretary of Homeland Security is free to concede the 
TPS to determined categories of individuals for a period of 6 up to 16 months (ex-
tendable if the conditions in the country of origin do not ameliorate), with the effect 
of providing foreigners who satisfy the necessary conditions54 with temporary resi-
dence and work permits. The TPS is currently valid for more than 300.000 individ-
uals coming from 13 different countries.55 Three among the most recent activations 
(Nepal, Western Africa, Syria) show, indeed, how the TPS is in fact capable of cov-
ering a broad spectrum of hypothesis: pandemics, natural disasters, civil wars56.  
 
51
 Adopted in 1990 and part of the Immigration and Nationality Act: ACT 244 – Temporary Protected 
Status (Sec. 244. 1/ [8 U.S.C. 1254]). 
52
 In the sense of an enlarging of the scope of application of international protection systems, and in 
particular with reference to the notion of “humanitarian migrant”, see ARGUETA and WASEM, “Temporary 
Protection Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues”, Congressional Research Service, 18 February 
2016, p. 1, available at: <http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P11608.pdf>. 
53
 By decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security. 
54
 Possession of the passport of the designated State and evidence of physical stay in the US from the 
activation of the TPS regime. 
55
 For more data regarding the TPS current application, see the following website: 
<https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status#Countries%20Currently%20Designa 
ted%20for%20TPS>; ARGUETA and WASEM, cit. supra note 51, p. 7. 
56
 Relevant, in a comparison with what previously stated about the TPD, appears especially the TPS 
activation for Syrian citizens. Following the beginning of the civil conflict, the TPS was activated in March 
2012 (and should be expiring in September 2018), because “conditions in Syria have worsened to the point 
where Syrian nationals already in the United States would face serious threats to their personal safety if 
they were to return to their home country”. 
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The TPS can hence be held as a valid and effective instrument: its numerous 
applications in the last two decades and a half show, in comparison to the lack of 
utilization of the European system, the latter’s inadequacy. Thus, it would seem log-
ical to advocate for a minimalist-oriented reform of the Directive: if the European 
legislator’s intent consists in strengthening the CEAS, a modification of the TPD 
should be oriented to an increase of its chances of activation, and this means towards 
more pragmatism. In this sense, the European system could “import” some elements 
from the TPS. 
A first relevant element is the explicit reference to environmental disasters as 
events capable of determining the system’s activation. A TPD’s modification (or re-
interpretation) should be oriented to protect categories of people displaced by events 
whose duration can be forecast without excessive doubts, and sudden-onset environ-
mental disasters clearly fall within this kind of events. Since the ratio of temporary 
protection systems consists, self-evidently, in granting temporary and not prolonged 
protection, it would be useful to equip the TPD with some further specifications re-
garding the kind of events that causes the mass influx, with the aim of circumscribing 
the chances of its activation in less vague boundaries. And it is precisely in this sense 
that it would be useful to explicitly underline in the text the role of sudden-onset 
disasters, such as floods, wind-storms, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc, which are, for in-
stance, a major cause of displacement worldwide. 
As shown, the activation of the TPD in case of mass influxes deriving from violent 
conflicts is highly improbable. The Directive would probably enjoy more chances of 
activation if it were (also) explicitly designed to face massive and temporary influxes 
of individuals displaced by natural disasters (similarly to what the TPS imposes).57  
In this regard, Article 2(c) is to be thoroughly analyzed to understand to what 
extent the TPD is equipped for this kind of events. The provision underlines, when 
explaining the notion of “displaced persons”, that their impossibility to return to the 
original countries depends on “the situation prevailing” there, and then offers some 
specifications as to the possible types of displaced that may fall within the definition 
(i.e., refugees and, more broadly, persons fleeing armed conflicts, endemic violence 
or generalized violations of human rights). The very broad notion of “situations pre-
vailing in the country of origin” clearly potentially encompasses environmental dis-
asters, since the specifications that follow appear to have an explanatory rather than 
 
57
 See Immigration and Nationality Act – Temporary Protected Status Section:  
“In general, The Attorney General, after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Govern-
ment, may designate any foreign state (or any part of such foreign state) under this subsection 
only if […] (B) the Attorney General finds that (i) there has been an earthquake, flood, drought, 
epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, 
disruption of living conditions in the area affected […]”. 
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exhaustive function (as the wording “in particular” suggests). Hence, the Council, 
upon proposal of the Commission, is not bound to strictly follow these specifications, 
and it appears in principle allowed to apply the TPD also in cases of mass influx 
deriving from sudden-onset disasters. Indeed, some major natural catastrophe can 
obviously create some “prevailing situation” in the country of origin that could force 
entire categories to temporarily flee from their homes seeking protection abroad.  
If this is the case, there would be no need to modify the Directive, but just to start 
reconsidering it. A more careful analysis of the text suggests however that natural 
disasters, even though potentially falling within the realm of application of the Di-
rective, are not considered at all as possible causes of displacement under it. The text 
does not, in fact, mention at any time, neither in the preamble nor in its dispositions, 
this kind of events. This is mainly because the instrument was adopted following the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia and the violence that broke out in the region during the 
Nineties.58 In 2001, European institutions were willing to create a legal framework 
aimed at institutionalizing at a supranational level the humanitarian assistance that 
some States had exceptionally offered during the diverse phases of the Yugoslavian 
Wars.59 The TPD is therefore (even though not being up to this task) almost exclu-
sively designed to offer assistance to persons displaced by conflicts and generalised 
human rights violations. Natural disasters, although potentially relevant, appear to 
be not considered within its realm (at least according to the legislator’s willingness), 
and this is the why a disaster-oriented modification or fundamental reinterpretation 
of the Directive appears nowadays crucial. 
We have seen that the TDP’s chances of activation appear very limited due to nu-
merous reasons. Although some of the very same reasons would also apply to natural 
disasters-related displacements of persons, these would at least avoid some. For in-
stance, sudden-onset disasters usually hit only limited and recognizable areas, thereby 
satisfying the geographic requisite needed for the identification of the particular cate-
gories to be protected under the regime. More importantly, this kind of disasters does 
not suffer from the dilemmas regarding the foreseeable temporariness of the protection 
to be provided. If, hypothetically, an earthquake struck Georgia, causing a mass but 
 
58
 On the dawning of temporary protection frameworks in Europe, see FITZPATRICK, cit. supra note 14, 
p. 286: “In the early 1990s, European states found themselves in an unwonted frontline position, with 
respect to forced migrants from the former Yugoslavia. They responded by favouring temporary protection 
and avoiding grants of durable asylum; additional interim measures of protection were introduced in na-
tional law and practice”; Humanitarian Issues Working Group, Survey on the Implementation of Temporary 
Protection, 8 March 1995, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3300.html>. 
59
 See FITZPATRICK, cit. supra note 14, p. 280. See also Amnesty International, “Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia: The Protection of Kosovo Albanian Refugees”, AI Index No EUR 65/0399, 1999, 
May 1999.  
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temporary emigration towards some EU MS, a specifically disaster-oriented TPD 
could be activated to protect those forced to leave their country, and be used to redis-
tribute them among different MS according to their reception capabilities. Arguably, 
damages and devastations caused by the earthquake could be restored in the period 
envisaged by the TPD (one up to three years), and, once normality is restored in the 
country of origin, namely rendering it capable of welcoming back its own citizens 
without precluding the correct enjoyment of their fundamental rights, the Union and 
its MS would be able to enact manageable repatriation programmes (that means with-
out incurring in the difficulties and paradoxes that emerged through the analysis of 
Article 6(2) of the TPD), according to which the categories protected by the TPD may 
be repatriated only in safe and stable conditions. 
In a longer-term perspective, a disaster-oriented evolution of the Directive would 
also be significant in order to provide with international protection a particular subset 
of the category of so-called “environmental refugees”, category that neither interna-
tional nor European law is nowadays adequately covering. Extremely synthetically, 
so-called “environmental refugees” can be defined as those forced to migrate be-
cause of environmental degradations that make their areas of origin uninhabitable.60 
In some cases, an “environmental refugee” might face difficulties determining the 
need for international protection, but under international refugee law (and also under 
complementary protection frameworks),61 environment and its degradations are not 
considered causes of persecution depending on which the host country is obliged to 
grant international assistance. It is furthermore crucial to remember that the increase 
in the frequency and intensity of extreme meteorological events is a phenomenon 
related to the processes of global climate change we have started to experience in the 
 
60
 For more information see generally MCADAM (eds.), Climate Change and Displacement, Multidis-
ciplinary Perspectives, Oxford, 2010. See also HUGO, “Environmental Concerns and International Migra-
tion”, International Migration Review, 1995, p. 105; EACH-FOR Project (Environmental Change and 
Forced Migration Scenarios), Synthesis Report, 14 May 2009 (http://rosamartinez.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2015/11/Migraciones-y-Cambio-Climatico_EACHFOR.pdf ); Chairperson’s Summary, Nansen 
Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century, 5-7 June 2011, Oslo, para. 4, avail-
able at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4ea969729.pdf>. As regards legal studies see ex multis BANWITIYA 
NTEKANGI, Vers un droit international des réfugiés écologiques, Kinshasa, 2014; MCADAM, Climate 
Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, Oxford, 2012; KAELIN and SCHRPEFER, “Protecting 
People Crossing Borders in The Context of Climate Change: Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches”, 
UNHCR Legal and Protection Research Series (reference no. PPLA/2012/01), February 2012, available at: 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4f33f1729.pdf>; WESTRA, Environmental Justice and the Rights of Ecological Ref-
ugees, London, 2009. 
61
 See in this regard MCADAM, “Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary 
Protection Standards”, UNHCR, Divison of International Protection (reference no. PPLA/2011/03), May 
2011. 
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current historical period,62 and that the phenomenon of migrations forced by environ-
mental degradation consequently appears destined to significantly increase its hu-
manitarian and numerical significance in the next future, as underlined by the great-
est experts in the field.63  
Under this perspective, the Union might have a particular interest in equipping 
itself with one of the first supranational legal instruments specifically addressing (at 
least one part) of a problem that will likely cover a growing importance in the dec-
ades to come.64 To the purpose of the present work, it is sufficient to stress that the 
macro-category of “environmental refugees” (a definition that although legally 
flawed65 remains symbolically effective) may be divided – in case of cross-border 
movements of people – into two different sub-categories: those pushed to migrate 
because of slow-onset disasters (such as sea-level rise and desertification), and those 
fleeing sudden-onset events. Although such a distinction surely suffers from over-
simplification, it remains useful since it visibly clarifies that diverse protection re-
gimes should be predisposed to protect the two different categories. The first one – 
whose epitomizing group consists in those opting to emigrate from low-lying small 
island-States adducing as principal reason sea-level rise – do not, normally, experi-
ence absolute emergency situations, and their emigration is therefore generally con-
sidered as voluntary and pre-emptive, not deserving immediate and incisive interna-
tional protection.66 Nevertheless, if we are to believe to the overwhelming majority 
of climate science and its predictions, we already know that such individuals need 
 
62
 For an exhaustive synthesis on the relation between extreme events and climate change see Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers. In: Managing the Risks of Extreme 
Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, FIELD, et al. (eds.)., Cambridge, and New 
York, pp. 1-19, available at: <https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srex/SREX_Full_Report.pdf>. 
63
 See for instance KAELIN, former Representative of the United Nations' Secretary-General on the 
Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, interview with Friederike Bauer, Akzente, The Giz Maga-
zine, March 2015, available at: <https://akzente.giz.de/en/artikel/were-talking-millions>. 
64
 In this sense, see also BERGOGLIO, Encyclical Letter Laudato Si’ of the Holy Father Francis on Care 
for Our Common Home, Vatican City, 2015, p. 23, para. 25. 
65
 From an eminently legal point of view, a “refugee” for environmental-related reasons does not exist. 
The 1951 Geneva Convention, as already mentioned, accords protection for those persecuted because of 
religion, nationality, race, membership of a particular political opinion or social group. There is no refer-
ence at all to environment or climate. From a historical perspective, this makes perfect sense, since in 1951 
massive environmental degradation and climate change were just a very remote mirage. See, in this volume, 
FEROLLA VALLANDRO DO VALLE, p. 1 ff. 
66
 See in this regard, among many others, SCIACCALUGA, “(Non) rifugiati climatici dal 1995 al 2015: 
perché il diritto internazionale dei rifugiati non può applicarsi al fenomeno delle migrazioni causate (anche) 
dai cambiamenti climatici”, Rivista Giuridica dell’Ambiente, 2015, pp. 465-488. 
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relocation programs onto other national territories,67 and/or evolutions in jurisdic-
tional systems enabling for the application of the non-refoulement principle for those 
who would undergo – in case of repatriation to their (almost) uninhabitable home 
countries – inhuman or degrading treatments. Anyhow, in such a case the protection 
to be granted should be permanent, not temporary, thereby rendering the analysis of 
the TPD trivial for this specific category of forced migrants. 
A disaster-oriented TPD would conversely be relevant for those fleeing the con-
sequences of rapid-onset events. In this regard, it seems important to stress that the 
reflections of scholars and policy-makers should not concentrate only on climate 
change, a phenomenon that even though affecting climatic or meteorological disas-
ters does not have any impact on others, such as geological ones. Excessively con-
centrating on the “climate change discourse”68 may, indeed, lead to a hazardous re-
ductionism, at least in the light of granting international protection to the victims of 
natural disasters. Since law needs some precise boundaries to enjoy a degree of ef-
fectiveness, it is crucial to critically look at the panoply of proto-legal definitions 
that identify the categories of subjects that should be protected under international 
law, such as survival refugees, humanitarian refugees, hunger refugees, and environ-
mental and climate refugees. As previously maintained, the TPD might become prac-
tically relevant if it were to protect only those fleeing temporarily a sudden-onset 
 
67
 It is worth noting that the Maldives’ Government has started discussion with Sri Lanka to by some 
latter’s territories to be used in case of necessity. As regards internal relocations in the Pacific also due to 
climate change, note the case of Carteret Islands in Papua New Guinea (see PASCOE, “Sailing the Waves 
on Our Own: Climate Change Migration, Self-Determination and the Carteret Islands”, QUT Law Review, 
2015, pp. 72-85; LEWIS, “Neighbourliness and Australia’s Contribution to Regional Migration Strategies 
for Climate Displacement in the Pacific”, QUT Law Review, 2015, pp. 86-101). Recently in the US 
52.000.000$ have been allocated to relocate a Lousiana community which is losing its territory because of 
sea-level rise (see “A Louisiana Tribe Is Now Officially A Community Of Climate Refugees”, Huffington 
Post, 12 February 2016); similarly, a 600-inhabitants village in Alaska has decided to start relocation pro-
grammes for similar reasons in August 2016 (see “U.S. village in Alaska votes to relocate due to climate 
change”, Grand Fork Heralds, 21 August 2016). 
68
 The “climate change discourse”, namely the totality of beliefs, scientific certainties and political-ideo-
logical behaviours that tend to identify in climate change the principal challenge of the present century, and 
attributing to it the emergence of phenomena highly impacting on social, political, and economic balances, 
can be traced in a recent study by the US National Academy of Science (KELLEYA, MOHTADIB, CANEC et al., 
“Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the Recent Syrian Drought”, Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Science, January 2015, available at: <http://www.pnas.org/content/112/11/3241>), 
which finds that the serious drought that has hit Syria before 2011 is one of the decisive drivers of the current 
civil war. The study, which was cited by many media, has fuelled the idea that the conflict is caused by climate 
change. Such a belief is obviously just an oversimplification of the articulated and complex thesis that is 
maintained in the study, which certainly helps to show how the Syrian drought – in whose causation and 
manifestation climate change has played a role – is a contributory cause to the conflict. 
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natural disaster – irrespective of its cause –69 whose effects can as a matter of fact be 
restored in one, two or three years at most. 
Finally, some reflection should also be dedicated to the modifications that should 
be brought to the TPD’s activation procedure, thoroughly disciplined by Article 5. Ac-
cording to it, the Commission enjoys the exclusive power of proposal, and the Council 
has then to decide by qualified majority whether to activate the instrument or not. As 
shown, such a system concedes, to the end of favouring the TPD’s utilization, an ex-
cessive margin of appreciation to European institutions and, especially, to MS national 
priorities. Procedures should therefore be stiffened to reduce this margin.  
A first useful modification would probably consist in granting, as the US TPS 
does, a right to the third-State suffering from a particular event (and, more specifi-
cally, from a natural disaster), to ask the Commission to trigger its power of proposal. 
Furthermore, if such change was accompanied by the obligation – for the competent 
European institutions – to motivate in detail their decision regarding the TPD’s use 
(e.g., by stating which quantitative requisites are needed to assess the existence of a 
“mass influx”), it would be possible to limit the margin of appreciation which is 
today existing. Although the duty to state reasons is integral part of EU law, this 
paper argues that the TPD should call for a duty of detailed motivation upon compe-
tent institutions. For instance, if such approach had been followed in 2011, following 
the “severe pressure” experienced by Italy and Malta, the Commission would have 
had to clarify the reasons why it was not possible, at that time, to “see a mass influx 
of migrants to Europe”. Indeed, the Commission and the Council, even though obvi-
ously remaining free to activate the system or not, would in this way inevitably shed 
some light on the scope of application of the Directive, which is currently too vague. 
Second, it would also be useful to make changes with respect to the power of 
proposal of activation recognized to European MS. As the TPD currently stands, MS 
can merely ask the Commission to take into consideration the proposal of activation, 
and the latter is then merely bound to an examination of the States’ request (“[the 
Commission] shall also examine any request by a Member State”, Article 5).70 This 
paper argues that by granting MS a greater incisiveness, it would be possible to 
stiffen the activation procedures, thereby increasing the chances of activating the 
TPD. For instance, a useful modification would consist in binding the Commission 
to propose the activation to the Council in case a determined quota of MS were 
agreeing on this action (e.g., one third, one quarter, or one fifth of MS). By so doing, 
 
69
 By so doing, the distinction between “climate” and “environmental” refugees falls without excessive 
complication. 
70
 Something that occurred in 2001 with the requests of activation of the TPD by Malta and Italy (see 
above, p. 82). 
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a minority of MS would de facto enjoy the power of proposal to the Council. 
Furthermore, with the objective of raising the TPD’s chances of activation (but 
also responding to the need for a more incisive democratic legitimation of EU deci-
sions), the role of the European Parliament (PE) should also be strengthened. Article 
5 currently disposes that once the Council’s decision is taken, the PE must be in-
formed, thereby reducing the latter’s role in the decision-making process to a mere 
passive actor. Again, it would seem reasonable to provide the Parliament with a (at 
least indirect) power of proposal of activation of the TPD, e.g., by obligating the 
Commission to trigger its proposal powers if a determined majority (simple, abso-
lute, or qualified) of the Parliament agrees on the activation. 
Finally, an incisive change would consist in decreasing the quota of votes needed 
in the Council to activate the Directive. The need for a qualified majority sharply 
limits the chances of activation of the instrument even in the (hypothetical) introduc-
tion of the aforementioned modifications. Consequently, if the final objective con-
sists in enhancing the TPD’s chances of activation, it appears quite clear that the 
latter should, in the name of the principle of solidarity, be subject to a Council’s 
decision taken by the simple majority of its components. However, such proposal 
needs to be examined through the lenses of some sincere pragmatism, since it is as 
matter of fact highly improbable that the Union and its MS will be willing to pursue 
such a path. Indeed, decisions in the Council are taken with a qualified majority (55% 
of MS accounting for at least 65% of the European Union’s population) in the vast 
majority of issues. Unanimity decisions tend to cover the rest, whereas simple ma-
jority (required, according to Article 238(1) TFUE, when no explicit disposition is 
to be found) is in fact limited to a restricted number of issues, mainly concerning the 
Council’s internal organization. Being the Union an organization of intergovernmen-
tal and supranational character, it is unlikely that the activation of an instrument like 
the TPD will be subject only to a simple majority decision. 
5. – Conclusions 
This paper has shown why it seems unrealistic to hope in the activation of the 
TPD as currently conceived and interpreted. The nature of the instrument, which was 
adopted in more prosperous times, appears nowadays incompatible with a Union of 
28 MS, suffering from negative economic fluctuations, and dealing with the greatest 
migration phenomenon since the end of WWII. 
The lack of utilization of the TPD is in part due to inherent terminological char-
acteristics, which, alongside the existing activation procedure, leaves broad discre-
tional powers to national political priorities. In a period of economic weakness and 
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concerns about internal political balance, this margin of appreciation makes it possi-
ble for MS to avoid the very discussion concerning the instrument’s activation.  
First, the ambiguity surrounding the notion of “mass influx” may represent a 
problem in view of activating the Directive, since such vagueness leaves EU MS and 
institutions free to “interpret” punctual immigration phenomena in function of the 
contingent existing political situation (as the recent North African and Syrian migra-
tion exoduses show). More precise identification criteria for the notion of mass influx 
seem necessary if the TPD is to be applied in the next future.  
At the same time, it is sobering to remember that when the Directive was adopted, 
in 2001, the political and economic situation the EU was facing was neatly different 
from nowadays. In this sense, the increase of EU MS and the on-going economic 
difficulties that have characterized the past ten years seem to play a crucial role in 
the current lack of utilization of the instrument. Moreover, the existing TDP’s acti-
vation procedure – requiring the qualified majority of the Council upon exclusive 
power of proposal of the Commission – seems to leave excessive space to national 
(and also nationalistic) political pressures based on the belief that a Directive’s acti-
vation would increase migratory inflows to the EU, consequently worsening, rather 
than relieving, the situation of some national asylum systems. 
It seems hence appropriate, with the aim of strengthening the CEAS, to advocate 
for a pragmatic reform of the TPD system. This work calls for a stiffening of the 
activation procedures, which should grant a more incisive role to some actors: for 
example, by providing a certain number of MS with the power of proposal of activa-
tion of the Directive, and/or by granting a third-Country hit by a disaster the right to 
ask EU institutions to activate the temporary protection regime when perceived 
needed. Also, the role of the European Parliament should probably be revisited and 
empowered, also with the aim of rendering EU decision-making in this field more 
democratically legitimated. 
Furthermore, relying on the assumption that the Union and its MS might uniquely 
be prone to use the instrument in response to events whose negative effects can be 
restored in a relatively brief period, this work calls for a sudden-onset disaster-ori-
ented evolution of the Directive. Sudden-onset natural disaster such as earthquakes, 
windstorms or floods may be considered as events whose damages are restorable in 
a relatively brief period, thereby allowing the would-be temporary protection to be 
effectively temporary. In this sense, the possible application of the Directive to mi-
gration flows surging from never-ending conflicts (as the Syrian one for instance) 
appears highly improbable, since MS fear that the would-be protection would in the 
end become long-lasting or permanent, consequently losing its temporary (and po-
litically feasible) character. 
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Additionally, a disaster-oriented TPD would contribute to the solution (at least 
under EU law) of part of the problem concerning environmental displacement, a phe-
nomenon that due to the existing and irreversible climate change patterns is expected 
to increase its numerical and humanitarian significance in the years to come. 
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1. – Notes on the Notion of “Environmental Refugees” in International 
Law 
Over the last few decades, an array of environmental problems have increased 
the phenomenon of environmentally-induced migration; of these problems, climate 
change poses the most severe threat. According to a recent report by the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), over the 21st century, such climatic 
changes are expected to increase poverty and to weaken economic growth, especially 
in developing countries, with a consequent rise in the number of displaced persons1. 
 
*
 The author wishes to thank the two anonymous referees of this volume, for reading the manuscript and 
providing useful comments. However, errors and omexpressly crerateissions in the contribution are the 
sole responsibility of the author. 
 
1
 IPCC, Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. 
Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of 
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Despite this, international law has not yet recognized peoples forced to flee because 
of environmental causes, so-called “environmental refugees”2, as an autonomous cat-
egory entitled to international protection. It can be underlined that some States, such 
as Italy3, have established temporary protection measures for people fleeing natural 
disasters, but such measures appear to be characterized by the exceptionality. This 
difficulty in protecting this category of people is in part due to the fact that it is 
difficult to prove the casual link between environmental phenomena and migration, 
with the latter often due to overlapping causes related to economic and social factors4. 
Climate change adds a new layer of complexity to the relationship between environ-
mental degradation and migration, since it causes both environmental disasters (i.e. 
tropical storms or floods) as well as processes of gradual deterioration of environ-
mental conditions, such as global warming, desertification and rising sea levels. 
Moreover, in the case of “environmental refugees”, it is difficult to distinguish be-
tween voluntary and forced emigration, except in a few circumstances, such as dur-
ing natural disasters or in the case of small islands threatened to disappear due to the 
increase in sea levels5. 
 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, p. 20, available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_spm_en.pdf.  
2
 In the paper, we use the expression “environmental refugees” in order to indicate people forced to 
flee because of environmental causes. Even though the aforementioned expression, at the present state of 
international law, does not indicate an effective legal category, it is used by some authors to indicate such 
movements of persons, alongside other terms, such as, inter alia, environmental migrants or climate refu-
gees. With respect to the difficulty of identifying an appropriate term to indicate such movements of people 
see COURNIL, “The Question of the Protection of “Environmental Refugees” from the Standpoint of Inter-
national Law”, in PIGUET, PÉCOUD & DE GUCHTENEIRE (eds.), Migration and Climate Change, Cambridge, 
2011, p. 359 ff., pp. 359-360, Draft copy available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1994357>. 
3
 See Consolidated Text of the Provisions Concerning the Regulation of Immigration and Rules on the 
Condition of the Foreigner, L. 286/1998, Art. 20. 
4
 Regarding the difficulty in distinguishing economic from environmental refugees, see MYERS, “En-
vironmental Refugees: a Growing Phenomenon of the 21st Century”, Philosophical Transactions of the 
Royal Society, 2002, p. 609 ff., p. 610. On the overlapping causes see MAYER, “Sustainable Development 
Law on Environmental Migration: The Story of an Obelisk, a Bag of Marbles, and a Tapestry”, Environ-
mental Law Review, 2012, p. 111 ff., p. 116. 
5
 With regard to a new form of statelessness, see COURNIL, GEMENNE, “Les populations insulaires face 
au changement climatique: des migrations a anticiper”, Vertigo – la revue électronique en sciences de 
l’environnement, 2010, p. 1 ff., pp. 17 – 19, available at: <https://vertigo.revues.org/10482>. On the con-
cept of ‘deterritorialised State’ in the context of the disappearing islands, see RAYFUSE, “W(h)ither Tuvalu? 
International Law and Disappearing States”, University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research 
Series, Paper 9, 2009, p. 1 ff., pp. 10-13, available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab-
stract_id=1412028>.  
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Regarding the protection afforded by international law, most authors agree that 
people fleeing for environmental reasons do not meet the criteria laid down in the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees for the granting of refugee status6. 
Analyzing the issue more specifically, scholars have emphasized that a person, in 
order to be considered a refugee under the 1951 Convention, has to be outside her/his 
own country and unable to take advantage of protections afforded by her/his State. 
On the contrary, people forced to flee for environmental reasons often remain within 
national boundaries, and are considered internally displaced people (IDPs), and thus 
able to take advantage of the protection of their government. Furthermore, environ-
mental disasters cannot be considered a persecution by one’s own State of origin, 
which, conversely, often cares about the accommodation of these people. Lastly, the 
reasons for persecution must be related to the individual characteristics of the person, 
while in the case of migration due to environmental factors there are groups or entire 
populations forced to leave their State7.  
 
6
 As set out in Art. 1(a)(2) of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, - signed on 28 July 
1951, entered into force on 22 April 1954 and adopted by 145 States – a refugee is who  
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; 
or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”. 
7
 On the inapplicability of the 1951 Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, to the people fleeing 
for environmental reasons, there are many contributions. See, inter alia, COURNIL, “Les Réfugiés 
écologiques: Quelle(s) protection(s), quel(s) statut(s)?”, Revue du droit public, 2006, p. 1035 ff., pp. 1041-
1043; COURNIL, MAZZEGA, “Réflexions prospectives sur une protection juridique des réfugiés 
écologiques”, Revue européenne des migrations internationales, 2007, p. 7 ff., pp. 11-12;  MCADAM, “En-
vironmental Migration Governance”, University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, 
Paper 1, 2009, p. 1 ff., pp. 11-13, available at: <http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti-
cle=1143&context=unswwps-flrps09>; ARGESE, “Threats from Sea-level Rise to Small and Low-lying Is-
land States: Is International Law a Hope for “Environmental Refugees?”, La Comunità internazionale, 
2010, p. 435 ff., pp. 443-446; MAYER, “The International Legal Challenges of Climate-Induced Migration: 
Proposal for an International Legal Framework”, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law 
and Policy, 2011, p. 357 ff., p. 380-382; SCIACCALUGA, “(Non) rifugiati climatici dal 1995 al 2015: perchè 
il diritto internazionale dei rifugiati non può applicarsi al fenomeno delle migrazioni causate (anche) dai 
cambiamenti climatici”, Rivista giuridica dell’ambiente, 2015, p. 465 ff., pp. 468-472. For arguments that 
go against the dominant opinion, see ALEXANDER, SIMON, “Unable to Return” in the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention: Stateless Refugees and Climate Change”, Florida Journal of International Law, 2014, p. 531 ff., 
draft copy available at: <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2643925>. According to the 
aforementioned authors, people unable to return as stateless are entitled to refugee status established in the 
1951 Convention, even if they are not victims of persecution. In particular, the authors refer to the inhab-
itants of small island nations, such as the Maldives and Tuvalu, which, due to the rising sea levels, are 
likely to become uninhabitable or to disappear. 
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These considerations are shared by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR)8 which, in a 2009 report, stated that “the terminology and notion 
of environmental refugees or climate refugees (…) have no basis in international 
refugee law”9, recalling the criteria set out in international and regional instruments. 
According to the UNHCR, environmental degradation can only be considered when 
examined within the context of the cause of events, such as armed conflicts or gov-
ernment policies that marginalize specific groups of people, for which people fleeing 
from their State can fall under the protection provided by international instruments. 
Furthermore, the use of such terminology, and the proposal to amend the 1951 Con-
vention in order to include “environmental refugees”, could weaken the current pro-
tection system, considering the adverse political climate.  
Therefore, as stated in a recent report regarding the correlation between climate 
change and displacement, the UNHCR is strongly committed to humanitarian assis-
tance to persons displaced for environmental reasons. However, from the point of 
view of international law, the report reiterates that persons displaced across borders 
because of environmental disasters or climate change cannot be considered refugees, 
unless such environmental disasters are related to a situation of armed conflict or a 
form of persecution against a particular group10.  
With regard to people forced to flee for environmental causes, but who remain 
within the national boundaries of their State, they are entitled to protection in light of 
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement11, which the UNHCR is also commit-
ted to promoting. These Principles have the merit of recognizing, among the causes of 
the internal displacement of persons, “natural or human-made disasters”12, but, while 
including an exhaustive review of the rights of displaced people, they are non-binding 
guidelines. Therefore, their contribution to the creation of a legal obligation towards 
internally displaced people, even for environmental reasons, appears limited.  
Considered the failure on behalf of the main international global instruments, to 
give legal recognition to people forced to flee for environmental reasons, the article 
 
8
 In this sense see MCADAM, “Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary 
Protection Standards”, UNHCR, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, 2011, p. 1 ff., pp. 12-14, 
available at: <http://www.unhcr.org/4dff16e99.pdf>. 
9
 See UNHCR, “Climate Change, Natural Disasters and Human Displacement: A UNHCR Perspec-
tive”, 2009, p. 8. 
10
 See UNHCR, “Climate Change and Disaster Displacement: An Overview of UNHCR’s Role”, 2017, 
p. 7. 
11
 Ibid., p. 9. 
12
 OCHA, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 2001, Introduction, par. 2. The other causes 
of internal displacement are “armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human 
rights”. 
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will thus focus on regional contexts, in order to analyze their instruments of protec-
tion. In particular, it will be analysed three different geographical areas, considered 
important, for the purposes of our analysis, as in them the movements of people due 
to climate change are becoming increasingly relevant. Moreover, it appears im-
portant to depthen the position of the regional organizations, to assess whether they 
have provided international protection instruments more advanced than those of an 
universal Organization such as the UN. 
2. – The Protection of “Environmental Refugees” in Regional Contexts: 
the African Continent 
Climate change has had several negative consequences on the African continent. 
According to recent studies, West Africa and large areas of the Sahel have been af-
fected by land degradation, water shortages and an increased frequency of droughts 
and floods. With regards to the scarcity of water, it is likely that this problem will 
expand to larger areas by 2050. The worsening of environmental conditions has 
caused increased conflicts over land and water resources and a change in traditional 
patterns of migration, largely directed towards big cities and coastal States, without 
the possibility of returning to arid environments13. Moreover, another interesting 
study concerning refugees from Eastern and the Horn of Africa, has sought to estab-
lish the influence of environmental causes on the decisions of these people to leave 
their States. According to affirmations by the refugees, they perceived the effects of 
climate change, such as droughts, over farming and unsustainable husbandry prac-
tices, stating that these phenomena have had consequences on their livelihoods14. 
However, the interviews gathered in the study did not refer to conflicts caused di-
rectly by environmental factors, even though the latter has served to amplify already 
existing conflicts15. What seems particularly interesting in the report, for the purposes 
of our study, is the conclusion that migration arising from environmental reasons is 
assumed by the people interviewed as a last resort and is mainly “internal, circular 
 
13
 See WARNER et al., “In Search of Shelter. Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Mi-
gration and Displacement”, 2009, pp. 9-10. This report was written with the support from, inter alia, the 
UNHCR and it is available at https://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/clim-migr-report-june09_fi-
nal.pdf.  
14
 AFIFI et al., “Climate Change, Vulnerability and Human Mobility: Perspectives of Refugees from 
the East and Horn of Africa”, 2012, pp. 24-27. The report was written thanks to a partnership between the 
United Nations University for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) and the UNHCR and it is 
available at http://www.unhcr.org/protection/environment/4fe8538d9/climate-change-vulnerability-hu-
man-mobility-perspectives-refugees-east.html.  
15
 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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and temporary”. In addition, the link between environmental degradation and cross-
border migration appears weak, and in any case reduced to a secondary movement 
or to people living close to borders16. 
With regard to the protection provided to so-called “environmental refugees” in 
the African continent17, the current section will analyze, in chronological order, the 
main instruments drafted within the context of the African Union (AU) -succeeded in 
2002 to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) – as well as by other African re-
gional organizations. Later, the protection provided in the African continent to IDPs 
will be considered, given that even internal displacement can have environmental 
causes. 
First of all, we can see the absence of a refugee definition in the constitutive 
Charter of the OAU18, as well as in the Constitutive Act of the AU19. Therefore, the 
refugee protection system is based on the OAU Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa20. The latter, while presenting itself as “the 
effective regional complement in Africa”21 of the 1951 Convention, has adopted a 
wider definition of refugee, which recapitulates that of the Geneva Convention, but 
augments it, adding a supplementary paragraph that confers refugee status also to 
the persons forced to escape “owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign dom-
ination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his 
country of origin or nationality”22. As underlined in doctrine, the OAU definition 
extends the concept of persecution, considering it not derived solely from the con-
duct of the State of origin, but also from an external event, and consequently resulting 
in the loss of authority of that government23. Furthermore, according to different au-
thors, the concept of “events seriously disturbing public order” could include those 
caused by natural disasters. Nevertheless, beyond what is stated in the article, it 
 
16
 Ibid., pp. 42-47. 
17
 On the causes of environmental degradation in sub-Saharan Africa and on the need to legally recog-
nize “environmental refugees” see OTUNNU, “Environmental Refugees in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Refuge, 
1992, p. 11 ff..  
18
 OAU Charter, signed at Addis Abeba on 25 May 1963. 
19
 Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted on 7 November 2000, entered into force on 26 May 
2001 and ratified by 55 States. 
20
 This Convention was adopted by the Assembly of the Heads of African State and Government, on 
10 September 1969, entered into force on 20 June 1974 and ratified by 46 States. 
21
 Ibid., Art. 8(2). In the Preamble there is an additional reference to the 1951 Convention, defined as 
“the basic and universal instrument relating to the status of refugees”. 
22
 Ibid., Art. 1(2). 
23
 See EDWARDS, “Refugee Status Determination in Africa”, African Journal of International and Com-
parative Law, 2006, p. 204 ff., p. 211. 
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should be recalled, for the purpose of recognizing the legal notion of “environmental 
refugees”, that in practice African States do not seem inclined to go beyond human-
itarian assistance towards people escaping from environmental degradation. In fact, 
most authors agree that, in cases where African States have assisted people coming 
from neighboring countries, they have underlined the voluntary and humanitarian 
character of their actions, claiming that they did not act in accordance with the legal 
obligations of the Convention24. 
It can be stressed that, in subsequent years, examining the acts of African inter-
governmental organizations, not much attention has been paid to the category of “en-
vironmental refugees”. A Declaration adopted by the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC)25, related to the protection of refugees26 considers that the flow 
of refugees and IDPs is caused by “conflicts and civil strife, economic and social 
imbalances, ethnic and other forms of intolerance, lack of respect for human rights 
and good governance”27. Even if another paragraph of the same article refers to ref-
ugees fleeing, inter alia, for “events seriously disturbing public order”28, the Decla-
ration reaffirms the principles laid down in the Geneva Convention and in the OAU 
Convention, without any particular innovation. With regard to the need to address 
the causes of the displacement, the SADC act underlines the commitment of the Or-
ganization to the establishment of a foundation to promote the development of dem-
ocratic institutions29, while no reference is made to environmental causes. 
 
24
 ID., p. 227. Furthermore, the author has emphasized that, in absence of an opinio juris about it, the 
concordant practice regarding humanitarian assistance to so-called environmental refugees “may be seen 
as contributing to the development of a right of temporary protection on humanitarian grounds under cus-
tomary international law, rather than under treaty”. According to another author, the maintenance of public 
order can be endangered by the occurrence of environmental disasters, but the excessive number of refu-
gees for environmental causes in Africa will not allow a full application of this Convention to their situa-
tion. See COURNIL, “Les Réfugiés écologiques: Quelle(s) protection(s), quel(s) statut(s)?” cit. supra note 
6, p. 1044. On the “humanitarian” character of regional practice see also LADAN, “Addressing the Plight 
of Environmental Migrants through African Union and Ecowas Community Laws: A Case for Climate 
Justice”, 2012, p. 1 ff., pp. 20-21, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2336108>. 
25
 The SADC was established by a treaty signed on 17 August 1992 and was the successor to the 
Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). It is composed by 15 Member States 
(Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimba-
bwe), with the objectives of obtaining economic growth, peace and security. 
26
 Declaration on Refugee Protection within Southern Africa, adopted by the Heads of State or Gov-
ernment of the SADC on 1° January 1998. 
27
 Ibid., Preamble, (b)(iii). 
28
 Ibid., Preamble, (b)(i). 
29
 Ibid., para. 2. 
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In addition, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights30 affirms only the 
right of persecuted individuals to seek and obtain asylum, in accordance with interna-
tional conventions and national laws31. Nevertheless, Article 24 of the Charter empha-
sizes the right of peoples to a “satisfactory environment”, aimed at their development. 
The Lomé Declaration on Climate Change and Protection of Civilians in West 
Africa 32 of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)33 which, 
while not binding, highlights an important concept, is also of significance. Firstly, 
this document recommends the establishment of a fund, as well as measures to ad-
dress the needs of people affected by environmental disasters. But, above all, the 
Member States have underlined the importance of drafting legal instruments to pro-
tect persons forced to flee for climate reasons, as current instruments do not provide 
adequate protection34. 
After having analyzed the protection granted by the regional instruments on refu-
gees, we shall turn our attention to the protection afforded to IDPs, given the large num-
ber present in the African continent. In particular, we consider important to eva-luate the 
possible protection afforded by regional instruments to internally displaced persons for 
environmental causes, as it could extend to people fleeing to a foreign country. 
First of all, it is worth mentioning the Khartoum Declaration, adopted within the 
framework of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)35. This Dec-
laration stated that the causes of internal displacement are not only armed conflict, 
 
30
 Adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on 1 June 1981, entered into force on 
21 October 1986 and ratified by 54 States. 
31
 Ibid., Art. 12(3). 
32
 See the “Lomé Declaration on Climate Change and Protection of Civilians in West Africa”, adopted 
on 16 September 2009, within the framework of the “Regional Conference on Protection Challenges to 
Climate Change in West Africa”. 
33
 The ECOWAS was a regional organization, established on 28 May 1975 with the Treaty of Lagos 
and composed by 15 Member States (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo). Its aim is to promote 
economic and political integration. 
34
 See ECOWAS, “Conference Adopts Human Rights-Based Approach to Climate Change Issues in 
West Africa”, 17 September 2009, N˚: 090/2009, available at: <http://news.eco-
was.int/presseshow.php?nb=090&lang=en&annee=2009>. 
35
 The IGAD was created in 1996 as a successor to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD) and is composed by 8 Member States (Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, 
Uganda, Eritrea and South Sudan). Its objective is to enhance regional cooperation in the sectors of eco-
nomic cooperation, environmental protection and social development. The Khartoum Declaration was 
adopted by the Ministerial Conference on Internally Displaced Persons in the IGAD Sub-Region, on 2 
September 2003. 
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but also natural disasters36 and urged the international community to provide support 
in the field. Moreover, in the IGAD Declaration, the Member States committed not 
only to protecting and respecting the human rights of IDPs, but also to addressing 
the needs of host communities. However, this instrument does not make any refer-
ence to the cause of natural disasters, while its effectiveness is limited by its non-
binding character. Therefore, we will consider two different binding instruments, 
adopted some years later.  
In 2006, a Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Per-
sons was enacted within the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR)37, with the stated objective of encouraging adoption of the ONU Guiding 
Principles by the Member States, in addition to a national legislation consistent with 
them38. With regard to the protection to be granted to IDPs, this Protocol recaps what 
was affirmed in the aforementioned Principles, urging Member States to ensure, inter 
alia, the respect of the principles of international humanitarian law and human rights; 
special protection for vulnerable people; adequate conditions of dignity; and freedom 
of movement and choice of residence, thereby also facilitating the work of humani-
tarian personnel. However, the Protocol, with respect to the Guiding Principles, 
places greater emphasis on environmental disasters caused by human projects. First 
of all, the definition of IDPs draws on that contained in the ONU document, but adds 
a paragraph regarding people forced to leave “as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of large scale development projects”39. In addition, Article 5 is specifically 
dedicated to displacement caused by development, stating that States shall “ensure 
that displacement owing to large-scale development projects shall be justified by 
compelling and overriding public interest and development” and that “all feasible 
alternatives of development are explored in order to avoid development induced dis-
placement” . In addition, this Article stresses that the States shall take all measures 
necessary to minimize displacement and mitigate their adverse effects; that they shall 
 
36
 Ibid., para. 1. 
37
 Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, 30 November 2006. The 
ICGLR is an inter-governmental organization, established in 2000 under the umbrella of the United Nations 
and the African Union. It is composed of twelve member States, located in the Great Lakes Region, namely 
Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, 
Uganda, Rwanda, Republic of South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia. The Protocol on IDPs is part of 
the Pact on Security, Stability and Development for the Great Lakes Region, signed on 15 December 2006 
and amended on November 2012, and ratified by all Member States. 
38
 Ibid., Art. 2(1) and Art. 2(3). This objective is present also in the Pact cited in the previous 
note, Art. 12. 
39
 Ibid., Art. 1(5). 
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obtain “the free and informed consent” of the people concerned, “as far as possible”; 
that States shall provide full information on the matter as well as adequate relocation, 
with the effective participation of the people involved, particularly women. 
A second important act related to the protection of IDPs is the African Union 
Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Af-
rica, the so-called Kampala Convention40. In this Convention, an explicit reference 
to natural disasters as a root cause of the displacement of people is already made in 
the Preamble, while the definition of IDPs indicates persons forced to escape because 
of “natural or human-made disasters”, as well as armed conflict, situations of gener-
alized violence and violations of human rights41. The Convention establishes the ob-
ligations of the State parties towards IDPs, emphasizing in the first place the duty to 
protect them from, inter alia, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and 
sexual and gender based violence as well as provide them with adequate humanitar-
ian assistance, while also respecting the role of international organizations. Nonethe-
less, respect for civil and political rights, as well as the freedom of movement and 
choice of residence, except for restrictions due to security reasons or public health, 
must be guaranteed to the IDPs. There is also an important exhortation to the State 
Parties to adopt national laws in accordance with the obligations of the aforemen-
tioned Convention42, as well as to protect and assist people displaced due to “natural 
or human made disasters, including climate change”43. 
Therefore, with regard to the protection of the rights of IDPs, it can be asserted 
that the Kampala Convention continues in line largely with the Guiding Principles 
of the United Nations, previously cited. Nevertheless, it introduces an innovation, 
devoting more attention to the role played by human-made disasters in the displace-
ment of people. First of all, in the 2009 Convention States are urged to guarantee 
“the accountability of non-State actors involved in the exploration and exploitation 
of economic and natural resources leading to displacement”44. Additionally, Article 
10 concerns the displacement caused by public or private projects, exhorting State 
Parties to ensure that stakeholders have studied possible alternatives; that the people 
 
40
 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Af-
rica, adopted by the Special Summit of the Union held in Kampala on 23 October 2009, entered into force 
on 6 December 2012 and ratified by 27 States. 
41
 Ibid., Art. 1(k). 
42
 Ibid., Art. 3(2)(a). 
43
 Ibid., Art. 5(4). 
44
 Ibid., Art. 3(1)(i). The Art. 3(1)(h) refers to acts carried out by multinational companies and private 
military or security companies which cause arbitrary displacement. 
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concerned are fully informed and consulted with; and that a socio-economic and en-
vironmental impact assessment of the said project is carried out45. It should also be 
stressed that the Kampala Convention hands over liability, with duty of State Party 
to make reparation for damage occurred to IDPs in case of omitted protection or 
assistance in the event of natural disasters46. Undoubtedly, the Kampala Convention 
represents an improvement in the protection of IDPs, due to both its binding nature 
as well as the introduction of important concepts regarding human responsibility for 
environmental disasters47. Nevertheless, the fact that it has been ratified by only 27 
States is a cause for concern with regard to its effective applicability within the Af-
rican territory48.  
More generally, while the Guiding Principles focus on the protection of the human 
rights of IDPs, both these African protection instruments represent, in our opinion, an 
innovation, as they attempt to attribute due responsibility for natural disasters49. 
From the considerations stated above, we can conclude that, in the African con-
text, there was a first attempt to extend the protection of refugees beyond the 1951 
definition, introducing the concept of “public order”. However, this concept has not 
been thoroughly clarified, as it lacks the political will of the States to bind themselves 
to stricter provisions in the field of refugee protection. Nevertheless, what seems 
encouraging is the will to ensure greater protection to IDPs, in addition to recogni-
zing the environmental causes underlying the internal displacement, present in bind-
ing instruments from various regional organizations. In addition, it is remarkable that 
 
45
 In addition, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement prohibit arbitrary displacement, such 
as, inter alia, displacement caused by “large-scale development projects, which are not justified by com-
pelling and overriding public interests”. See Principle 6(2)(c). 
46
 See supra note 38, Art. 12(3). 
47
 The Kampala Convention has been defined as a “historic document”, as per the Report of the Rep-
resentative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, Walter Kälin, 
UN Doc. A/HRC/13/21, 5 January 2010, para. 13. 
48
 On the difficulty of effective implementation of the Kampala Convention by Nigeria, despite its 
ratification, see KOLAWOLE, “Towards the Evolution of Legal and Institutional Framework for the Protec-
tion of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria”, OIDA International Journal of Sustainable Devel-
opment, 2013, p. 141 ff., pp. 148-149.  
49
 See Comparison of the Kampala Convention and the IDP Protocol of the Great Lakes Pact, January 
2014, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/COMPARISON%20OF 
%20THE%20KAMPALA%20CONVENTION%20AND%20THE.pdf. According to this briefing note by 
the International Refugee Rights Initiative – a non-governmental organization founded in 2004- the provi-
sions on responsibility regarding displacement caused by development projects are harsher in the ICGLR 
Protocol. In addition, given the similarity between the two documents, the note urges States Parties of the 
ICGLR Protocol who still haven’t become members of the Kampala Convention to ratify it. 
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an attempt has been made to establish a connection between displacement and de-
velopment projects, public or private. In our opinion, the latter aspect is worthy of 
further elaboration. 
3. – The South-American Context: from the Cartagena Declaration to 
Recent Trends 
On the American continent as well, environmental phenomena, in particular cli-
mate change, has had various consequences. It should be underlined that in Mexico 
and Central America, in addition to cyclone events of particular gravity, the decline 
in precipitation and increased drought periods have weakened rain-fed agriculture, 
typical of smallholder -farmers. Furthermore, deforestation, soil erosion and deserti-
fication, with their incidence on agricultural livelihoods, also cause migration50. The 
link between climate change, natural disasters and a rise in migration has also been 
affirmed in a recent report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR)51. 
With regard to the protection of “environmental refugees” in the South American 
context, the paragraph will analyze acts drawn up within the context of the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS), as well as the Cartagena Declaration on Refu-
gees52, which is the basis of the Latin American refugee protection system. The latter 
Declaration was the result of an initiative of a group of regional experts, who, to-
gether with the support of the University of Mexico, gathered at the beginning of the 
1980’s in response to the weak interest of the OAS in addressing the issue of refugees 
in Central America53. 
Going in chronological order, we can see that in the constitutive Charter of the 
OAS54 there is no reference to the issue of refugees, while the right “to seek and 
receive asylum” is enshrined in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
 
50
 Cit. supra note 12, pp. 6-7. On environmental issues in the South American continent, see 
TANZARELLA, “Rifugiati ambientali in Sudamerica”, Rivista giuridica dell’ambiente, 2014, p. 277 ff. 
51
 IACHR, “Human Rights of Migrants, Refugees, Stateless Persons, Victims of Human Trafficking 
and Internally Displaced Persons: Norms and Standards of the Inter-American Human Rights System”, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 46/15 (2015), Chapter 1, para. 17. 
52
 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the International Protection of 
Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, 22 November 1984. 
53
 On the process leading to the adoption of Cartagena Declaration, see REED-HURTADO, The Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other Situations of Vio-
lence in Latin America, UNHCR, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, 2013, p. 1 ff., pp. 6 -12. 
54
 See the Charter of the Organization of American States, adopted on 30 April 1948, entered into force 
on 13 December 1951 and ratified by 35 States. 
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of Man55. Moreover, this right has been reaffirmed in the American Convention on 
Human Rights, which, however, refers to a right granted exclusively to those suffer-
ing from political persecution56.  
With regard to the Cartagena Declaration, it has first and foremost reaffirmed the 
importance of adopting national laws in accordance with the 1951 Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol, highlighting the need to ratify these instruments without reserva-
tions limiting their effectiveness. Moreover, this Declaration has affirmed, on the 
basis of the situation in the region of Central America, the importance of widening 
the notion of refugee, making a clear reference to the previous definition of the OAU 
Convention and to the reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 
In particular, also according to this instrument, “circumstances which have seriously 
disturbed public order”57 can contribute to the determination of refugee status.  
However, this definition, though innovative, entails a need for further clarification. 
Therefore, we should consider the International Conference on Central American Ref-
ugees, whose final Declaration underlines the important role played by the Cartagena 
Declaration, but does not address the issue of the correlation between migration and 
environmental degradation58. According to a document prepared by a Group of Experts 
and adopted during the Conference, the broadening of the refugee definition in the 
Cartagena Declaration is due to the fact that displacement is largely caused by conflicts 
within several Central American States59. Nonetheless, the document highlights how 
the concept of public order should be related to human actions and not to natural dis-
asters60. Moreover, it stresses a distinction between economic migrants and victims of 
natural disasters, pointing out that the latter cannot be qualified as refugees, “unless 
special circumstances arise which are closely linked to the refugee definition”61. From 
the above considerations, we can conclude that this document presents a restrictive 
view of the refugee definition present in the Cartagena Declaration.  
 
55
 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted by the Ninth International Confer-
ence of American States, 1948, Art. XXVII. 
56
 American Convention on Human Rights, adopted on 22 November 1969, entered into force on 18 
July 1978 and ratified by 25 States, Art. 22(7). Para 8 and 9 of the same article affirm the principle of non-
refoulement and the prohibition of collective expulsions. 
57
 See supra note 50, para. 3. This paragraph includes, among other reasons that can cause refugee 
status, “generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights”. 
58
 Declaration and Concerted Plan of Action in Favour of Central American Refugees, Returnees and 
Displaced Persons, 30 May 1989. 
59
 Principles and Criteria for the Protection of and Assistance to Central American Refugees, Returnees 
and Displaced Persons in Latin America, 1989, para. 28. 
60
 Ibid., para. 33.  
61
 Ibid., para. 38. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
114 Maria Vittoria Zecca 
 
 
In the subsequent statements of the South American States gathered to celebrate 
the anniversaries of the Cartagena Declaration, no improvements have been made in 
terms of clarifying the notion of public order. In the San José Declaration, adopted 
on the Cartagena’s Declaration tenth anniversary, the importance of the Cartagena 
refugee definition was reaffirmed, since it allowed States to overcome the notion 
contained in 1951 Convention and in 1967 Protocol, extending international protec-
tion to people who needed it62. However, even in this Declaration there does not ap-
pear to be an in-depth analysis of the notion of “public order”, so as to extend greater 
protection to “environmental refugees”.  
 On the occasion of its twentieth anniversary, it was emphasized that the Carta-
gena refugee definition, though it has been included in the national legislation of 
several States, should be made more specific. In particular, it has been recalled the 
need “to clarify (…) the interpretation of the specific grounds and their application 
in individual cases”, taking into account the jurisprudence of human rights organs 
and tribunals and security concerns of States63. Finally, it is important to consider 
what was affirmed in the statement adopted to commemorate the thirtieth anniver-
sary64. The Brazil Declaration recalled the incorporation, by the majority of Latin 
American States, of the Cartagena refugee definition into their national legislations, 
while simultaneously emphasizing the difficulties faced by several countries in the 
application of its extended refugee definition65. Moreover, it should be pointed out 
that this statement took into account the problem of displacement of people caused 
by climate change and natural disasters, underlining the need to conduct further stud-
ies, together with the involvement of the UNHCR, regarding this matter. 
Considering other documents relating to the issue of refugees and adopted in the 
South American context in past decades, “environmental refugees” were not given 
 
62
 San José Declaration on Refugees and Displaced Persons, adopted by the International Colloquium 
in Commemoration of the “Tenth Anniversary of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees”, 7 December 
1994, Part II, second paragraph. 
63
 See Mexico Declaration and Plan of Action to Strengthen the International Protection of Refugees 
in Latin America, adopted on 16 November 2004, Chapter 1.  
64
 Brazil Declaration, “A Framework for Cooperation and Regional Solidarity to Strengthen the Inter-
national Protection of Refugees, Displaced and Stateless Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean”, 
adopted on 3 December 2014. 
65
 Given the actions provided by the “Quality Asylum” Programme, included in the Brazil Plan of 
Action, related to the Declaration, there was an emphasis on the need to “continue making progress in 
applying the regional extended refugee definition recommended in the Cartagena Declaration and its in-
corporation in the national legislation of the countries in the region”, p. 9. 
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much attention. In the Brasilia Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and State-
less Persons in the Americas 66, there is no reference to the issue of “environmental 
refugees”, if not in emphasizing “the need to address the fundamental root causes of 
refugee displacement”67.  
Taking into consideration the resolutions of the General Assembly of the OAS, 
it should be noted that greater awareness of the negative effects of climate change 
has been spreading since the late nineties. Firstly, several resolutions were devoted 
to the importance of climate change and its socio-economic consequences68. Moreo-
ver, it should be noted that, in order to address the damage provoked by these natural 
events, the General Assembly established the Inter-American Committee on Natural 
Disaster Reduction (IACNDR), with the aim, inter alia, to give advice to the Perma-
nent Council regarding effective participation by the OAS in the policies and pro-
grams during emergencies; the possible establishment of an emergency fund in favor 
of countries affected by natural disasters; and activities dealing with advocacy and 
public information69. 
Moreover, it seems noteworthy that the General Assembly has underlined the 
repercussions that climate change can have on the enjoyment of human rights, invit-
ing interested States and civil society organizations to contribute to the efforts of the 
OAS in helping the affected populations70. 
In line with the context of the consequences of climate change, during the 2014 
Session, a resolution was devoted to the correlation between climate change and the 
 
66
 Brasilia Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons in the Americas, adopted 
on 11 November 2010. 
67
 Ibid., para. 4. 
68
 See, for instance, “Climate Change in the Americas”, UN Doc. AG/RES. 1674 (XXIX-O/99), 
adopted on 7 June 1999. In this resolution, the General Assembly urged the Inter-American Council for 
Integral Development (CIDI) to cooperate with member States to tackle the effects of climate change. In 
addition, in 2010, the General Assembly approved a resolution regarding “Climate Change in the Countries 
of Hemisphere”. See UN Doc. AG/RES. 2588 (XL-O/10), adopted on 8 June 2010. See also “The Socio-
economic and Environmental Impacts of Climate Change on the Countries of Hemisphere”, UN Doc. 
AG/RES. 1736 (XXX-O/00), adopted on 5 June 2000, in which the General Assembly exhorted the CIDI 
to take into account this issue. The invitation was renewed in the subsequent session. See the resolution 
UN Doc. AG/RES. 1821 (XXXI-O/01), adopted on 5 June 2001. 
69
 “OAS Natural Disaster Reduction and Response Mechanisms”, UN Doc. AG/RES. 1682 (XXIX-
O/99), adopted on 7 June 1999. In particular, see para. 6. 
70
 “Human Rights and Climate Change in the Americas”, UN Doc. AG/RES. 2429 (XXXVIII-O/08), 
adopted on 3 June 2008. 
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worsening of quality of life across member States, encouraging joint efforts to ad-
dress the negative effects of this phenomenon71.  
Nevertheless, the General Assembly recently adopted a Declaration on Climate 
Change, Food Security, and Migration in the Americas, in which the importance of 
greater awareness regarding the effects of climate change and phenomena such as El 
Niño and La Niña on displacement and increased refugee flows was emphasized. 
Therefore, the Assembly has cautioned the organs of the OAS, as well as regional 
and multilateral organizations, to take more of an interest in the aforementioned is-
sue. At the same time, the Declaration urges the member States to strengthen coop-
eration efforts in order to counteract the negative effects of climate change, with 
hopes of receiving help from the International Organization of Migration, the Gen-
eral Secretariat of the OAS, other international organizations and civil society72. 
However, this Declaration, while useful in underlining the importance of the problem 
and the need for a coordinated response, is lacking in that it fails to address the prob-
lem of recognizing a new category of refugees. 
However, despite greater awareness of the effects of climate change, it can be 
stated that, even in recent years, the resolutions devoted by the General Assembly to 
the issue of refugees do not make specific reference to the problem of migration 
caused by environmental factors. Firstly, a series of resolutions by the General As-
sembly devoted to the analysis of migration flows should be mentioned, as they af-
firm the importance of spreading awareness about this phenomenon. Therefore, 
member States are exhorted to cooperate with the General Secretariat in order to 
exchange information about their legal frameworks, while the OAS should be also 
continue to engage in the matter73. 
Moreover, regarding the refugee issue, the General Assembly has enacted a series 
of resolutions, which have reaffirmed the importance of the Geneva Convention and 
the 1967 Protocol as the main instruments to protect refugees; urged both the inter-
national community and member States, together with the participation of the 
UNHCR, to strengthen technical and economic cooperation; and commended the 
improvements made by countries in the implementation of protection mechanisms, 
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 “Climate Change in the Context of Sustainable Development in the Hemisphere”, UN Doc. AG/RES. 
2818 (XLIV-O/14), adopted on 4 June 2014.  
72
 “Declaration on Climate Change, Food Security, and Migration in the Americas”, UN Doc. 
AG/DEC. 88 (XLVI-O/16), adopted on 14 June 2016. 
73
 See “Migrant Populations and Migration Flows in the Americas”, UN Doc. AG/RES. 2465 (XXXIX-
O/09), adopted on 4 June 2009; UN Doc. AG/RES. 2608 (XL-O/10), adopted on 8 June 2010. In this sense, 
see also “Attention to Migratory Flows in the Americas with a Human Rights Perspective”, UN Doc. 
AG/RES. 2690 (XLI-O/11), adopted on 7 June 2011. 
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in accordance with international law74.  
With regards to IDPs, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly make 
only a weak reference to environmental causes, given that the act makes reference to 
the UN Guiding Principles, previously cited, in which natural or human-made disas-
ters are considered reasons for displacement. Therefore, the resolution urges member 
States to prevent the causes of displacement, by addressing the problem of natural 
disasters, as well as to guarantee the needs of IDPs, when natural disasters do occur75. 
With concern to the latest developments, we can consider documents prepared 
by the Committee on Migration Issues (CAM)76. In particular, an its recent paper has 
underlined how the percentage of people forced to migrate in the American continent 
because of environmental reasons, such as extended floods and droughts, has in-
creased. In addition, such climate change is a threat to collective security and stabil-
ity. For these reasons, the paper has pointed out that the international community, in 
its concern with this issue, has urged States to cooperate more closely with one an-
other and exchange experiences in the management of the phenomenon. It is note-
worthy to mention that this CAM document underlines the main shortcomings as the 
“lack of specific rules, formal recognition and guidelines for action on environmental 
migration, at the domestic and regional levels”77. 
In order to thoroughly analyze the South American context, it is also worth con-
sidering what has been affirmed by other regional organizations. In particular, an 
interest in the issue of refugees was demonstrated by Mercosur78, which, in 2000, 
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 See “Protection of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in the Americas”, UN Doc. AG/RES. 2839 (XLIV-
O/14), adopted on 4 June 2014. See also, inter alia, UN Doc. AG/RES. 2758 (XLII-O/12), adopted on 5 
June 2012; UN Doc. AG/RES. 2678 (XLI-O/11), adopted on 7 June 2011; UN Doc. AG/RES. 2597 (XL-
O/10), adopted on 8 June 2010; UN Doc. AG/RES. 2511 (XXXIX-O/09), adopted on 4 June 2009; UN 
Doc. AG/RES. 2402 (XXXVIII-O/08), adopted on 3 June 2008. 
75
 See “Internally Displaced Persons”, UN Doc. AG/RES. 2850 (XLIV-O/14), adopted on 4 June 2014. 
See also, inter alia, UN Doc. AG/RES. 2716 (XLII-O/12), adopted on 4 June 2012; UN Doc. AG/RES. 
2667 (XLI-O/11), adopted on 7 June 2011; UN Doc. AG/RES. 2578 (XL-O/10), adopted on 8 June 2010; 
UN Doc. AG/RES. 2508 (XXXIX-O/09), adopted on 4 June 2009. 
76
 This Committee is a permanent Committee of the CIDI and was established by a resolution of the 
General Assembly, with the aim, inter alia, to “be a forum for exchanges of experiences and lessons learned 
in the member states on the effective management of migration flows and for the identification of possible 
areas for cooperation”. See UN Doc. AG/RES. 2738 (XLII-O/12), adopted on 4 June 2012. 
77
 Committee on Migration Issues, “Climate Change, Food Security and Migration in the Americas. 
Executive Summary”, OEA/Ser. W, CIDI/CAM/doc.34/17, 1 March 2017. 
78
 The Mercosur is a process of economic regional integration, established in 1991 by the Treaty of 
Asuncion, and currently involves Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. Bolivia is in the 
accession process. 
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along with Bolivia and Chile, enacted the Rio de Janeiro Declaration on the Institu-
tion of Refuge. This act makes reference to the traditional definition of a refugee, 
namely a person persecuted “for reasons of race, nationality, religion, membership 
of a particular social group, political opinion”79, foreseeing the possibility for State 
parties to also include in the definition of refugees “victims of serious and general-
ized human rights violations”80. 
However, in a subsequent Declaration, the Latin American organization took on 
a more innovative position, as it affirmed the principle of non-refoulement in those 
territories where the life and physical integrity of refugees would be at risk for rea-
sons related to, inter alia, “other circumstances that disturb the public order”81. More-
over, the same statement underlined the need to implement the refugee definition 
contained in the Cartagena Declaration, preferring it to the definitions enshrined in 
other international instruments. 
Taking into account the abovementioned considerations, we can conclude that in 
the South American context as well there has been an attempt to extend the refugee 
definition, with the introduction of the concept of public order. But the need for fur-
ther clarification remains evident. Nevertheless, in our opinion, also analyzing the 
resolutions of the General Assembly, it is clear that a gap exists between an increased 
awareness of the adverse effects of environmental phenomena including climate 
change and effective protection granted to “environmental refugees”. 
4. – The Arab Region 
The problem of climate change dramatically affects the Arab region. According 
to what was affirmed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), severe 
droughts, water scarcity and rising sea levels will contribute to an increase in dis-
placement82. The issue is so important that, recently, the UNHCR and the League of 
Arab States signed a Memorandum of Understanding in order to cooperate and to 
address the needs of refugees83. 
 
79
 Rio de Janeiro Declaration on the Institution of Refuge, adopted on 10 November 2000, preamble. 
80
 Ibid., para. 3. 
81
 Mercosur Declaration of Principles on International Refugee Protection, adopted on 23 November 
2012. Other reasons of persecution were “race, religion, nationality, social group, political opinion, gener-
alized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive human rights violations”. 
82
 KHODAY, “Climate Change, Peace and Security in the Arab Region”, 4 November 2015, available 
at: <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2015/11/4/Climate-Change-Peace-and-Security-in-
the-Arab-Region.html>. 
83
 UNHCR, “UNHCR and League of Arab States Sign Agreement to Address Refugee Challenges in 
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With regard to the legal protection of refugees in this region, we shall consider in 
particular the instruments drafted within the context of the League of Arab States, a 
regional organization founded in 1945 with the aim of strengthening the cooperation 
between member States and “to safeguard their independence and sovereignty”84.  
In the institutive Charter of the League of Arab States, there is no reference to 
the right to asylum. Instead, the recognition of the right to seek asylum is present in 
the Arab Charter on Human Rights, but only with reference to people forced to es-
cape due to political persecution85. Moreover, political refugees are not subject to 
extradition86, while measures derogating from the obligations of the State Parties, in 
case of public emergency deemed dangerous for the life of nation, should not be 
made over the right to political asylum87. 
Nonetheless, the main refugee protection instrument is the Arab Convention on 
regulating status of refugees in the Arab countries, adopted by the League of Arab 
States in 1994. This Convention repeats the definition of refugees present in the Ge-
neva Convention, referring to people subjected to persecution for reasons related to 
“race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion”88. Nonetheless, the Convention introduces an important innovation, as it also 
considers refugees persons forced to escape “because of sustained aggression 
against, occupation and foreign domination of such country or because of the occur-
rence of natural disasters or grave events resulting in major disruption of public order 
in the whole country or any part thereof”89. Therefore, it can be stated that the Arab 
Convention constitutes a remarkable step towards the recognition of “environmental 
refugees”, as it does not limit itself, like other regional instruments previously ana-
 
the Arab Region”, 22 September 2017, available at: <http://www.un-
hcr.org/news/press/2017/9/59c4d7024/unhcr-league-arab-states-sign-agreement-address-refugee-chal-
lenges-arab.html>. 
84
 Charter of Arab League, adopted on 22 March 1945 by seven States (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, Yemen), Art. 2. Currently, the League of Arab States is composed by 22 Mem-
ber States, including Palestine. 
85
 Arab Charter on Human Rights, adopted on 15 September 1994, amended on 22 May 2004 and 
entered into force on 15 March 2008, Art. 28. 
86
 Ibid. 
87
 Ibid., Art. 4(2). As stated in the Art. 4(1), derogations of the State Parties are admitted “to the extent 
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with 
their other obligations under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of 
race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin”. 
88
 Arab Convention on Regulating Status of Refugees in the Arab Countries, 1994, Art. 1(2). 
89
 Ibid., Art. 1(3). 
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lyzed, to cite an undefined notion of “public order”, but recognizes that environmen-
tal causes are sufficient to grant refugee status. 
In addition, considering documents drafted outside the context of the League of 
Arab States, the Cairo Declaration should also be taken into account. Said Declara-
tion was adopted by a group of Arab experts who came together in order to further 
explore the issues related to the development of refugee law in the Arab context90. 
Even though this statement makes no reference to the issue of “environmental refu-
gees”, it seems worthwhile to note the attempt to guarantee protection even to per-
sons who do not fall within the definition of the Geneva Convention, the 1967 Pro-
tocol or other instruments. In fact, according to Article 5 of the Cairo Declaration, in 
such cases protection should be guaranteed by the principle of asylum under Islamic 
law, Arab values, human rights rules established by international and regional organ-
izations, and other relevant principles of international law. Furthermore, it is worth 
noting that, in Article 6, Arab States are urged to consider a wider notion of refugees 
and IDPs, awaiting the adoption of an Arab Convention regarding this matter91. 
Finally, emphasis must be placed on the right to asylum “within the framework 
of Shari’a”, as is enshrined in the Cairo Declaration92, adopted by the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference, currently replaced by the Organization of Islamic Coop-
eration, an inter-governmental organization, representative of the Muslim world, es-
tablished in 1969. However, according to the aforementioned Declaration, the obli-
gation of the State of refuge to provide protection to the asylum-seeker is limited by 
the fact that the asylum application depends on the commission of an act considered 
a crime by the Shari’a. 
5. – Conclusions 
From the abovementioned considerations, we can conclude that the regional con-
texts examined are characterized by an attempt to extend the protection granted by 
general international law to people escaping from their State, in an attempt to over-
come the limits of the Geneva Convention. The first attempt to expand upon the defi-
nition of refugee occurred in the African continent, with the OAU Convention, which 
introduced the concept of “public order”, whose disruption can determine the granting 
of refugee status. Later, the above-mentioned concept was resumed within the South 
 
90
 Declaration on the Protection of Refugees and Displaced Persons in the Arab World, 19 November 
1992. As stated in the Declaration, it has been approved at the end of a Seminar on “Asylum and Refugee 
Law in the Arab World”, organized by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law with the Faculty of 
Law of Cairo University, with the sponsorship of UNHCR. 
91
 Ibid., Art. 6. 
92
 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, adopted on 5 August 1990, Art. 12. 
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American continent with the Cartagena Declaration. However, in both regional con-
texts, there was no clarification of the concept of “public order”, which would allow 
for its application to people fleeing from environmental degradation. The explicit 
recognition of “natural disasters” as reason for granting refugee status is present only 
in the Convention of the League of Arab States, even if it is not clear whether such 
expression includes environmental degradation caused by climate change. Neverthe-
less, we believe that this provision is an important basis for subsequent recognition of 
full protection for people forced to flee for environmental reasons. 
Considering another profile, regarding IDPs, it is worth noting that in the African 
context they are guaranteed greater protection than under general international law, 
through the adoption of the two binding instruments examined. However, it should 
be underlined that, although the Kampala Convention represents an important inno-
vation, the fact that it has only been ratified by 27 States raises doubts as to the will-
ingness of the States to bind themselves to obligations towards IDPs. 
Another important aspect in the African context is the correlation between envi-
ronmental disasters and development projects, as well as the attempt to establish ac-
countability of non-State actors, including multinationals. In our opinion, this aspect 
deserves to be studied in detail, as a starting point from which to establish a form of 
protection for people fleeing due to environmental causes. 
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a Game-Changer for Low-Lying States’ Future? – 5. Conclusions. 
 
1. – Introduction 
It’s undeniable that the impacts of climate change are being felt worldwide, how-
ever, the Low-lying States are among the most severally affected. These countries 
make up the group of nations that largely rely on the oceans to survive, although it is 
expected that oceans should give rise to their extinction. Considering that one of the 
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most relevant United Nations Sustainable Development Goals for these States is Goal 
14, named “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for 
sustainable development”, is the implementation of this goal enough to save these 
countries? 
Climate change effects on the environment and on human life have never been 
discussed so often as in the recent years. Since the Paris Agreement, the media chan-
nels’ interest, in addition to the general public’s awareness on this subject has in-
creased. 
Recent hurricanes’ destructive force, as  was Irma’s, Jose’s and Maria’s case1, 
linked to the climate change impacts on weather, demonstrated the coastal States’ 
vulnerability to these effects. Although the 2017 hurricanes had a devastating effect 
in several countries, the global warming underlying impacts can’t be disregarded. 
For a certain group of countries, (also referred as “low-lying coastal States”), 
stopping, or at least slackening climate changes’ impacts is a matter of survival. 
These countries are usually located in the Caribbean Sea, the Pacific, Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans, and are considered Small Island Development States (“SIDS”), coin-
taining parts of their territories at or below sea level2. 
Although these countries are being impacted in different ways, they are all expe-
riencing some kind of induced climate changes negatives impacts. For some3,global 
warming and its impacts on the sea level may cause their vanishing.  
In addition, most of these States are developing countries economically reliant 
on the oceans, struggling with social and economic problems that are bolstered by 
climate changes negative impacts on a variety of sectors including tourism, freshwa-
ter resources, fisheries and agriculture, human settlements4. 
 
1
 The 2017 hurricane season has been worse than usual, until mid-September there have been formed 
seven hurricanes, which four of them were category 3 and above. Experts predict that there will be two or 
three named storms in October and one in November or December. Rice, Doyle, “Yes, this hurricane season 
has been worse than usual”, USA Today, 18 September 2017. Available at: <https://www.usato-
day.com/story/weather/2017/09/18/yes-hurricane-season-has-been-worse-than-usual/677360001/>. 
2
 ASHE, LIEROP,CHERIAN, “The role of the alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) in the negotiation 
of the United Nations framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC)”, in Natural Resources Forum, 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 1999. p. 209 ff. 
3
 Such as Kiribati, The Maldives, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Samoa, Nauru, Fiji Islands, Mar-
shall Islands.  
4
 These effects were already predicted by the Second Assessment Report (SAR) of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1995. BARROS et al, Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, 
and vulnerability-Part B: regional aspects-Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Re-
port of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, New York NY, 2014, p. 1613 ff., p. 1618. 
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According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) Fifth 
Assessment Report, “The key climate and ocean drivers of change that impact small 
islands include variations in air and ocean temperatures; ocean chemistry; rainfall; 
wind strength and direction; sea levels and wave climate; and particularly the ex-
tremes such as tropical cyclones, drought, and distant storm swell events” 5. 
The report also points out the direct cause-effect link between climate changes 
impacts and the increasing human displacements in the world6. The IPCC report pre-
dicts a hike in the number of climate-induced displacements in the next years7. 
Though it is expected that climate change may have a disastrous impact on low-
lying countries, causing coastal erosion, increasing coral bleaching and reduced reef 
calcification rates, changing islands biodiversity, and reducing these regions’ fresh-
water supply, ultimately fostering human displacement, it can’t be disregarded that 
human activities on the shores also play a role in causing these effects. 
Documented cases of coastal erosion are often associated with additional circum-
stances besides global warming8. Likewise, the tourism9 and urbanization rates rise in 
these areas are also significant causes of reefs degradation and freshwater scarcity10.  
 
5
 Ibid, p. 1619. 
6
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report Fifth Assess-
ment Report, Available at: <http://ar5-syr.ipcc.ch/topic_futurechanges.php > 
7
  Ibid. 
8
 “Four examples can be cited. First, on the Torres Islands, Vanuatu communities have been displaced 
as a result of increasing inundation of low-lying settlement areas owing to a combination of tectonic sub-
sidence and SLR (Ballu et al., 2011). Second, on Anjouan Island, Comores in the Indian Ocean, Sinane et 
al. (2010) found beach aggregate mining was a major contributing factor influencing rapid beach erosion. 
Third, the intrinsic exposure of rapidly expanding settlements and agriculture in the low-lying flood-prone 
Rewa Delta, Fiji, is shown by Lata and Nunn (2012) to place populations in increasingly severe conditions 
of vulnerability to flooding and marine inundation. Fourth, Hoeke et al. (2013) describe a 2008 widespread 
inundation event that displaced some 63,000 people in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands alone. 
That event was caused primarily by remotely generated swell waves, and the severity of flooding was 
greatly increased by anomalously high regional sea levels linked with ENSO and ongoing SLR”. See 
BARROS, cit. supra note 4, p. 1620. 
9
 “Coastal tourism, especially in SIDS, the growth of the industry brings with it a host of challenges, 
including loss of fragile habitat and biodiversity, marine and land-based pollution, inadequate waste man-
agement, resource consumption and competition, and limited community engagement and benefit.” Part-
nership dialogue 5: Increasing economic benefits to small islands developing States and least developed 
countries and providing access for small-scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and markets, UN Doc. 
Concept Paper, p. 6. Available at: <https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/14410Part-
nershipdialogue5.pdf > 
10
 “Now the majority of the settlement, infrastructure, and development are located on lowlands along 
the coastal fringe of small islands. In the case of atoll islands, all development and settlement are essentially 
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Because of the human impact on nature, the effects people are perceiving that 
climate changes cause, and the lack of international response to the displacements 
caused  by the climate changes issue or even because of the environmental degrada-
tion, we aren’t able to assess the issue of climate impacts on Low-lying countries 
isolated of the sustainable development discussions. 
Sustainable development debates are presently directly related to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (“SDGs”). A proposition to establish SDGs was one Rio+20’s 
outcomes, which would guide national policies and international cooperation activi-
ties in the next fifteen years, following the Millennium Development Goals 
(“MDGs”). 
Past two years of negotiation,  the United Nations (‘UN’) sustainable develop-
ment goals were adopted in September 2015. There are 17 goals and 169 targets, 
including issues related to the present paper, such as good health and well-being, 
clean water and sanitation, sustainable cities and communities, climate action, life 
below water, life on land. 
Considering the low-lying States vulnerability to climate changes impacts and 
their reliance on oceans sustainability – not exclusively as an economic source, but 
also as a way to keep sea levels stable –, one of the most important UN SD Goals to 
these countries is Goal 14, “Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and ma-
rine resources for sustainable development”.  
The first UN Ocean Conference took place in June 2017, and aimed to adopt by 
consensus an intergovernmental declaration in the form of a call for action to support 
Goal 14 implementation11. The Conference’s outcome was the adoption of a decla-
ration entitled “Our ocean, our future: call for action”12. 
In light of the fact that low-lying nations are the most vulnerable to the unsus-
tainable use of the oceans effects, it’s pressing to ascertain if the declaration’s adop-
tion will help them to survive and deal with an imminent catastrophe that could lead 
to inevitable migration flows.  
This study sought to examine the UN Ocean Conference’s key takeaways , its 
impact on the low-lying nations’ situation, what to expect from the Conference's call 
 
coastal. It follows that populations, infrastructure, agricultural areas, and fresh groundwater supplies are 
all vulnerable to extreme tides, wave and surge events, and SLR (Walsh et al., 2012)”. See Barros, cit. 
supra note 4, p. 1623. 
11
 UN. Our oceans, our future: partnering for the implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 
14. Available at: <https://oceanconference.un.org/about> 
12
 UN. Outcomes. Available at: <https://oceanconference.un.org/about > 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The UN Ocean Conference and the Low-Lying States Situation … 127 
 
 
for action, and if this will be enough to avoid a migration emergency. The research 
methodology adopted in this paper will be qualitative, explanatory, and will be de-
veloped by means of a scientific output and documentary review.  
The research will be divided into three parts. The first part aims to present the Low-
lying States migratory emergency and its relation to the oceans degradation. The sec-
ond part will study the borderless nature of oceans and the need of international coop-
eration and participation to the UN Ocean Conference Declaration’s success. 
The third part will ascertain if the UN Ocean Conference and the Sustainable De-
velopment Goal 14’s implementation could be a game-changer for the low-lying na-
tions’ future, avoiding human displacement due to the climate change adverse effects. 
The research will look into the possibility to use the Law of the Sea Legal Instruments 
to support these actions, and also the important outcomes from this event. 
2. – The Low-Lying States Migratory Emergency: the Relation between 
the Oceans Degradation and the Human Forced Displacement  
Forced human displacements provoked by the climate are usually treated in in-
ternational discussions as a concern, but not properly an emergency to be addressed. 
However, discoveries made by climatologist Patrick Nunn show that at least six un-
inhabited islands in Micronesia have been submerged since 200713. 
But for the Solomon Islands this situation is an ongoing reality, five small Pacific 
islands that made part of the country’s territory have already been vanished due to 
rising seas and erosion14. There were no human groups settled in these islands, how-
ever, six other islands were also affected, and large swaths of land were covered by 
the ocean, and the impacts forced people to relocate due to the villages’ obliteration 
on two of those islands 15. 
Surveys conducted by universities in Queensland suggest that the same effects 
will be experienced by other Low-lying Pacific Countries, which are experiencing 
seven to twelve millimetres of sea level rise per year, while the global average is 
 
13
 COLE, “Rising tides: islands lost to the sea”, Geographical, 07 nov. 2017, available at: 
<http://geographical.co.uk/nature/oceans/item/2445-rising-tides> 
14
 This discovery has been considered by Australian researchers as the first scientific evidence of the 
impact of climate change on coastlines in the Pacific. “ Five Pacific islands lost to rising seas as climate 
change hits”, The Guardian, 10 May 2016, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/environ-
ment/2016/may/10/five-pacific-islands-lost-rising-seas-climate-change >  
15
 Ibid. 
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three millimetres16. 
Climate Change it’s being considered one of the largest threats to future genera-
tions, and forced global migration is the most serious threats consequence of the ad-
verse impacts of climate Global leaders must face, especially for Pacific Island Na-
tions17. 
The Climate Change Fifth Assesment Report evidences that a large part of the 
negative impacts that SIDS experience is due to the global warming effects in the 
oceans. The same oceans that maintained these States’ economy throughout years, 
thanks to fishing and tourism, may be responsible for their vanishing, by means of 
floods, advancing sea levels, and oceans acidification, which will lead to the marine 
wildlife death and fish poisoning18. 
In the same report the Panel pointed out two types of forced migration that will 
occur: migration as a response to extreme weather events (likely to increase due to 
climate change) – such as the recent hurricanes that destroyed entire villages in the 
Caribbean Sea – and migration due to “longer term climate variability and change” 
(presumably from sea level rise) which will mainly affect the Low-lying States, due 
to their more vulnerability to this type of climate adversity19.  
The importance of the oceans to human life across the planet is undeniable, they 
influence our climate and are intrinsically linked to the atmosphere through heat stor-
age, transportation of heat around the globe, evaporation, freezing and thawing in 
polar regions, and gas storage and exchange (including CO2)20. 
For Herr and Galland “The ocean acts as a buffer for Earth’s climate. The oceanic 
uptake of CO2 has somewhat mitigated the effect of global warming by reducing its 
concentration in the atmosphere. However, this continual absorption of CO2 changes 
the ocean in ways that have potentially dangerous consequences for humans and for 
marine biodiversity”21.  
Herr and Galland also highlighted that “the scale and rate of environmental 
 
16
 See COLE cit. supra note 13. 
17
 WARREN, “Forced Migration after Paris COP21: evaluating the ‘climate change displacement 
coordination facility’ ’’, Columbia Law Review, 2017, available at: 
<http://columbialawreview.org/content/forced-migration-after-paris-cop21-evaluating-the-climate-
change-displacement-coordination-facility/ >  
18
 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change cit. supra note 6. 
19
 Ibid. 
20
 HERR and GALLAND, The Ocean and Climate Change: Tools and Guidelines for Action, Gland, 
2009, p. 12. 
21
 Ibid. 
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change, driven by the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, [...]will 
negatively affect the ocean’s ability to continue to support ecosystems, human pop-
ulations, and cultures”22.      
Despite the risk of, in a few decades, being entirely swallowed by the rising seas, 
a large portion of these Low-lying Countries have developing economies extremely 
dependent on the oceans, that are already suffering due to climate impacts on marine 
ecosystems, which are vital to economic sectors such as fisheries and tourism23.   
The rise of sea level has increased the risk of coastal flooding, and has also in-
creased erosion of coastal land and ecosystems and increased salinization of low-
lying agricultural land. “Coastal flooding already leads to displacement of affected 
populations, erosion of ecosystems such as wetlands and mangroves exposes coast-
lines to greater risk, and increasing salinization lowers the productivity of agricul-
tural land”24.  
Usually, human displacement caused by the degradation of the environment due 
to the climate change impacts drive people to move internally, such persons being 
recognized as internally displaced persons. However, because of the size of most of 
the Low-lying States25, if the living conditions for their population get worse, people 
are more likely to migrate to a different State than to migrate internally to seek better 
living conditions in their own country.  
The IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report reveals that the human displacements risk 
increases when populations that have no resources to a planned migration are ex-
posed to extreme climate conditions, for example, floods and droughts26.   
The problem is that there is no international policy enabling climate migrants to 
be admitted and protected in another State. In fact, there is an international resistance 
in recognizing people that are forced to migrate to other Countries because of the 
adverse climate or the environmental conditions as refugees.  
The UN Refugee Convention doesn’t acknowledge the need to flee a Country 
caused by environmental or climate distress as an inclusion clause in the recognition 
of a migrant as a refugee. 
Both international refugee and international environmental law have been failing 
 
22
 Ibid, p. 11. 
23
 See Partnership dialogue 5, cit. supra note 11, p. 2. 
24
 BLACK et al, “The effect of environmental change on human migration”, Global Environmental 
Change, p. 53 ff., p. 52. 
25
 “Many SIDS have maritime zones that are exponentially larger than their land territory (in Tuvalu, 
for instance, the size of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is more than 26,000 times that of the land 
mass)”. See Partnership dialogue 5, cit. supra note 11. 
26
 See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, cit. supra note 6. 
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to introduce a solution for this issue, which leaves climate change victims at the 
mercy of States’ goodwill 27.  
Although the effects felt by the Low-lying States are directly related to climate 
change –  as the reports released by the IPCC show in recent years – under the inter-
national climate regime the issue of climate displacement is still treated in a very 
superficial manner.  
It should be underlined that the population of low-lying States doesn’t want to 
leave their countries, most of them don’t want to become climate migrants28, but the 
local governments of these countries can’t reverse their vulnerability to marine en-
vironment distress by themselves.  
In order to avoid a migratory emergency, measures should be taken to increase 
the resilience of those countries, which depend on international cooperation to be 
effective, not only because they are economic developing countries, but also because 
of the borderless nature of the oceans, which will be discussed in more depth in the 
next topic.  
3. – The Borderless Nature of the Oceans: The Need of International 
Cooperation and Participation to Cope with the Low-Lying Coastal 
States’ Vulnerability to Climate Changes Impacts 
In this section, we will assess the nature of climate and environmental impacts 
suffered by the low-lying coastal States and the principles of cooperation and partic-
ipation’s relevance in attempting to accomplish SD goal 14. 
Mr. Antonio Guterres, UN Secretary-General, opened the conference calling the 
States to put aside their short-term national gain in favor of the health of our oceans, 
and to exercise the multilateralism principle, he said: “Oceans are a testing ground 
for the principle of multilateralism, […] The health of our oceans and seas requires 
us to put aside short-term national gain, to avoid long-term global catastrophe29.”    
 
27
 MONT’ALVERNE and MATOS, “O regime internacional do clima e a proteção aos ‘refugiados 
climáticos’: quais desafios da cop 21?”, Brazilian Journal of International Law, 2016, p. 53 ff., p. 58. 
28
 Aso Ioapo from Tuvalu says “migration is the last option of the Tuvaluan people”. Erietera Aram 
from Kiribati affirmed “We don’t want to leave our country,” Aram says. “We love our land, and it doesn’t 
have the same meaning to be living somewhere else. We don’t want to be migrants of climate, but if there 
is no change our country will disappear into the sea.” Doherty, Ben, “ ‘Our country will vanish’: Pcific 
islanders bring desperate message to Australia”, The Guardian, 13 May 2017, available at: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/14/our-country-will-vanish-pacific-islanders-bring-des-
perate-message-to-australia > 
29
 UN Secretary-General, UN Secretary-General opens Ocean Conference, calling on countries to set 
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To understand what the multilateralism principle means, we bring forward Keo-
hane’s concept of it. For him “Multilateralism can be defined as the practice of co-
ordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrange-
ments or by means of institutions”30. 
The concept expresses, therefore, a political project to be promoted with the pref-
erence for a collective action standard over individual solutions. Pursuant to this def-
inition, we should also add the goal of universality’s normative dimensions, a per-
ception of space indivisibility and common problems, and future prospects, in the 
pursuit of principles that guarantee a minimum of predictability to the interaction 
between the actors31.  
Exercising this principle requires compliance with another international princi-
ple, the principle of cooperation. The UN recognized the importance of international 
cooperation to sustainable development, having included it in its goals. Goal 17 es-
tablishes the need of partnership for the goals to strengthen the means of implemen-
tation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development. 
It’s also important to highlight the UN Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, which established the duty of States to co-
operate with one another32. 
The principle of international cooperation among States is one of the International 
 
aside short-term gain to avoid catastrophe, 05 June 2017, available at: <https://sustainabledevelop-
ment.un.org/content/documents/15405PR_Ocean_Conference_Opening.pdf>  
30
 KEOHANE, “Multilateralism: an agenda for research”, International Journal, p. 731 ff., p. 731. 
31
 MELLO, “O Brasil e o multilateralismo contemporâneo”, Instituto de Pesquisa Aplicada, p. 6 ff., p. 13. 
32
 “States have the duty to co-operate with one another, irrespective of the differences in their political, 
economic and social systems, in the various spheres of international relations, in order to maintain interna-
tional peace and security and to promote international economic stability and progress, the general welfare 
of nations and international co-operation free from discrimination based on such differences”. Declaration 
on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UN Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (1970). 
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Law principles that is more often portrayed in the preambles of International conven-
tions33, especially in those dealing with issues related to man’s impact on nature, be-
cause of the transnational nature of this kind of action on the environment34-35. 
This principle can be understood as a process “when actors adjust their behavior 
to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordi-
nation”36. 
As Mr. Antonio Guterres recalls in the UN Ocean Conference opening, we can 
not discuss the sustainable use of oceans without exercising the multilateralism prin-
ciple, and, for that purpose, international stakeholders will need to exercise the in-
ternational cooperation principle.  
Climate change negative impacts and direct human actions on oceans are per-
ceived in a more severe way by low-lying coastal States, but they are the least re-
sponsible for these effects. This happens because of the oceans’ borderless nature, 
for that the impacts of pollution, predatory fishery and human settlement are not 
limited to the countries causing these environmental damages, but actually cause 
transboundary damages. 
Considering the need of international cooperation to tackle the oceans vulnera-
bilities, during the preparatory process of the United Nations Conference to support 
SD goal 14’s implementation, a background note by the Secretary-General was pre-
pared, including a proposal for themes of partnership dialogues for the conference, 
to be considered by the preparatory meeting that took place in New York in February 
201737. 
 
33
 Such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
34
 “Recognizing the desirability of establishing through this Convention, with due regard for the sov-
ereignty of all States, a legal order for the seas and oceans which will facilitate international communica-
tion, and will promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of 
their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the 
marine environment”. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UN Doc. A/37/147 (1982), fourth 
preambular paragraph. 
35
 “Acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation 
by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and eco-
nomic conditions,” United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1771, No. 30822 (1992), sixth preambular paragraph. 
36
 KEOHANE, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton, 
1984. Available at: <http://people.iq.harvard.edu/~olau/ir/archive/keo8.pdf > 
37
 Preparatory process of the United Nations Conference to Support the Implementation of Sustainable 
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The background note proposed as partnership themes addresses the following 
topics: addressing marine pollution; managing, protecting, conserving and restoring 
marine and coastal ecosystems; minimizing and addressing ocean acidification; mak-
ing fisheries sustainable; increasing economic benefits to small island developing 
States and least developed countries and providing access for small-scale artisanal 
fishers to marine resources and markets; increasing scientific knowledge, and devel-
oping research capacity and transfer of marine technology; implementing interna-
tional law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea38. 
As noted above, the preparatory process of the UN Ocean Conference took into 
consideration the vulnerability and the the Small Island States’reliance – most of 
them considered low-lying States – on oceans and has suggested the discussion about 
increasing economic benefits to SIDS and least developed countries and providing 
access for small-scale artisanal fishers to marine resources and markets as a theme 
for a partnership dialogue39. 
It’s nonetheless noteworthy that all the other partnership dialogues are also re-
lated to problems that population from the Low-Lying States experience, and that 
affect their lives and their well-being. However, none of the dialogues addressed the 
migratory issues faced by the Low-Lying States as one of the imminent effects of the 
oceans deterioration. 
The background note acknowledged that the coastal and marine ecosystem dete-
rioration has a more severe and immediate impact on vulnerable groups, such as 
small island developing States40. The note also highlighted the need of taking into 
consideration continuing efforts to identify an effective and feasible solution to the 
development and livelihood needs of SIDS at a multilateral level41. 
The discussions focused on measures to increase the economic and 
environmental resilience of the most affected countries, which could postpone the 
negative effects of climate change on the Low-lying States, but did not address 
immediate measures to avoid a migration crisis due to the deterioration of living 
 
Development Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable 
development, UN Doc. A/71/733 (2017), para. 2. 
38
 Ibid., para. 87. 
39
 See Our oceans, our future: partnering, cit. supra note 11. 
40
 See Preparatory process of the United Nations Conference to Support the Implementation of Sus-
tainable Development Goal 14, ibid. para. 8. 
41
 Ibid., para. 42. 
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conditions in places such as Kiribati and Tuvalu. 
SIDS face huge sustainable development challenges, as vulnerability to natural 
disasters and external shocks, small populations, limited resources. They have dis-
proportionately expensive public administration and infrastructure, and little oppor-
tunities to create economies of scale. Regardless of that, these States have significant 
chances to harvest economic benefits from an ocean-based economy that reconciles 
economic development with sustainable development42. 
The encouragement of sustainable economic growth has been presented as one 
of the alternatives to ensure the survival of the affected Low-Lying States and is a 
way of increasing the possibility of investments in measures of environmental resil-
ience against the adverse effects of climate change on the oceans, which indirectly 
would guarantee the permanence of the populations of these countries, avoiding a 
forced human displacement in mass. 
Partnership dialogue 5’s concept paper acknowledges that maximizing these op-
portunities will require a multi-stakeholder approach43. In this sense, it is also im-
portant to mention the participation principle. 
This principle is a part of the so-called Lisbon Principles44, which are a core set 
of six principles that provide basic guidelines for the sustainable governance of the 
oceans. 
In accordance with Costanza, the principle of participation means that “All stake-
holders should be engaged in the formulation and implementation of decisions con-
cerning environmental resources. Full stakeholder awareness and participation con-
tribute to credible, accepted rules that identify and assign the corresponding respon-
sibilities appropriately”45. 
The Conference also recognized this principle’s importance by encouraging vol-
untary commitments registration46 geared at driving implementation of Sustainable 
 
42
 Ibid., para. 4.  
43
 Ibid., para. 27. 
44
 COSTANZA et al, “Principles for sustainable governance of the oceans”, Science, p. 198 ff., p.199. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 “Voluntary commitments for The Ocean Conference are initiatives voluntarily undertaken by Gov-
ernments, the United Nations system, other intergovernmental organizations, international and regional 
financial institutions, non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations, academic and re-
search institutions, the scientific community, the private sector, philanthropic organizations and other ac-
tors – individually or in partnership – that aim to contribute to the implementation of Sustainable Devel-
opment Goal 14. Any voluntary commitments made within the framework of the 2030 Agenda targeting 
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Development Goal 14 and its associated targets by all stakeholders47.  
Stakeholders were encouraged to register commitments that: advance implemen-
tation of SDG 14 and associated targets, reflecting inter-linkages between SDG 14 
and other Sustainable Development Goals; respect the United Nations principles and 
the legal framework in force applicable to the oceans; build upon existing successful 
efforts (scaling it up, new phase, etc.) or introduce a new one; include means of im-
plementation – such as finance or capacity building – as an element to help ensure 
the initiative’s longevity and sustainability48.  
At the end of the Conference 1402, voluntary commitments were made including 
all targets related to SD Goal 14, most of them by governments and NGOs49-50. 
The international cooperation and participation importance were also stressed out in 
the Conference final document named “Our ocean, our future: call for action”, in which 
the UN Assembly recognized that “our ocean is critical to our shared future and common 
humanity in all its diversity”51, also recognizing “the need to address the adverse impacts 
that impair the crucial ability of the ocean to act as climate regulator, source of marine 
biodiversity and as key provider of food and nutrition, tourism and ecosystem services 
and as an engine for sustainable economic development and growth”52. 
Finally, the declaration also underlined “the need for an integrated, interdiscipli-
nary and cross-sectoral approach, as well as enhanced cooperation, coordination and 
policy coherence, at all levels53”, and the need “to integrate Goal 14 and its interre-
lated targets into national development plans and strategies, to promote national 
ownership and to ensure success in its implementation by involving all relevant 
stakeholders, including national and local authorities, […], local communities,[…] 
as well as the academic and scientific communities, business and industry”54. 
For that purpose, the General Assembly purposed adopting some actions, among 
them: 
 
SDG 14 can be registered as voluntary commitments for The Ocean Conference”. United Nations “Volun-
tary commitments”, Available at: <https://oceanconference.un.org/commitments/>. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 44% and 20%, respectively. 
50
 Ibid., para. 48. 
51
 Our ocean, our future: call for action, UN Doc. A/RES/71/312 (2017), para. 2. 
52
 Ibid., para. 4 
53
 Ibid., para. 8. 
54
 Ibid., para. 9. 
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“(b) Strengthen cooperation, policy coherence and coordination among institutions at all 
levels, including between and among international organizations, regional and subregional or-
ganizations and institutions, arrangements and programmes; (c) Strengthen and promote effective 
and transparent multi-stakeholder partnerships, including public-private partnerships, by enhanc-
ing engagement of Governments with global, regional and subregional bodies and programmes, 
the scientific community, the private sector, the donor community, non-governmental organiza-
tions, community groups, academic institutions and other relevant actors”55; 
It is important to emphasize that, although the commitments assumed and the 
actions purposed by the General Assembly represent a step forward in the discus-
sions and, especially, in the adoption of practical actions to improve the oceans health 
and the wellbeing of the populations that depend on it, they  were based on measures 
to increase the resilience of the most affected countries to the oceans distress, not 
dealing with the Low-Living States migratory emergency directly. 
Although these measures are not focused on a permanent and definitive solution 
to the migratory crisis in these countries, their importance can not be denied. 
It can be inferred from the information presented above that, as already acknowl-
edged in priors UN conventions related to the oceans and to the climate change im-
pacts the success of this declaration, and also the success of any action to cope with 
the enhancement of the low-lying States resilience to climate change impacts on 
oceans will demand the international community’s cooperation in different areas, 
especially in implementing obligations that countries took on by signing interna-
tional instruments on the matter. 
Moreover, the French President launched the Global Pact for the Environment's 
project during the UN General Assembly in September 2017 as a way to develop a 
single and more coherent text and an international and legally binding document, 
gathering and harmonizing all environmental laws56. 
The Pact’s preliminary draft expressly acknowledges the relevance of coopera-
tion to deal with the adverse effects of climate change and to protect the oceans. The 
draft recognizes the need for integration of the requirements of environmental pro-
tection into the planning and implementation of States policies and national and in-
ternational activities, especially in order to promote the fight against climate change 
 
55
 Ibid, para. 13. 
56
 The Global Pact for the Environnement. Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations in New 
York. https://onu.delegfrance.org/The-Global-Pact-for-the-Environnement 
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and the protection of oceans57.  
International environmental laws harmonization, such as the Global Pact for the 
Environment advocates, would make the Agenda 2030 and its 17 Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals58 – including SDG 14 – implementation easier. Nevertheless, in order 
to President Macron accomplish his project, he relies on the international commu-
nity’s goodwill to cooperate and engage in this project and to the construction of a 
sustainable future to mankind, irrespective of present economic gains. 
In the next topic, it will be discussed how the States’ cooperation and participa-
tion to Sustainable Sevelopment Goal 14’s implementation can help to change the 
Low-Lying States’ future. 
4. – The UN I Ocean Conference and the Sustainable Development Goal 
14’s Implementation: Could it be a Game-Changer for Low-Lying 
States’ Future? 
In this section, the proposals emerging out from the UN Ocean Conference for 
the implementation of SD goal 14 and its impacts on the survival of the Islands Na-
tions will be analyzed. This section will introduce the support that the Law of the 
Sea legal instruments can provide to this issue, and will discuss the possible Confer-
ence outcomes, especially for low-lying countries and their probable migration emer-
gency. 
Despite the importance of the resolution 71/312 adopted by the UN General As-
sembly, which endorsed the declaration entitled “Our ocean, our future: call for ac-
tion”59, it should be remembered that it was established a legal framework for all 
matters related to oceans and seas in 1982, the so-called United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). 
The Convention aimed to regulate all issues related to the law of the sea, and 
within its framework, it was developed a series of instruments regulating various 
aspects related to the use of the oceans and their resources and the marine environ-
ment, and it is the most important international instrument adopted in this field until 
these days, currently having 168 States Parties, including all SIDS. 
Because of its relevance, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
 
57
 The Global Pact for the Environment, UN Preliminary draft (2017), article 3. 
58
 See The Global Pact for the Environnement…, cit. supra note 56. 
59
 See UN, Our Ocean, our future, cit. supra note 51. 
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acknowledged, as one of its target, the need to Enhance the conservation and sus-
tainable use of oceans and their resources by implementing international law as re-
flected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea60-61. 
In the UN Ocean Conference’s background note, it was highlighted that a wide 
array of international and regional legal instruments exists, covering many aspects 
of ocean management62, but not all Member States are parties to all relevant instru-
ments. For this reason, continued efforts have been made to strengthen the interna-
tional legal framework for the oceans and seas with additional instruments to address 
emerging challenges. It is clear, however, that effective compliance with and en-
forcement of those provisions remain a challenge63. 
One of the greatest challenges pointed for the implementation of global commit-
ments was the fragmentation in many States of the policies related to ocean affairs64. 
Therefore, the Secretary-General of the United Nations Ocean Conference suggested 
“Implementing international law, as reflected in the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea” as a theme for a partnership dialogue, in order to promote un-
derstanding that there are opportunities for additional partnerships aimed at assisting 
the development of adequate policy, legislation or regulation to implement the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and for partnerships aimed at 
building the necessary monitoring, control and surveillance and enforcement capac-
ity65 that would contribute to the conservation and sustainable use of oceans, seas and 
marine resources. 
 
60
 This target is, as a matter of fact, part of a broader target, that is target 7: “By 2030, increase the 
economic benefits to small island developing States and least developed countries from the sustainable use 
of marine resources, including through sustainable management of fisheries, aquaculture and tourism”. 
61
 Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, UN Doc. A/RES/70/1 
(2015). 
62
 “The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and its implementing agreements are sup-
plemented by several instruments, including global treaties relating to sustainable fisheries, pollution from 
ships, maritime safety, atmospheric pollution, the release of hazardous substances into the environment, 
the protection of certain species or habitats and the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity. In 
addition, a host of soft law instruments also contain goals and targets, ranging from the outcome documents 
of the successive United Nations conferences and summits on sustainable development and the annual 
General Assembly resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea and on sustainable fisheries to guidelines, 
codes of conduct and programmes of action”. See Preparatory process of the United Nations Conference 
to Support the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14 …, cit. supra note 37, para. 63. 
63
 Ibid., para. 63-66. 
64
 Ibid., para. 70. 
65
 Ibid., para. 86. 
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The importance of the Law of the Sea and its instruments to the SD Goal 14 
achievement was recognized in the Ocean Conference final document, which has  
emphasized the need to accomplish Goal 14 by implementing international law as 
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and that the need 
of enhancing the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources 
should reinforce and not duplicate or undermine existing legal instruments, arrange-
ments, processes, mechanisms or entities66.  
The document also called up all stakeholders to cooperate and participate taking 
various actions on an urgent basis, amongst them, to: 
Actively engage in discussions and the exchange of views in the Preparatory Committee 
established by General Assembly resolution 69/292: Development of an international legally 
binding instrument under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on the conserva-
tion and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction, so 
that the General Assembly can, before the end of its seventy-second session, taking into account 
the report of the Preparatory Committee to the Assembly, decide on the convening and on the 
starting date of an intergovernmental conference67; 
Although the relevance of an international legally binding instrument’s develop-
ment on the protection and sustainable use of areas beyond national jurisdiction’s 
marine biological diversity, it should be noted that the instruments already in force 
under the Convention on the Law of the Sea68 can assist on the sustainable develop-
ment goal 14’s implementation.  
 
66
 See UN, Our Ocean, our future, cit. supra note 51, para. 11. 
67
 Ibid., para. 13 (a). 
68
 The Fish Stocks Agreement is an important instrument to SIDS because of its impact on the economy 
of these Countries. This agreement sets out principles to ensure conservation and promote the objective of 
the optimum utilization of fisheries resources both within and beyond exclusive economic zone by estab-
lishing detailed minimum international standards for managing and protecting straddling fish stocks and 
highly migratory fish stocks, ensuring that measures taken for this purpose in areas under national jurisdic-
tion and in the adjacent high seas are compatible and coherent “The United Nations Agreement for the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 
1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks (in force as from 11 December 2001) Overview”, available at: <http://www.un.org/depts/los/con-
vention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm >. 
The Agreement relating to the implementation of United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’s 
Part XI is also an important instrument due to the oceans’ transboundary nature. This Agreement addresses 
certain difficulties with the seabed mining provisions contained in Part XI of the Convention related to the 
area. 
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Still, the obligations within UNCLOS’ implementation doesn’t resolve all prob-
lems that low-lying States face and that are caused by climate change and human 
actions on the environment, especially those related to forced human mobility, a 
topic that is not even superficially addressed in the international documents of the 
law of the sea. For this reason, the Ocean Conference is so important, and should be 
analyzed in detail. 
During the Ocean Conference finalization, Ms. Isabella Lövin, Minister for In-
ternational Development and Climate of Sweden69, stated “I truly believe this con-
ference will constitute the game changer we so desperately need. Now the work re-
ally begins to save our oceans"70. The question is whether this Conference will be a 
real game changer for those mostly affected by the severe impacts of climate change 
and the marine environment degradation, the Low-lying States? 
Minister Isabella Lövin’s declaration is related to the political engagement that 
has been mobilized during this Conference. All 193 United Nations Member States 
unanimously agreed to a set of measures that aim to contribute to reverse the decline 
of the oceans71. Also, as we already said, the event resulted in 1,402 voluntary com-
mitments from countries, NGOs, companies and other stakeholders72, and this num-
ber can still increase as the registry remains open for new commitments.  
However, none of the commitments made were focused on measures to deal with 
the forced displacement problem that countries like Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kir-
ibati are dealing. The human mobility issue was not included in such commitments.  
Among the 2030 Agenda’targets to implement Sustainable Development Goal 
 
UNCLOS’s relevance itself should also be highlighted, as well as its Part XII regulating the marine 
environment’s protection and preservation. This is a legally binding Convention that establishes States’ 
obligations to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environment, also predicts the need of 
global and regional cooperation to achieve this goal, and mechanisms to monitor and assess the marine 
environment. Finally, the Convention on the Law of the Sea is important because it establishes the different 
maritime zones, and the Coastal States’ obligations for each area, including the obligations related to the 
marine resources’ and marine environment’s protection. See UN, Convention on the Law of the Sea, cit. 
supra note 36. 
69
 The Ocean Conference was co-chaired by Sweden and Fiji. 
70
 Minister for International Development and Climate of Sweden Government Offices of Sweden. 
“The Ocean Conference”, 9 june 2017, available at: http://www.government.se/government-policy/the-
ocean-conference/ 
71
 United Nations, “Countries agree on decisive and urgent actions to restore marine world to health 
as Ocean Conference concludes”, available at: https: <//oceanconference.un.org/prjune9 > 
72
 See UN, Voluntary commitments, cit. supra note 46. 
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14, targets 14.273, 14.174 and 14.a75, received the largest number of voluntary commit-
ments76, and they are directly related to the problems faced by low-lying States.  
As already highlighted above, a series of voluntary commitments related to the 
increase of the resilience of SIDS were presented, stands out measures of efficient 
removal of plastic pollution at large-scale and from aquatic ecosystems77, education 
programmes on the impacts of marine pollution and on the importance of managing 
their marine resources in a sustainable manner78, among others. 
Some of the commitments are more important because will be fulfilled directly 
in low-lying States, such as the two that will be described below, and could be used 
not only to improve the lives and the environment to their inhabitants but also as a 
model to other States facing with the same kind of vulnerability. 
 
73
 “By 2020, sustainably manage and protect marine and coastal ecosystems to avoid significant ad-
verse impacts, including by strengthening their resilience, and take action for their restoration in order to 
achieve healthy and productive oceans”. See UN, Transforming our world, cit. supra note 61. 
74
 “By 2025, prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds, in particular from land-
based activities, including marine debris and nutrient pollution”. Ibid. 
75
 “Increase scientific knowledge, develop research capacity and transfer marine technology, taking 
into account the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission Criteria and Guidelines on the Transfer of 
Marine Technology, in order to improve ocean health and to enhance the contribution of marine biodiver-
sity to the development of developing countries, in particular small island developing States and least de-
veloped countries”. Ibid. 
76
 718, 549 and 543 voluntary commitment, respectively. 
77
 The Ocean Cleanup it is an organization committed to efficiently remove plastic pollution at large-
scale and from aquatic ecosystems, covering SDG target 14.1. The expectation is to deploy their first clean-
up system in mid-2018. United Nations, “The Ocean Cleanup”, available at: <https://oceanconfer-
ence.un.org/commitments/?id=15227> 
78
 WiseOceans is an initiative from the private sector devoted to marine education as a manner to 
increase people’s knowledge on the oceans and the impact they have on them. They pledged to create a 
section in their website and social media platforms to educate the audience on the impacts of marine pol-
lution, specifically plastics, and on their land-based sources, by 2018, with an interactive approach, leading 
the audience to pick one commitments to reduce their plastic consumption. United Nations, “WiseOceans 
commitment to marine education and reduction of marine plastic”, available at: <https://oceanconfer-
ence.un.org/commitments/?id=20396 > 
“WiseOceans in collaboration with their partners, Four Seasons Resort Seychelles, recently reported 
that they have successfully launched a programme with Baie Lazare Primary School in Seychelles, man-
groves being one of the topics covered. The programme includes traditional classroom based sessions (in-
volving a presentation), and a field trip. Additionally, the children of the programme has created a mural 
for their school wall on mangroves. The programme is being promoted through social media channels, and 
has been recognized by the Ministry of Education, Seychelles”. Ibid. WiseOceans’ commitment it is im-
portant not only because it aims to implement SDG target 14.1, but also because it is a pledge related to 
target 14.7, which intends to increase the sustainable use of marine resources’ economic benefits for SIDS. 
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The Phoenix Islands Protected Area (“PIPA”) Conservation Trust is a NGO 
launched the bring PIPA home initiative to help enabling the biodiversity and sus-
tainability values to be more accessible to the Kiribati public. The project covers 
SDG targets 14.1, 14.2, 14.579, 14.a., and has registered five commitments, among 
them: to scope and guide the establishment of 8 community Marine Protected Areas 
in other regions of Kiribati by 2025, consistent with SDG 14.5; support mangrove 
replanting in Kiribati’s Gilbert and Line Islands; support in banning the use of single 
plastic bag; and supporting coastal clean-up based on governmental involvement, as 
well as private sector’s and local communities’ engagement80. 
The World Team Project: Sustainable Solutions Oceans Opportunities & Small 
Island States (“SOS-IS”) it is a NGO that has as its goals to build renewable energy 
micro grids toward energy independence, clean water and power, biodiversity pro-
tection, and leading technology demonstration. The Project has been assessing and 
removing invasive species, and replanting mangroves in Fiji as part of their voluntary 
commitment, and they are also reaching out to various stakeholders and donors in 
New York and California in order to bring additional resources81.  
This is another example of commitment that is being implemented in a low-lying 
State and could serve as a model to increase their resilience against climate change’s 
adverse effects. 
These were just a few voluntary commitments that were made by stakeholders to 
assist SD Goal 14’s implementation in accordance with the Conference final docu-
ment. In addition, the Call for action established the need to adopt various measures 
to conserve and sustainably use of the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustain-
able development, among them a few should be underlined for their connection with 
low-lying States’ vulnerability:  
(g) Accelerate actions to prevent and significantly reduce marine pollution of all kinds 
[…]; (j) Support the use of effective and appropriate area-based management tools […];(k) 
 
79
 “By 2020, conserve at least 10 per cent of coastal and marine areas, consistent with national and 
international law and based on the best available scientific information”. See UN, Transforming our world, 
cit. supra note 61.  
80
 Phoenix Islands Protected Area (PIPA): Bring PIPA Home. Available on: <https://oceanconfer-
ence.un.org/commitments/?id=20784 >  
81
 The World Team Project: Sustainable Solutions Oceans Opportunities & Small Island States (SOS-
IS). Available on: <https://oceanconference.un.org/commitments/?id=21714 >  
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Develop and implement effective adaptation and mitigation measures that contribute to in-
creasing and supporting resilience to ocean and coastal acidification, sea level rise and in-
crease in ocean temperatures, and to addressing the other harmful impacts of climate change 
on the ocean as well as coastal and blue carbon ecosystems[…];(l) Enhance sustainable fish-
eries management, including to restore fish stocks in the shortest time feasible at least to 
levels that can produce maximum sustainable yield as determined by their biological char-
acteristics […];(q) Support the promotion and strengthening of sustainable ocean-based 
economies, which, inter alia, build on sustainable activities […]82. 
Despite the substantial engagement from States and the stakeholders that made 
voluntary commitments in approving the UN Ocean’s Declaration, it should be 
stressed that this is not a legally binding instrument, being considered by the inter-
national legal regime as soft law, which may hamper the predicted actions’ imple-
mentation. 
For that reason, many member States and stakeholders underscored at the Ocean 
Conference that, in order to ensure that all Nations are working to meet their Goal 
14 implementation obligations, an effective follow up to the Ocean Conference 
would be crucial83-. 
Participants from governments, UN system and other stakeholders took part in 
the first webinar in September 2017, which aimed at discussing arrangements for 
following up on voluntary commitments related to mangroves. The United Nations 
will organize a series of global webinars, to provide a virtual platform where all ac-
tors can share updates on the implementation of their commitments84. 
Nevertheless, because of this declaration’s soft law nature, it is important to seek 
the protection and sustainable use of oceans and their resources by implementing the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and its instruments, because their legally binding 
nature, which usually compels States to be more committed to complying with as-
sumed international obligations.  
 
82
 See UN, Our Ocean, our future, cit. supra note 51, para. 13. 
83
 See UN, Voluntary commitments, cit. supra note 46. This concern and desire on the follow-up to 
the Conference led member States to agree to include it in the declaration “Our Ocean, our future: call for 
action”, including: “(t) Welcome follow-up on the partnership dialogues and commit to implementing our 
respective voluntary commitments made in the context of the Conference; (u) Contribute to the follow-up 
and review process of the 2030 Agenda by providing an input to the high-level political forum on sustain-
able development on the implementation of Goal 14, including on opportunities to strengthen progress in 
the future”. See UN, Our Ocean, our future, cit. supra note 51, para. 13. 
84
 United Nations, “The UN follows up on the Ocean Conference Voluntary Commitments for the 
implementation of Sustainable Development Goal 14”, available at: <https://oceanconference.un.org/UN-
follows-up-on-the-Ocean-Conference-Voluntary-Commitments >  
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In the end, the Conference did not address urgent measures to assist Low-Lying 
States facing an imminent migratory crisis, the focus was on the sustainable use of 
the oceans and on enhancing the resilience of the affected populations, which is the 
main focus of SD Goal 14. 
It can be inferred from the commitments made, as well as from the measures 
proposed in the call for action, that once again the international community has failed 
to address and develop immediate solutions for the forced human mobility of Low-
Lying States populations caused by environmental degradation, in this case espe-
cially by the oceans conditions. 
The UN Ocean Conference was an event centered around the environmental is-
sues related to oceans and seas that discussed the importance and the means to im-
plement SD Goal 14 and its targets. For that reason, measures to directly solve the 
Low-Lying States migration emergency weren’t discussed, but the actions suggested 
during the Ocean Declaration, and also the voluntary commitments will assist those 
Countries in enhancing their resilience against adverse effects of climate change and 
human actions on the environment, especially on the marine environment. 
As already underlined most of the population of low-lying States don’t want to 
leave their countries, that is why the discussion of the adoption of effective and im-
mediate resilience measures is so important to them. 
As the Ocean Declaration reminded, all the Sustainable Development Goals are 
integrated and have an indivisible character, especially to the people living in States 
that are severely affected by the human impact on nature, such as the low-lying 
States, because of that it is necessary to seek the implementation not only of the SDG 
14, but the implementation of the 2030 Agenda as a whole, so that countries facing 
the greatest climate, economic and social vulnerability can be able to resist the cli-
matic adversities. 
As recognized by the President of the UN General Assembly, Peter Thomson, 
one of the most important outcomes of the Conference was to raise awareness of the 
international community on the decline of ocean’s health85. If this awareness will be 
enough to prompt stakeholders to take urgent and effective measures to improve the 
health of the oceans and seas and increase the resilience of countries most dependent 
on them to the effects of climate change, only time will show. 
 
85
 United Nations, “Countries agree on decisive and urgent actions to restore marine world to health 
as Ocean Conference concludes”, available at: <https://oceanconference.un.org/prjune9 > 
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5. – Conclusion 
The United Nations Ocean Conference was an important step towards the sus-
tainable development goals’ implementation, especially for countries that rely on the 
oceans, whether for economic reasons or even for their survival in the face of the 
adverse effects of climate change, which is the case of the Low-Lying States. 
The Conference generated a momentum for the discussion on the topic and suc-
ceeded in involving all Member States of the UN General Assembly that agreed to 
adopt the measures proposed in the final document, as well as the event was able to 
draw attention to the importance of marine resources and to its current state of deg-
radation,  more than 1400 voluntary commitments related to the implementation of 
the SDG 14 objectives were made, until now, by States, NGOs, companies and other 
sectors of society. 
This Conference’s focus wasn’t on immediate measures to resolve the migratory 
emergency of some of the Low-Lying States, but on measures to increase resilience 
and restore the living conditions of marine resources. However, the importance of 
such measures to these countries can’t be denied, since the majority of their popula-
tion, as well as their governments, understand that migratory measures should be 
treated as a last resort. 
The great issue that will define whether the Ocean Conference, in fact, repre-
sented a game changer for low-lying States, will be the cooperation and participation 
of stakeholders in order to effectively implement the actions and commitments un-
dertaken, so that such proposals will cease to be only promises and could become 
reality.  
Even though low-lying States are the countries most affected by the degradation 
of the oceans, they are the ones that generate the least environmental impacts in re-
lation to them, so they have no means to resolve the problem without global involve-
ment and engagement. 
Finally, it is emphasized that the Declaration of the Oceans is a soft law docu-
ment, therefore, one of the most effective means of ensuring the implementation of 
the commitments made especially by the Member States of the United Nations will 
be through the effective Convention on the Law of the Sea’s and of its legally binding 
instruments’ implementation. 
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1. – Introduction and Key Concepts 
In the absence of international legal instruments to ensure that appropriate assis-
tance is provided to those who have been forced to relocate due to a disaster, the 
Nansen Initiative was launched in 2012 by the governments of Switzerland and Nor-
way. The protection agenda lists priority areas for future actions at national, sub-
regional and international level. In 2014, led by the United States Government and 
the Philippines, the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative (MICIC) was created 
to improve the protection of migrants in countries where they experience conflict or 
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natural disaster. The initiatives have identified a wide range of assistance measures 
for displaced persons, including, for example, the issuance of visas, the granting of 
refugee status in exceptional cases, or the issuance of work permits. Issued in June 
2016, the Guidelines to Protect Migrants in Countries Experiencing Conflict or Nat-
ural Disaster1 contain guidance that contributes to a comprehensive approach to 
cross-border communication after disaster, including through disaster risk manage-
ment in the country of origin. Interestingly, the Initiatives do not establish new in-
ternational legal obligations, do not limit or replace existing frameworks. They pro-
vide practical, non-binding and voluntary guidelines for states, international organi-
zations and civil society to help migrants before, during and after emergencies. 
Initiatives use terms such as “disaster”, “disaster displacement”, ”environmental 
migrant”. The term ”disaster” refers to disruptions triggered by or linked to hydro-
metrological and climatological natural hazards, including hazards linked to anthro-
pogenic global warming, as well as geophysical hazards. The term “disaster displace-
ment” refers to situations where people are forced or obliged to leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence as a result of a disaster or in order to avoid the impact of 
an immediate and foreseeable natural hazard. 2, It should be noted that disaster dis-
placement can occur within a country causing an internal displacement, or across 
international borders, which results in cross-border disaster-displacement. Accord-
ing to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,  
“internally displaced persons are individuals or groups of persons who have been forced 
or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a 
result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, 
violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an 
internationally recognized state border.” 3  
The term “environmental migrant” was adopted by the International Organiza-
tion for Migration (IOM). According to IOM; “Environmental migrants are persons 
or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the envi-
ronment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave 
 
1
 Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative, Guidelines To Protect Migrants In Countries Experiencing 
Conflict Or Natural Disaster, (2016). 
2The Nansen Initiative Global Consultation. Conference Report, Geneva, 12-13 October 2015 (2015), 
p.28  
3
 Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng, submitted pursuant to 
Commission resolution 1997/39. Addendum: Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998), UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2, 11 February 1998. 
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their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently, and who 
move either within their territory or abroad.”4 
According to existing legal regulations there are distinguished two types of dis-
asters: a) Slow-onset disasters, which take a long time to produce emergency condi-
tions, for instance natural disasters such as drought or socio-economic decline, which 
are normally accompanied by early warning signs 5; b) Sudden-onset disasters, which 
are both “natural” disasters (e.g. earthquakes, hurricanes, floods) and man-made or 
“complex” disasters (e.g. sudden conflict situations arising from varied political fac-
tors), for which there is little or no warning. 6 Both types of the disasters may cause 
extensive migration movements.  
1.1. – Outline of the Problem 
Displacement of people living in a country or region, change of residence, called 
migration, is a common phenomenon. Such activities date back to the Palaeolithic period 
when prehistoric spread of human species took place, related to the search for food, sea-
sonal or environmental changes. Migration is a very dynamic and heterogeneous pro-
cess. Hence, in the demographic and sociological studies, various qualification criteria 
for migration are taken into account in terms of duration (permanent, seasonal and pen-
dulum), range (internal and external), causes (economic, political, coercive, environ-
mental), forms (immigration, emigration, repatriation, refugee, deportation, evacuation), 
and legality (legal, illegal)7, 8. However, it has been recently that environmental migration 
has brought more attention to society, non-governmental organizations and academics, 
and to a political scene. This is mainly due to observed large-scale migration caused by 
natural disasters, which, according to numerous scientific analyses, are associated with 
climate change and the degradation of the environment. 
The causes of global warming remain the subject of research. The first results of 
the Cosmic Leaving Outdoor Droplets (CLOUD) experiment show that the impact 
of external factors on the Earth’s climate is much higher than previously thought. 
One of the key factors shaping the climate is the formation of clouds. CERN experi-
ence has shown that cosmic rays play a key role in this process, which accelerates 
 
4
 International Organization for Migration (ed.), Discussion Note: Migration and the Environment, 
MC/INF/288-1’ (2007). 
5
 Glossary of Humanitarian Terms (2008), available at www.reliefweb.int/glossaries. 
6
 Glossary of Humanitarian Terms (2008) available at www.reliefweb.int/glossaries. 
7
 CASTLES, MILLER, “The Age of Migration: International Population Movements In the Modern 
World”, American Foreign Policy Interests (2005), pp.537-541. 
8
 CLIFFORD JANSEN, “Migration: a sociological problem”, in C.J. Jansen (ed.) Readings in the Sociol-
ogy of Migration, 1970, Oxford: Pergamon Press, pp. 3-35... 
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cloud formation around aerosols in the atmosphere. One of the theories related to 
CERN studies assumes that the most important factors shaping our plane’ts climate 
are Sun, volcanoes, climate change from other natural sources, and human-induced 
changes9. In addition, greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) absorb heat (infrared 
radiation) emitted from the Earth’s surface. Increasing concentrations of these gases 
in the atmosphere lead to warming up the Earth by capturing more of this heat. While 
these greenhouse gases represent a fraction of the percentage of Earth’s atmosphere, 
their impact on the climate is enormous. As a result of human activity - especially 
through the burning of fossil fuels, the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere has 
increased.10 Both in short and long term, climate change will lead to increased 
drought, land degradation, desertification, salinization, coastal erosion, sea level rise 
and flood intensity, tropical cyclones and other geophysical events. Detailed research 
has shown that warming up during this time is mainly due to increased concentra-
tions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. Constant emissions of these gases can 
cause further climate change,11 including a significant increase in global average sur-
face temperature and significant regional climate change.  
Consequently, climate fluctuations leading to changes in the environment funda-
mentally influence the situation of people on many levels. Limited access to water 
supply, loss of yields and food production, loss of livelihoods and health issues, force 
people to leave their homes and migrate. Obviously, this can create conflicts between 
migrants and local communities. It is pointed out that one of the reasons for the out-
break of the current Syrian conflict was also environmental change12,13. At the end of 
2010, The New York Times reported that after four consecutive years of the worst 
drought in 40 years, agricultural areas in Syria, along with adjacent areas in Iraq, 
were seriously threatened:  
 
9
 SeeDUNNE et al., “Global atmospheric particle formation from CERN CLOUD measurements”, Sci-
ence, 2016, pp. 1119-1124 
10
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change , Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change, 2007. 
11
 See more about the effects of greenhouse gas emissions in RIPPLE, WOLF, NEWSOME, GALETTI, 
ALAMGIR, CRIST, MAHMOUD, LAURANCE, and 15,364 scientist signatories from 184 countries, “World Sci-
entists’ Warning to Humanity: A Second Notice”, BioScience, 2017, pp. 1026-1028 
12
 KELLY, MOHTADI, CANE , SEAGER, KUSHNIR, “Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and im-
plications of the recent Syrian drought”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the 
United States of America, 2015, pp. 3241-3246 
13
 SALMAN, MUALLA. “Water demand management in Syria: Centralized and decentralized 
views”,Water Policy , 2008, pp. 549-565. 
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“Ancient irrigation systems have collapsed, underground water sources have run dry and 
hundreds of villages have been abandoned as farmlands turn to cracked desert and grazing 
animals die off. Sandstorms have become far more common, and vast tent cities of dispos-
sessed farmers and their families have risen up around the larger towns and cities of Syria 
and Iraq.”14. 
Many of the Syrian farms have reduced or stopped food production. This in turn 
has led to an increase in unemployment and, consequently, to the dissatisfaction of 
society that has turned into an open conflict with the government.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicted in its first re-
port in 1990 that the most important consequence of climate change could be popu-
lation migration 15. It has been estimated that as many as 25 million people were 
forced to leave homes and areas of residence as a result of a number of serious envi-
ronmental pressures, including pollution, land degradation, droughts, and natural dis-
asters. It was also claimed that that the number of “ecological refugees”, as they were 
called, exceeded any documented number of refugees from caused by war and polit-
ical persecutions taken together16. Estimated value of 25 million of “ecological refu-
gees” was repeated in 2001 in the World Disasters Report of the Red Cross and the 
Red Crescent Societies. In October 2005, the UN’s Institute for Environment and 
Human Security warned that the international community should be prepared for an 
increase in the number of “ecological refugees” to 50 million, in 201017. Prof. My-
ers’s estimates of 200 million climate migrants by 2050 are widely cited in respected 
scientific publications, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change18.  
 
 
 
14
 Worth Robert F., “Earth Is Parched Where Syrian Farms Thrived”, The New York Times, 13 Octo-
ber, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/14/world/middleeast/14syria.html. 
15
 HOUGHTON, JENKINS AND. EPHRAUMS (eds.), Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment 
(1990), Report prepared for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by Working Group I, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, Great Britain, New York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia 
p. 223  
16
 MYERS, N. (2001), Environmental Refugees: Our Latest Understanding, Philosophical Trans-
actions of the Royal Society B: 356, pp. 1-5. 
17
 United Nations University, Institute of Environment and Human Security “As ranks of “Envi-
ronmental Refugees” swell worldwide, calls grow for better definition, recognition, support”, UN 
Day for Disaster Reduction, 12th October 2005, pp. 1-4. United Natons document,  
18
 STERN (ed.) (2006), The Economics of Climate change: the Stern review,, Cambridge, 2006, p. 
3.  
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1.2. – The Protection of Displaced Persons in the Context of Climate Change 
Impacts, Including Disasters, in International Law 
In such a changing world, it is necessary to modify the approach to migration. 
Displacement due to catastrophes is a global challenge in humanitarian law and hu-
man rights. Disasters undermine development and, in some situations, may affect 
safety. International law does not explicitly regulate the circumstances in which dis-
placed persons affected by disasters will find protection in another country and what 
rights they have during their stay. The problem is also the traditional definition of 
the term “refugee”, which, according to some observers, should take into account 
new situations and circumstances. The current debate on environmental migration 
also addresses the lack of binding terminology of the definition of migrants and en-
vironmental migration. While refugees who are fleeing persecution and war are pro-
tected by international law, it is not clear what conventions and policies effectively 
protect people displaced by natural disasters, including those related to climate 
change19. The most commonly used working definition is the already mentioned def-
inition developed by by IOM20. Many organizations and legal bodies point out the 
diversity of legal solutions applicable to environmental migration. They also under-
line the fact that environmental migrants are not refugees within the meaning of the 
Convention on the Status of Refugees, and that the persons affected by changes in 
the natural environment or forcibly displaced for that reason are not covered by ad-
equate legal protection. However, even though the lack of political will to establish 
a legal definition of an environmental refugee will have significant consequences for 
the international community’'s obligations under international law, changes in this 
situation should not be expected in the near future. There is also no consensus on the 
scale of the problem. As stated above, Myers21 have estimated that the number of 
environmental migrants may reach nearly 200 million in the near future, while 
 
19
 See: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change Secretariat, Norwegian Institute of International, National Center for Atmospheric Re-
search, United Nations University, International Institute for Environment and Development, Center for 
Unconventional Security Affairs, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford United Nations Habitat, 
The Nansen Conference: Climate Change and Displacement in the 21st Century , (2011), available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/521485ef4.html [accessed 11 April 2017]. 
20
 LACZKO. AND AGHAZARM. (eds.), Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the evi-
dence, IOM, Geneva, (2009). 
21
 Myers, N. (2002). Environmental refugees: A growing phenomenon of the 21st century. Philosoph-
ical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences. 357. 609-13. 
10.1098/rstb.2001.0953. and Myers, N. (2001), Environmental Refugees: Our Latest Understanding, 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: 356, pp. 1-5 
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Black22 presents an opinion that there are no environmental migrants, and that deser-
tification, for example, is only a result of vegetation response to rainfall fluctuations.  
It is a fact that people who leave their current place of residence for environmen-
tal reasons do not belong to one particular category and fall outside systems of pro-
tection currently provided for by the international community. Terms such as “envi-
ronmental refugee”, “ecological refugee” or “climate refugee” do not have legal 
grounds in the international refugee law. According to UNHCR, the use of these 
terms should be avoided as they may be misleading and potentially violate the inter-
national legal system for the protection of refugees. Indeed, many difficulties appear 
when it comes to distinguishing between “forced” and “voluntary” migration related 
to environmental factors, except in the case of near and sudden disasters. Despite 
growing importance in the political, national and international arena, environmental 
migration is still not regulated in the international legal framework. There are, how-
ever, a number of international and regional instruments that could be relevant as 
regards the various forms of displacement associated natural disasters and climate 
change, but these instruments have not been applied in such circumstances. Simi-
larly, they have not been applied to people who cannot return because of long-term 
effects of climate change in their current place of residence. Even the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its 1997 Kyoto Protocol 
do not deal with human migration. These instruments focus on mitigating and adapt-
ing to climate change and the associated funding and support mechanisms. However, 
positive efforts have been made in the context of the Cancun agreement of 2010, 
which calls on all parties to take appropriate measures, including “actions to improve 
understanding, coordination and cooperation related to national, regional and inter-
national resettlement, migration and planned resettlement”23.  
It is also worth mentioning that the International Law Commission (“ILC” ) is 
involved in the development of legal rules on the protection of persons in the event 
of natural disasters.24  
In summary, transboundary movements caused by natural disasters represent a 
serious problem that has been particularly aggravated in recent years as a result of 
global warming. National and international measures to protect people affected by a 
disaster are inadequate. In effect, resettled people are protected in their own country 
 
22
 BLACK., , “Environmental refugees: myth or reality?”, New Issues in refugee research, Working 
Paper No. 34, University of Sussex, 2001, pp. 1-20 
23
 UNFCCC (2010). The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group 
on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention.FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, (2011), para. 14 (f).  
24
 All documentation related to the ILC’s work on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters 
is available at: http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/6_3.htm. 
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by the UN Guidelines on internal displacement25 and by regional instruments, but 
there is a gap in legislation regarding cross-border movements caused by natural dis-
asters. Usually, as indicated above, such persons are not victims of persecution and 
therefore they are not protected under the UN Refugee Convention. Further, human 
Rights Conventions do not regulate key aspects such as the right to enter the country, 
settlement and basic rights of those affected. There are also no criteria to distinguish 
between cross-border movements caused by natural disasters and voluntary migra-
tion. . It is well known that there are regions, such as the Pacific Ocean area, where 
population movements are caused by several factors (?). They are caused by natural 
hazards, but also by lack of resilience, existing legal gaps or lack of development. In 
some other regions conflicts and violence are constantly erupting, which is especially 
true for the Horn of Africa. In this region we observe direct link between the impact 
of natural threats and the ongoing conflicts. Clear example of that is an armed con-
flict in Somalia or the conflict between communities in countries like Kenya and 
Uganda, which proliferates as a result of declining amount of natural resources. Lo-
cal shepherds are losing their lands due to ongoing drought, and subsequently they 
try to migrate to other, unaffected by the disaster areas. On the way they are met by 
other communities, what often results in escalating conflicts around access to water 
and grazing areas.  
2. – A Challenge towards a Global Protection Agenda  
The analysis of law, the activities of relevant institutions and the activities related 
to the protection and assistance of displaced persons as a result of disasters, indicates 
the lack of readiness for a quick and effective response. It is important to look at 
these situations in a multidimensional manner, and good solutions must concern not 
only natural threats but also holistic approaches that take into account a dimension 
of a conflict. For this reason, attention should be paid to the need for a holistic ap-
proach focused on human security in the context of environmental migration, to reg-
ulate all forms of mobility in a comprehensive way, placing environmental migrants 
at the centre of attention rather than focusing on formal legal categories.26  
 
25
 United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Situations of Migrants in 
Transit, Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/StudyMi-
grants/OHCHR_2016_Report-migrants-transit_EN.pdf., pp. 7-24. 
26
 See: Discussion note: Migration and the Environent (2007)MC/INF/288, available at 
http://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/site/myjahiasite/shared/shared/mainsite/micro-
sites/IDM/workshops/evolving_global_economy_2728112007/MC_INF_288_EN.pdf. Some more 
ecplaination may be found in: World Migration 2008: Managing Labour Mobility in the Evolving 
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It is also worth noting that there is currently no international agency or organiza-
tion specifically authorized to protect and support people affected by disasters. Fur-
thermore, the lack of data and general gaps in knowledge of cross-border movements 
resulting from natural disasters make it difficult to develop appropriate measures. 
The problem is also to study the influence of particular elements of the natural envi-
ronment on the decisions of individuals or communities. Climate change migrations 
- both internal and external – take different forms and require different responses at 
national, sub-regional, regional and international levels to address the specificity of 
different situations. National legislation, policies and institutions will be crucial for 
developing appropriate responses to both internal and external dimensions of climate 
change migration. Collaboration between the country of origin and the country of 
refuge is important, as well as cooperation with international community with a view 
to supporting the reception of displaced persons across borders and finding lasting 
solutions. The main goal seems to be to set up preventive measures that meet the 
needs of people and communities who are displaced by natural hazards and adverse 
effects of climate change across borders. Thus, the paradigm of refugees is not ideal. 
New actions are needed, with innovative solutions. And more importantly, when 
conditions of an environment deteriorate, for example due to droughts or floods, 
people should be able to move freely, voluntarily, in order to adapt to these chal-
lenges. Voluntary migration as an adaptation is, in these situations, a true coping 
strategy. In order to achieve this goal, technical assistance and capacity building may 
provide a basis for raising community awareness to political level and to complement 
and strengthen national adaptation policy. Preventive measures and effective prac-
tices in appropriate areas, including disaster risk reduction, climate change adapta-
tion and humanitarian responses, are therefore essential. 
Taking all of the above mentioned factors into consideration, it was necessary to 
find solutions that would reduce a tension between the need for security, on the one 
hand, and the need for people to move to at least temporarily escape difficult situa-
tion, on the other. Such gaps often provide inadequate protection and assistance to 
those displaced by disasters. In order to fill these gaps, an intergovernmental process 
is required, for example through more effectively organizing such population move-
ments. Good example could be seen in northern Kenya, where effective mediation 
between the host communities and the shepherds arriving from the other side of the 
border was undertaken. It is important to bear in mind that the challenges of mobility 
 
Global Economy, IOM, Geneva, available at http://www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/cache/offonce/pid/ 
1674?entryId=20275, p. 399. 
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do not just address the humanitarian issue. They are also related to underdevelop-
ment issues, as displacement adversely affects development, and development inter-
ventions can help prevent displacement by stabilizing the situation. From the per-
spective of climate change so far observed by scientists, it can be concluded that, 
regardless of whether or not greenhouse gas emissions are reduced, more people will 
move, especially because of rising desertification, droughts, hurricanes and rising 
sea levels. Therefore, countries should be prepared for what is already easy to predict 
and try to develop a whole set of tools to help meet these challenges.  
In response to the needs and questions presented above a chance for better protec-
tion of persons displaced by natural disasters has arisen through the Nansen Initiative. 
Also, in 2016 the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative (MICIC) was undertaken, 
which led to Guidelines for the Protection of Migrants in Countries experiencing Con-
flict or Natural Disasters. These projects aim to meet the demand for normative and 
institutional measures to protect displaced persons. The government of Nepal de-
scribed the Nansen Initiative as “one of the most effective forums to accelerate collab-
orative efforts among all the related stakeholders to tackle these issues”. 
3. – Goal and Scope of the Nansen Initiative 
The purpose of this program is to create a framework and identify effective prac-
tices to strengthen the protection of displaced persons as a result of disasters as well 
as for humanitarian reasons, and to launch international solidarity with affected com-
munities. It also aims at providing guidelines on improving the management of the 
risk of resettlement in the country of origin, through better monitoring of risk factors 
and their minimization, facilitating migration from hazardous areas, as well as 
promptly taking action in the event of a catastrophe and after a catastrophe. The ini-
tiative also identifies opportunities to enhance the role of local communities in ad-
dressing natural disasters. The comprehensive approach of the Agenda is to address 
the protection and assistance needs of people who have been resettled abroad and, at 
the same time, to respond to the needs of internally displaced persons. 
The initiative deals with catastrophes such as floods, droughts, cyclones, melting 
of glaciers, earthquakes, tsunamis, and eruptions of volcanoes. The Agenda also 
takes into account the effects of both emergency and slow-moving threats, including 
those related to the adverse effects of climate change. 
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3.1. – Global Consultations on Migration 
The bottom-up consultation process, aimed at identifying effective practices and 
building consensus on key principles and elements to meet the needs for the protec-
tion and assistance of people resettled across borders in the context of natural disas-
ters, including the adverse effects of climate change, has been launched by the Gov-
ernments of Norway and Switzerland, in October 2012. The initiative was supported 
by Australia, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Germany, Kenya, Mexico and the Philippines 
and accompanied by the Group of Friends co-chaired by Morocco and the European 
Union. This provided an opportunity to undertake many activities, such as the adop-
tion of paragraph 14 point f)of the regulatory framework for adaptation to guidelines 
provided by Cancun Treaty, according to which states have been invited to “better 
understand, coordinate” and cooperate on resettlement, climate change migration 
and resettlement, where appropriate, at national, regional and international level.The 
Nansen Initiative Protection Agenda has been endorsed by 109 governmental dele-
gations during a Global Consultation in October 2015, which gathered a total of 361 
representatives from states, international organizations, academia and civil society.  
In the context of the Nansen Initiative on Disaster-Induced Cross-Border Dis-
placement was also drafted a Guide to Effective Practices for member countries of 
the Regional Conference on Migration (RCM) to create more harmonised responses 
to disaster-related movement.27  
The Platform on Disaster Displacement constitutes the next stage and aims at the 
implementation of the Protection Agenda. the Platform, launched at the World Hu-
manitarian Summit in Istanbul, in May 2016, was created as a follow-up mechanism. 
It has started work during the German term of office since July 2016. Many coun-
tries, including Switzerland, declared that they will continue to be active in its efforts 
in this field and support the implementation of the Protection Agenda as a member 
of the platform. According to Elizabeth Ferris, a member of the Consultative Com-
mittee, one of the Nansen Initiative’s strengths was its focus on ‘very concrete tools 
which can be used to help governments and others which are faced with the reality 
of cross-border movements occurring because of disasters, such as humanitarian vi-
sas, stays of deportation, bilateral or regional arrangements on free movement of 
persons, etc.’.28  
 
27
 Protection for Persons Moving across Borders in the Context of Disasters: A Guide to Effective 
Practices for RCM Member Countries (2016). The RCM Member Countries are Belize, Canada, Costa 
Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and the United 
States.. 
28
 FERRIS, ‘Climate Change, Migration and the Incredibly Complicated Task of Influencing Policy’ 
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The Initiative Program is essentially based on three pillars:  
1) the concept of a comprehensive approach to disaster mobility, focusing 
primarily on the protection of internationally displaced people; 
2) the compilation of effective practices that can be used to ensure more 
effective future responses to such resettlement;  
3) stressing the need to link many policies and activities and to ensure better 
cooperation between them. 
Three priority areas for further action to address the gaps identified by the pro-
gram are:  
1) data collection and awareness raising on cross-border disaster recovery; 
2) increasing the use of humanitarian protection measures for transnationally 
displaced persons as a result of disaster, including mechanisms for 
sustainable solutions, for example by harmonizing approaches at sub-
regional and regional level;  
3) strengthening disaster risk management in the country of origin by: 
combining mobility of people as a part of disaster risk reduction, climate 
change mitigation strategies and other relevant strategies; facilitating 
migration in dignity as a potentially positive way to deal with the effects of 
natural hazards and climate change; improving the use of scheduled 
relocations as a means of preventing or responding to catastrophic hazards 
and eliminating them; ensuring that the needs of IDPs (internally displaced 
persons) are addressed in detail by relevant statutory and policy provisions 
responsible for disaster risk management or internal dislocation.29 
In addition, there is a need to improve the coordination of the overall approach 
of governments to planning and response, which in turn includes the involvement of 
local authorities and affected communities. Regional coordination and planning are 
also crucial and can include  
“Regional consultation processes (on migration), human rights mechanisms, disaster risk 
management centres, climate change adaptation strategies, as well as common markets and 
free movement of persons”.30  
At international level, a wide range of institutions and organizations dedicated to 
 
(Speech delivered at the Conference on Human Migration and the Environment: Futures, Politics, Inven-
tion, Durham University,) 1 July 2015) 8 ???. 
29
 Ibid.10. 
30
 Ibid. 
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humanitarian actions, development projects, human rights, migration, refugee pro-
tection, disaster risk reduction, adaptation, climate change and development sectors 
can provide operational, technical and capacity building support.31  
As a result of implementing guidelines of the Nansen Initiative, The Sendai Frame-
work for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 was undertaken32. It focuses on displace-
ment in response to extreme events and provides solutions to protect people moving due 
to/in anticipation of gradual changes in climate. As a result of joint efforts, the Sendai 
framework includes an important step on human mobility in the context of disasters.33 It 
aims to significantly reduce the risk of catastrophes and loss of life, livelihoods, health 
and assets. Sendai Framework recognizes that resettlement is one of the most destructive 
effects of natural disasters and that the reduction of the risk of natural disasters requires 
“protection of people and their property, health, livelihoods and resources, cultural and 
environmental resources, promoting and protecting all human rights”. National and local 
authorities, on the other hand, must “make regular preparations for disaster response, 
including evacuation, training and support systems, in order to ensure rapid and effective 
response to disasters, including access to safe shelters and food, depending on local 
needs”.34 It highlights the need to develop “public policies, where applicable, aimed at 
addressing the issues of prevention of human settlements in disaster risk-prone zones” 35 
and calls for the promotion of “cross-border cooperation in order to increase resilience 
and reduce the risk of disasters, including the risk of displacement”.36 Another step for-
ward has been taken thanks to the Paris Agreement, which calls for the establishment of 
a task force, under the auspices of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and 
Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts37 “to develop recommendations for 
 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, available at 
http://www.unisdr.org/files/43291_sendaiframeworkfordrren.pdf 
33
 Walter Kälin, “Sendai Framework: An Important Step Forward for People Displaced by Disasters”, 
Up Front, 20 March 2015, available at <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2015/03/20-sen-
dai-disasters-displaced-kalin>. 
34
 Ibid. para 33(h). 
35
 Ibid. para 27(k). 
36
 Ibid. para 28(d). 
37
 The 2012 Doha Decision 3/CP.18 acknowledged the need for ‘further work to advance the under-
standing of and expertise on loss and damage’, including ‘[h]ow impacts of climate change are affecting 
patterns of migration, displacement and human mobility’. See United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Eighteenth Session, Held in Doha from 26 
November to 8 December 2012, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (2013) para 7(a)(vi). Following on from 
that decision, in 2013 the Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage was created ‘to address loss and dam-
age associated with impacts of climate change, including extreme events and slow onset events, in devel-
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integrated approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to the adverse 
impacts of climate change’’.38  
3.2. – The Nansen Principles 
During the process of the Nansen Initiative ten Principles were stated. They con-
tain a set of recommendations for the emergence of climate change and other envi-
ronmental hazards. Principle I stresses the need to have the knowledge base needed 
to respond to climate change and mobility. According to Principle II, primary re-
sponsibility for the protection of the population affected by climate change and other 
environmental threats, including both displaced people and host communities endan-
gered by the process of resettlement, rests on the states that have to devise appropri-
ate legislation, policies and institutions, and allocate adequate resources. It has also 
been stressed that without the leadership and involvement of local governments and 
communities and the private sector, the challenge of climate change, including those 
related to human mobility (Principle III), cannot be effectively tackled. Where na-
tional capacity is limited, actions undertaken by governments on local level must be 
complemented by regional frameworks and international cooperation. Such cooper-
ation will help to build national capacity to prevent displacement, or provide assis-
tance and protection for people and communities affected by resettlement, and pro-
vide the basis for finding lasting solutions, as Principle IV points out. Therefore, it 
is particularly important to strengthen prevention, increase immunity in accordance 
with the Hyogo Framework39 (Principle V) and build local and national capacity to 
prepare and respond to catastrophes (Principle VI). Nansen’s principles also empha-
size that the existing norms of international law (Principle VII) should be fully ex-
ploited. With regard to internal displacement, they point out that “Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement provide a sound legal framework to address protection con-
cerns arising from climate- and other environment-tally-related internal displace-
ment” and urge states to “to ensure the adequate implementation and operationaliza-
tion of these principles through national legislation, policies and institutions” (Prin-
ciple VIII). At the same time, it indicates that “more coherent and consistent ap-
proach at the international level is needed to meet the protection needs of people 
 
oping countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change’. See United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change, Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage 
Associated with Climate Change Impacts, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (2014) para 1. 
38
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, UN 
Doc FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, (2015), para 49; see also para 50. 
39
 Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building Resilience of Nations and Communities to 
Disaster (2005). Extract from the final report of the World Conference on Disaster Reduction 
(A/CONF.206/6), available at www.unisdr.org/wcdr  
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displaced externally owing to sudden-onset disasters” and urges the development of 
a guiding framework or instrument by the states together with the UNHCR (Principle 
IX). The Principles conclude that “policies and responses, including planned reloca-
tion, need to be implemented on the basis of non-discrimination, consent, empower-
ment, participation and partnerships with those directly affected, with due sensitivity 
to age, gender and diversity aspects”, having regard to the voices of the displaced or 
those threatened with displacement (Principle X). 
Although the Nansen Principles are not universally accepted, they constitute a 
comprehensive normative framework, based on the principles of international law, 
human rights and good practices. The Principles fill the legal gap with regard to 
cross-border movements in the context of disasters and the effects of climate change 
that exist between national law, international human rights law, and the UN guide-
lines on internal resettlement and several regional instruments. Lastly, the Principles 
provide a good reference for further discussion on the interaction between human 
rights and climate change.  
4. – Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative: Background and Key 
Areas of the Protection Agenda 
The idea of “mini-multilateralism” has taken hold in the migration arena. The 
term refers to situations where a large number of states are unable to reach agreement 
through formal processes, and a smaller group takes action on a pressing issue.40 The 
Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative (MICIC) is an activity undertaken by the 
United States and the Philippines to improve the protection of migrants when the 
countries they live, work or learn in, experience a conflict or a natural disaster. This 
multilateral consultation process, was launched in 2014 at the Global Forum on Mi-
gration and Development (GFMD) in Stockholm, to develop non-binding, voluntary 
principles, guidelines and effective practices for states and other stakeholders to bet-
ter prepare, respond and address the long-term effects of migration from conflict-
affected countries. The co-chairs were joined by a working group comprised of the 
governments of Australia, Bangladesh, Costa Rica, and Ethiopia; the European Com-
mission; the International Organization for Migration (IOM); the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the Office of the UN Special Repre-
sentative of the Secretary General for International Migration; the International Cen-
 
40
 NAIM, “Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action”, Foreign Policy, 
2009, pp.3-4. 
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tre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD); and the Georgetown University In-
stitute for the Study of International Migration (ISIM). IOM serves as the Secretariat. 
In 2015 and 2016, the MICIC Initiative organized a number of consultations, includ-
ing six regional consultations, to develop a range of good practices in preparing and 
responding to these situations. Events, such as the 2015 Sendai World Conference 
on Disaster Risk Reduction, the 2015 GFMD in Istanbul, and the 2016 World Hu-
manitarian Summit in Istanbul, garnered additional perspectives.  
The scope of the MICIC Initiative is limited to migrants caught in countries ex-
periencing specific types of crises such as conflicts/civil unrest and natural disasters. 
The initiative encompasses all migrants/non-citizens, with or without legal status, 
who are present in a country temporarily or permanently at the time a crisis ensues.  
4.1. – The Principles, Guidelines, and Practices to Protect Migrants in 
Countries Experiencing Conflict or Natural Disaster. 
The results of the consultations contributed to a set of principles, guidelines, and 
practices that were presented on June 15, 2016 at the United Nations. The MICIC 
Guidelines do not create new international legal obligations nor limit and replace the 
existing frameworks. They provide practical, non-binding and voluntary guidelines 
for states, private sector entities and international organizations to protect and assist 
migrants before, during and after emergencies. The Guidelines also include general 
principles (foundational, cross-cutting ideas that inform and guide actions by all 
stakeholders to protect migrants) along with 15 thematic guidelines. Under the rules, 
basic rights and duties are distinguished - the duty to save lives during conflict or 
disasters is the first responsibility. Rule 6 explicitly states that “Migrants are rights 
holders and capable actors, resilient and creative in the face of adversities, not merely 
victims or passive recipients of assistance.41 States, private sector representatives, 
international organizations, and civil society can use the guidelines to inform and 
shape crisis preparedness, emergency response, and post crisis action”42. They were 
organized according to the division into the stages of the crisis: before, during and 
after the crisis. Each of them takes into account the application of specific practices, 
supporting their implementation. Specifically, crisis preparedness is discussed in de-
tail, as it is a time when many effective actions can be taken. The guidelines recom-
mend a continuous assessment of the situation and flexibility in adapting and intro-
ducing innovation where appropriate during the reaction period. They also demand 
to pay particular attention to the long-term needs of migrants displaced by conflicts 
 
41
 MICIC Guidelines to Protect Migrants In Countries Experiencing Conflict Or Natural Disaster 
(2016) 
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and natural disasters as well as the needs of the communities they can move to.  
Through the process of extensive consultation, the MICIC initiative seeks to im-
prove capacity of states and other stakeholders to effectively protect the dignity and 
rights of migrants from the affected countries. Where appropriate, the Initiative takes 
into account links with the international refugee protection system, but does not in-
tend to change existing practices in this area. 
Similarly as in the case of the Nansen Initiative, MICIC provides several princi-
ples that are fundamental, cross-cutting precepts, drawn, in some instances, from 
international law. The Principles are intended to inform, underpin, and guide actions 
to protect migrants.43 There are 10 basic Principles:  
 
1. All possible measures to save lives and provide migrants with the opportunity to move 
to a safe place and apply their right to leave any country in accordance with international 
law must be undertaken. 
2. All responses to crises and post-crisis situations should be respectful of the human rights 
of migrants, with particular regard to immigration status, gender, age, disability, sexual 
orientation, race, nationality or other characteristics that may limit access and safety. 
The principle of non-refoulement should be fully respected at all times. 
3. The main responsibility for the protection of migrants in their territories and their own 
citizens, including abroad, is borne by host countries and transit states that have obliga-
tions to all persons within their territories, irrespective of their immigration status. States 
of origin, on the other hand, are responsible for their citizens, even if they live, work, 
study or travel in other countries. 
4. The private sector, international organizations and civil society play an important role in 
the protection of migrants and in supporting countries in the protection of migrants. 
5. Humanitarian action to protect migrants should be guided by the principles of humanity, 
neutrality, impartiality, and independence. The purpose of humanitarian action is to pro-
tect life and health and to respect human beings. Humanity means that human suffering 
must be addressed wherever it is found. Neutrality means that humanitarian actors must 
not take sides in hostilities or engage in racial, religious, or ideological controversies. 
Impartiality means that humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need 
alone, without discrimination, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and 
making no distinction on the basis of immigration status or other grounds. Independence 
means that humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, mili-
tary, or other objectives of taking such action. 
6. Stakeholders should promote the participation and empowerment of all migrants, includ-
ing migrants of different ages, genders, and abilities in efforts related to crisis prepared-
ness, response and recovery so migrants can mitigate risks and take charge of their well-
being. 
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7. Promoting positive communication about migrants by emphasizing tolerance, non-dis-
crimination, openness and respect for migrants. 
8. Effective and increased engagement at local, national, regional and international levels 
will enhance the protection of migrants. 
9. Partnership, cooperation and coordination are essential between countries, private sector 
actors, international organizations, civil society, local communities and migrants be-
cause they promote trust, increase the effectiveness of limited resources and opportuni-
ties, and improve responses. 
10. Through regular and joint research, state science and innovation, private sector actors, 
international organizations and civil society can improve approaches, policies and tools 
to better protect migrants.44 
 
There were also fifteen guidelines prepared, which represent some suggestions, 
organized by theme, that identify in broad terms the actions needed to better protect 
migrants. Stakeholders can use these guidelines to inform and shape crisis prepared-
ness, emergency response, and post-crisis action. The Guidelines are as follows:  
 
1. Track information on conflicts and natural disasters, and potential impact on migrants. 
2. Collect and share information on migrants, subject to privacy, confidentiality, and the 
security and safety of migrants. 
3. Empower migrants to help themselves, their families, and communities during and after 
the crisis. 
4. Incorporate migrants In prevention, preparedness, and emergency response systems. 
5. Involve migrants in contingency planning and integrate their needs and capacities. 
6. Communicate effectively with migrants. 
7. Establish coordination agreements in advance to leverage strengths and trusts. 
8. Build capacity and learn lessons for emergency response and post-crisis action. 
9. Communicate widely, effectively, and often with migrants on evolving crises and how 
to crises and how to access help. 
10. Facilitate migrants' ability to move to safety. 
11. Provide humanitarian assistance to migrants without discrimination. 
12. Establish clear referral procedures among stakeholders. 
13. Relocate and evacuate migrants when needed. 
14. Address migrants' immediate needs and support migrants to rebuild lives. 
15. Support migrants' host communities. The Practices are a non-exhaustive selection of 
examples that illustrate ways to implement the Guidelines and address the needs of mi-
grants. They are based on existing practices as well as recommendations and can be 
adapted to suit particular contexts and priorities.45 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
In a world full of crises, conflicts and disasters, migrants will increasingly move 
either within or outside borders. Since mobility of people due to conflicts, natural 
hazards or environmental degradation cannot be avoided, measures should be prior-
itized to support lasting solutions aimed at solving the displacing problem in the least 
human-inducible way. Resettlement is one of the main challenges for reducing the 
risk of natural disasters. Appropriate measures to prevent disasters, including better 
understanding of threats, readiness, prevention (e.g. through data collection, early 
warning and awareness raising) will provide people with greater security which will 
encourage them to stay home. Where relocation is unavoidable, identification of 
places of refuge can mitigate its negative effects and enable evacuations, voluntary 
migration or planned relocation of the population. These measures must be taken 
into account before, during and after the occurrence of natural disasters or conflicts 
and include coordinated reconstruction phase.  
Humanitarian aid and protection systems without coordinated action will be in-
adequate and ineffective. Comprehensive and sustainable solutions will have to take 
into account the dimensions of migration, humanitarian solutions, development and 
security. International agencies, including the IOM, the UNHCR, the Red Cross, 
strengthen their cooperation to support states and migrants in addressing the current 
challenges of migration resulting from the complexity of crises. Key factors are: 
planning and preparing for the crisis, coordinating the actions during a crisis, and 
greater attention to long-term developmental implications. The Nansen and the 
MICIC initiatives share the similarity of being state-led consultative processes con-
cerned with establishing non-binding guidelines and identifying and disseminating 
best practices. While the Nansen Initiative launched its “Agenda for the Protection 
of cross-border displaced persons in the context of disasters and climate change” in 
2015, MICIC followed with the launch of its “Guidelines to protect migrants in 
countries experiencing conflict or natural disaster” in 2016. The main motivation for 
setting up the Nansen Initiative and its successor were gaps in existing international 
law, which does not address the needs of displaced people outside the borders in the 
context of disasters and climate changes. In this context, a possible approach is to 
create a broader systemic policy. Thanks to existing regulations, the state has the 
capacity to shape such situations – whether it is humanitarian catastrophe, evacuation 
and return, voluntary migration or planned relocation. Although the ideal result may 
be to avoid displacement at all, the planned mobility strategy will still be far more 
advantageous than hasty actions in the face of a catastrophe. Such strategies are not 
only intended to provide a safe passage and shelter but also to build resilience in the 
long run by providing access to education, employment and secure legal status. It is 
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therefore important that the Disaster Mobility Platform continue this forward-look-
ing perspective, taking care of the needs, rights and privileges of people and com-
munities. 
Finally, these initiatives are good examples for further actions that will help trans-
late proposed guidelines into international instruments. Global Compact on Migra-
tion provides an excellent opportunity to adapt these models to make progress on 
other issues; for example, on state efforts to develop guiding principles for migrants 
in difficult situations, as the New York Declaration suggests.46 
The Initiatives propose several solutions that states can take at national, regional 
and international level. The change in the current approach is that instead of calling 
for a binding international convention on cross-border disaster-displaced persons, 
the agenda fosters an approach that focuses on integrating effective practices by 
states and regional organizations in their own normative framework, in line with their 
specific situations and challenges. The findings were the result of years of detailed 
consultation, evidence gathering and discussion with various stakeholders from 
around the world. 
Both initiatives are inclusive, consulted with many governments, civil society 
and experts from over a hundred countries. They have launched a global dialogue on 
human mobility in the context of disasters and climate change to meet the needs of 
cross-border displaced people around the world. In addition, the Initiatives have re-
vealed regional diversity - not only in terms of the cross-border phenomenon itself, 
but also in terms of experience and response.Both conservation programs provide 
valuable toolsets for affected countries and other entities, presenting a comprehen-
sive picture of the phenomenon of cross-border catastrophe and displacement. 
 
 
 
 
46
 See New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants (2016). Resolution adopted by the Gen-
eral Assembly on 19 September 2016. United Nations A/RES/71/1. In addition to a potential state-
led effort, the Global Migration Group (GMG) has generated “Principles and Guidelines, supported 
by practical guidance, on the human rights protection of migrants in vulnerable situations within large 
and/or mixed movements”. 
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I. Six of One, Half a Dozen of the Other: the Inefficiency of Recognizing Refugee 
Status to Environmentally Displaced Persons (Mariana Ferolla Vallandro do 
Valle)  
 
This article seeks to analyse the concrete effects of proposals for expansion of 
refugee status to environmentally displaced persons and why transposing the norms 
of refugee law to provide a protection framework for these persons is not the appro-
priate solution. Firstly, we will briefly clarify why the concept of “environmental 
refugees” is not legally sound under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees. Secondly, it will be shown that, even if a category of environmental refu-
gees is recognised as legally binding, the protection regime of refugee law is not 
adequate to the needs of environmental migrants, due to the lack of political will of 
States to receive these persons, the temporary character of refugee status, and the 
fact that refugee law does not apply to internally displaced persons. Accordingly, 
even if refugee status is extended to environmental migrants, little will change re-
garding their effective protection, evincing the need for other solutions.  
 
 
II. State Responsibility for Climate Change under the UNFCCC Regime: Chal-
lenges and Opportunities for Prevention and Redress (Fulvia Staiano) 
 
Climate change is increasingly affecting human mobility worldwide. Environ-
mental degradation linked to this phenomenon undermines livelihood security, espe-
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cially for rural communities, who are then pushed to resort to migration as an adap-
tion strategy. Moreover, climate change causes natural disasters such as severe 
storms, floods and droughts, with the consequent displacement of affected popula-
tions. The pressing need to address these issues was also acknowledged by the Con-
ference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change on the occasion of the adoption of the 2016 Paris Agreement. The creation 
of a dedicated Task Force on Displacement and the framing of climate-change re-
lated displacement as loss and damage in this context constitute an acknowledgement 
that this phenomenon cannot be avoided or prevented through mitigation or adapta-
tion efforts. However, these developments do not settle a crucial question in this 
field, concerning state accountability and responsibility for causing environmental 
damage in breach of the UNFCCC regime and other sources of international envi-
ronmental law. This chapter focuses on such a matter, with specific reference to two 
main questions. First, it reflects on the allocation of responsibility for GHG emis-
sions, on the grounds of the causal links between the latter, climate change and hu-
man displacement. With this respect, it enquires on which type of responsibility, if 
any, is better suited to face questions of prevention and reparation for climate-change 
related events such as human displacement. Second, this chapter analyses the poten-
tial of international law principles - such as the prohibition of transboundary harm, 
the polluter pays principle and the precautionary principle - to provide protection and 
redress to persons displaced by climate change-related events.  
 
 
III. Environmental Migrants and the EU Immigration and Asylum Law: Is 
There any Chance for Protection? (Giuseppe Morgese) 
 
This contribution discusses some legal options aimed at protecting environmental 
migrants (EMs) within the EU, none of which however proves to be fully satisfactory 
mainly due to the lack of (at least) a European common legal definition. On the one 
hand, the legal framework for international protection according to the Qualification 
Directive has shown to be inadequate, insofar as neither refugee status nor subsidiary 
protection status are fit for purposes of EMs; also the Temporary Directive and the 
possibility of adopting temporary non-legislative measures according to Article 
78(3) TFUE look like unsatisfactory. On the other hand, humanitarian provisions in 
the Visa Code, the Schengen Borders Code and the Return Directive are not viable 
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legal instruments because they are non-mandatory for Member States. Furthermore, 
protection against removal orders according to relevant human rights law applicable 
in the EU is not a valid solution for all cases. Finally, it should be noted that reset-
tlement programmes, humanitarian admission schemes, private sponsorships and 
protection within Regional Development and Protection Programmes might be use-
ful only in specific cases. As a conclusion, we stress the need for a European ad hoc 
legal instrument dealing with every aspect of the protection of EMs. 
 
 
IV. Sudden-Onset Disasters, Human Displacement, and the Temporary Protec-
tion Directive: Space for a Promising Relationship? (Giovanni Sciaccaluga) 
 
This paper faces the question of environmental displacement through the lenses 
of EU asylum law, and, more specifically, by examining the potential application of 
directive 2001/55/CE (the Temporary Protection Directive, TPD) to persons fleeing 
environmental sudden-onset disasters. 
The TPD (never activated though adopted in 2001) is designed to grant temporary 
protection to entire category of persons massively migrating into the EU because of 
civil war, endemic violence, or systematic violations of human rights occurring in 
their home country. This paper shows on the one side that the TPD suffers both from 
substantive and procedural characteristics that render its possible activation in re-
sponse to civil wars and endemic violence extremely remote (at least in the current 
historical period). 
However, the TPD may be fit to protect persons fleeing sudden-onset natural dis-
asters, thus revealing itself one of the first supra-national legal frameworks able to 
face (at least one aspect) of the phenomenon of environmental displacement. The 
paper argues that EU Member States would presumably be more favourable to a 
TPD’s activation if they were to protect immigrants fleeing rapid-onset natural dis-
asters, since these cause damages that are restorable in a relatively brief period. 
Hence, the paper calls for some modifications of the directive with the view of ren-
dering it more specifically disaster-oriented. 
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V. The Protection of “Environmental Refugees” in Regional Contexts (Maria 
Vittoria Zecca) 
 
Despite the number of people forced to flee from their States due to environmen-
tal causes is steadily increasing over the past few decades, the general international 
law fails to recognize the so-called “environmental refugees” as an autonomous cat-
egory. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to focus on three different regional 
contexts, in order to assess the protection afforded to this category of people. A crit-
ical analisys of asylum regional instruments highlights different attempts to extend 
the notion of refugee present in the Geneva Convention. These attempts need a fur-
ther clarification and still can not provide an effective protection to the people fleeing 
from environmental degradation, but nevertheless they contain interesting aspects 
that should be studied in detail. 
 
 
VI. The UN Ocean Conference and the Low-Lying States Situation: Would the 
UN SD Goal 14 Suffice to Avoid a Migratory Emergency? (Ana Carolina Barbosa 
Pereira Matos, Tarin Cristino Frota Mont’Alverne) 
 
For Island Nations the ocean has always been a friend, however in the last dec-
ades this friend has also been a foe, seeing that for these States one of the most im-
portant United Nations - UN Sustainable Development - SD Goal is Goal 14 “Con-
serve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable de-
velopment”, but is the implementation of this goal enough to save these countries? 
When we think about countries severally affected by climate change, the most re-
called examples are from the Low-lying States. These countries are, literally, sinking 
owing to the global warming effects, such as the melting of polar ice and rising sea 
levels. Inasmuch they depend on the oceans to survive, it is expected that the same 
oceans will cause their extinction. In June 2017, the first UN Ocean Conference took 
place, aimed at adopting by consensus an intergovernmental agreed declaration in 
the form of a call for action to support the implementation of Goal 14. The outcome 
of the Conference was the adoption of the declaration entitled “Our ocean, our future: 
call for action”. In the light of the fact that the Low-lying Nations are the most vul-
nerable to the effects of the unsustainable use of the oceans, it is urgent to analyze if 
the adoption of this declaration will help them survive and deal with an imminent 
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catastrophe, that could lead to inevitable migration flows. This study sought to ex-
amine the important outcomes from the UN Ocean Conference and its impact on the 
situation of Low-lying Nations, what to expect from the Conference's call for action, 
and if this will be enough to avoid a migration emergency. The research methodology 
adopted in this paper will be qualitative, explanatory, and will be developed through 
a bibliographic and documentary analysis. At the end of this research, we concluded 
that this Conference’s focus was on measures to increase resilience and restore the 
living conditions of marine resources. However, the importance of such measures 
for the Low-lying countries can’t be denied, since the majority of their population, 
as well as their governments, understand that migratory measures should be treated 
as a last resort.  
 
 
VII. The Nansen Initiative and the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative: New 
Frameworks for More Effective Migrants Protection (Patrycja Magdalena Zgoła) 
 
A consultative process launched in 2014 developed a consensus on a global pro-
gram on the protection of migrants in the areas affected by military conflicts or nat-
ural disasters. The Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in 
the Context of Disasters and Climate (the “Nansen Initiative” which gave birth to the 
Disaster Displacement Platform), and the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative 
(MICIC) have made progress at the margins of improving overall conditions for mi-
grants by dealing with topics such as migrants affected by natural hazard-induced 
crises and people displaced across borders by disasters. These Initiatives have devel-
oped guidelines, that provide specific and practical instructions for stakeholders at 
local, national, regional and international level. These non-binding and voluntary 
principles, guidelines and practices define the roles and responsibilities of various 
stakeholders on immigrants in countries in crisis and provide clear guidance on how 
to prepare and respond to crises. 
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